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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Christian Fuchs and David Chandler
1. Introduction
In May 2017, The Economist’s front cover headlined a feature on Big Data titled 
‘The World’s Most Valuable Resource’. The feature argued that data is the world’s 
new oil. Data would drive development in the twenty-first century in the same 
way as oil transformed the world’s economy and society in the early twentieth 
century. Such popular discourses claim that Big Data enables new ways of gen-
erating knowledge that will lead to innovative and creative possibilities.
In the same month as The Economist ran this feature on Big Data, we organ-
ised the interdisciplinary symposium ‘Digital Objects, Digital Subjects: Activ-
ism, Research & Critique in the Age of Big Data Capitalism’ at the University of 
Westminster (May 20-21, 2017)1. The symposium was hosted by the Westmin-
ster Institute for Advanced Studies and the Department of Politics and Interna-
tional Relations. It featured ten presentations by leading international experts 
on the study of the digital in politics, the economy and society. This edited 
collection is a product of the conference, and provides further reflections on 
the presentations given.
We especially thank Denise Rose Hansen from the Westminster Institute for 
Advanced Studies, who brilliantly managed the organisation of the conference 
and supported us in bringing this book to publication. We also thank Andrew 
Lockett from University of Westminster Press for his interest in publishing this 
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book and his editorial help. We are also grateful to our colleagues from the 
Communication and Media Research Institute and the Centre for the Study 
of Democracy who have acted as chairs and respondents, as well as to the 
speakers, contributors, volunteers, interpreters, technicians and administrators 
whose work helped to make the conference a big success.
Many claims have been made about the emergence of a ‘digital turn’ that is said to 
have radically transformed the possibilities for politics by undermining traditional 
modernist binaries of subject/object, state/society, politics/economics, public/ 
private, consumption/production, time/space, mind/body, labour/leisure, culture/
nature, human/posthuman. This turn has run through several phases, including 
cybernetics, automation technologies, mainframe computers, databases, artificial 
intelligence, personal computers, the World Wide Web, smart phones, geographical 
information systems, social media, targeted digital advertising, self-quantification, 
Big Data analytics, Cloud computing and the Internet of Things.
This collected volume presents interdisciplinary assessments of the digital’s 
impact on society. The contributions interrogate the claims of both digital 
 optimism and digital pessimism. Digital optimists assert that digital techno-
logies have radically transformed the world, promising new forms of commu-
nity, alternative ways of knowing and sensing, creative innovation, participatory 
culture, networked activism and distributed democracy. Digital pessimists ar-
gue that digital technologies have not brought about positive change, but have 
rather deepened and extended domination through new forms of control. 
The pessimists speak of networked authoritarianism, digital dehumanisation, 
 alienation 2.0, networked exploitation and the rise of the surveillance society.
The chapters engage with questions of the digital in respect to activism, re-
search and critique. They engage with the possibilities, potentials, pitfalls, limits 
and ideologies of digital activism. They reflect on whether computational social 
science, the digital humanities and ubiquitous datafication enable new research 
approaches or result in a digital positivism that threatens the independence of 
critical research and is likely to bring about about the death of the social sci-
ences and humanities. The volume explores the futures, places and possibilities 
of critique in the age of digital subjects and digital objects.
The main question this book asks is: what are the key implications of the digi-
tal for subjects, objects and society? This question is examined through three 
lenses: digital capitalism/Big Data capitalism, digital labour, and digital politics. 
These three perspectives form three sections in the book. Each section consists 
of six chapters: three presentations each followed by a comment or response. 
The first section focuses on society in its totality as digital capitalism. Digital 
capitalism exists wherever capitalist society is shaped by computer technologies. 
In recent years, Big Data has become an important aspect of digital capitalism, 
leading to the emergence of a new dimension of Big Data capitalism. The three 
contributions by David Chandler, Christian Fuchs and Paul Rekret, as well as the 
three comments (Christian Fuchs’ comments on David Chandler,  Chandler’s on 
Fuchs, Robert Cowley’s on Paul Rekret) focus on digital capitalism in general, as 
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well as aspects of Big Data. Chandler discusses how Big Data capitalism brings 
about a new form of digital governmentality focused on correlation. Fuchs ar-
gues that Karl Marx helps us to critically understand digital capitalism and Big 
Data capitalism. Paul Rekret criticises the posthumanist approaches of Donna 
Haraway and Bruno Latour in the context of digital  capitalism.
When analysing capitalism critically, we are dealing – as the subtitle of Marx’s 
opus magnum Capital indicates – with the critique of political economy. Politi-
cal economy has an economic side and a political dimension, and these inter-
act. Sections II and III approach digital political economy. Section II focuses on 
digital labour and Section III gives attention to digital politics.
The three chapters in Section II – by Kylie Jarrett, Phoebe Moore and Jack L. 
Qiu – focus on a range of issues concerning labour and class in the digital age: 
the digital houseworker (Jarrett), the digital worker’s quantified self (Moore), 
and slavery in the digital age (Qiu). Joanna Boehnert comments on Kylie 
 Jarrett, Elisabetta Brighi on Phoebe Moore, and Peter Goodwin on Jack L. Qiu.
The three chapters in Section III – by Jodi Dean, Paolo Gerbaudo and Toni 
Negri – discuss aspects of digital politics, namely social movements in the con-
text of communicative capitalism (Dean), political parties in the digital age 
(Gerbaudo), and the question of how social struggles can advance digital alter-
natives (Negri). Paulina Tambakaki comments on Jodi Dean, Anastasia Kavada 
on Paolo Gerbaudo, and Christian Fuchs on Toni Negri.
Taken together, the three sections, with their nine presentations and accom-
panying comments show that we face a contradiction of subjects and objects 
in contemporary digital capitalism, and that structures of domination and ex-
ploitation threaten social cohesion and democracy. Digital domination and the 
exploitation of digital labour are the hegemonic structural forces shaping digi-
tal capitalism. But the situation is not hopeless, because there are potentials for 
struggles that can establish alternatives. For example, potentials for establishing 
a society of the digital commons are emerging within digital capitalism. Toni 
Negri, in his contribution, therefore asks how we can politically appropriate 
digital machines. The interest in advancing the digital commons and establish-
ing a society of the commons is a political perspective that holds together many 
of the contributions to this book.
In the remainder of this introduction to the collected volume, we will discuss 
the relationship of digital subjects and digital objects (Section 2) and the notion 
of Big Data capitalism (Section 3), which form the background and context of 
the nine presentations and responses in this book.
2. Digital Subjects/Digital Objects
This volume engages with the changes that objects and subjects are under going 
in digital society. It asks what are the key implications of Big Data and the digi-
tal for subjects, objects and society.
4 Digital Objects, Digital Subjects
Computing and digitality are not exclusively phenomena of the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries. Digital logic has a much longer history. Already in 1703, 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz suggested basing mathematics, not on the decimal 
system, but on binary logic: ‘But instead of the progression of tens, I have for 
many years used the simplest progression of all, which proceeds by twos, hav-
ing found that it is useful for the perfection of the science of numbers. Thus I 
use no other characters in it bar 0 and 1, and when reaching two, I start again’ 
(Leibniz 1703, np). In the history of computing, pioneering work was done 
by Charles Babbage and Ada Lovelace in the nineteenth century. Babbage and 
Lovelace were ahead of their time because the technological standards of the 
nineteenth century were focused on what Marx (1867/1976) termed large-scale 
industry, rather than building a computer. Computing devices as we know them 
today go back to Alan Turing’s concept of the Turing Machine that he invented 
in 1936. The digital logic of zeros and ones is a key feature of the way a Turing 
Machine operates. During the Second World War, Turing built  computers for 
the British military in order to decipher the Nazis’ encoded messages. In this 
light, the Second World War was not merely a war of military might, but also 
the first computational and digital war.
The example of the Turing Machine indicates that computing and the digital 
always stand in a broader social, political, economic and ideological context. 
Today, digital computing is ubiquitous and shapes all aspects of contemporary 
life, including capitalism, governance, everyday life, culture, education, welfare 
and science.
Technologies have always impacted human capacities. We cannot, therefore, 
easily separate technological objects from human subjects. The computer, the 
digital machine, has from its beginning changed the way subjects act and in-
teract in the world. In the history of warfare, we have gone from hand-to-hand 
combat to killing at a distance through computerised technologies that enable 
smart bombs, killer robots, drone assassinations and pre-emptive warfare. 
These technologies do not only make warfare more distanced in space and 
time, but they also distance it morally. The example of digital warfare shows us 
that digital machines change the way subjects and objects relate to each other 
and are constituted.
This edited collection focuses on the latest stage of digital life and the digital 
transformation of society. We call this latest stage ‘Big Data capitalism’. Algo-
rithms that generate Big Data have today become central to political and ethical 
concerns, but there is no clear consensus on the distinctiveness of algorithmic 
knowledge.
The United Nations argues that Big Data analytics are central to solving 
the world’s most pressing problems, from food shortages to conflicts and en-
vironmental crises. For example, the UN Global Pulse project developed a 
model of real-time food price changes by collecting and analysing more than 
40,000  tweets about food prices in Jakarta, Indonesia. Less altruistically, Big 
Data is also crucial for Facebook and its users who share over 5 billion posts and 
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upload more than 300 million images per day. More than 500,000  comments 
are posted per minute. Facebook’s 2016 advertising profits of US$ 10.2 billion 
were generated by targeting users based on the analysis of Big Data generated 
through users’ activities and content.
‘Smart cities’ like London and Barcelona deploy Big Data analytics to more 
efficiently administer these urban complexes. Transport for London (TfL) cap-
tures and analyses 20 million Oyster travel card taps per day in order to manage 
traffic flows and innovate transportation. In Barcelona, more than 20,000 smart 
meters are installed on bins, streetlights and other pieces of infrastructure, col-
lecting socio-environmental Big Data. At Walmart, the world’s largest company 
with a turnover of almost half a trillion US dollars per year, an analytics team 
analyses hundreds of data streams in real time, including customer data, sales 
data, meteorological data, social media data and event and location data, all 
with a view to responding rapidly to emerging trends and thereby increasing 
sales and catering to its customers’ perceived needs.
These examples, in the areas of disaster risk (UN Global Pulse), media and 
communication (Facebook), smart cities (Transport for London) and business 
(Walmart), demonstrate the vast amount, variety and speed of data collection 
and analysis. Big Data has transformed our ways of knowing in different fields, 
and algorithmic knowledge is impacting on everyday practices and processes. 
This book aims to clarify what is at stake when knowledge, subjects, objects and 
society become digital and algorithmic. Algorithmic detection of correlations 
across time and space enables Big Data approaches to operate in ‘real-time’ sce-
narios, as in the examples of food prices in Jakarta, TfL’s data management of 
traffic, Facebook’s advertising practices, and Walmart’s retailing strategies.
Although there is no agreed definition of what Big Data means, it tends to be 
understood as being related to volume, variety and velocity (Kitchin 2014, 68). 
Big Data’s volume refers to datasets so large that they cannot be processed and 
analysed by humans but only by machine-driven algorithms. There is a wide 
variety of sources and types of Big Data. Big Data has a high velocity: it is pro-
duced, circulated and acted upon in real time, and at very high speeds.
Connected digital devices such as CCTV, drone cameras, Internet of Things 
sensors, Twitter, Google, Facebook, smartphones, UN Global Pulse technolo-
gies, smart city technologies, news feeds, weather report stations, demographic 
and population data collectors, price and economic data tools, or Walmart’s 
data collection methods, create constant streams of data. Algorithmic knowl-
edge enables Big Data analytics that are produced by correlating these data 
streams to identify and analyse patterns of occurrences that enable new under-
standings and ways of seeing the world.
In philosophy, the rationalist tradition saw knowledge as existing in fixed 
causal relations and in fixed properties or essences of entities that were inde-
pendent of and prior to experience, while empiricism argued that knowledge 
was experiential, contextual and obtained through the human sense organs. It 
was Immanuel Kant who advanced an epistemology that stressed the importance 
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of the distinction between rational knowledge and sensual knowledge. ‘To the 
extent to which knowledge is subject to the laws of sensuousness it is sensuous; 
to the extent to which it is subject to the laws of intelligence it is intellectual or 
rational’ (Kant 1770, 50). Algorithmic knowledge undermines this distinction.
The algorithm is a notion found in mathematics and computing that has long 
been associated with the pursuit of rational forms of knowledge. ‘An algorithm 
is a reliable, definable procedure for solving a problem. The idea of the algo-
rithm goes back to the beginnings of mathematics’ (Henderson 2009, 7). Today, 
algorithms not only calculate existing data but also develop new forms of ‘sen-
sual’ or ‘empirical’ knowledge by finding correlations. Algorithmic knowledge 
seeks to find patterns and relationships, enabling new ways of seeing, sensing, 
responding and adapting to life in its complex emergence.
In this process, the Kantian distinction between rational knowledge ob-
tained through the brain’s reflective capacity, and experiential knowledge ob-
tained through the sense organs, breaks down. Digital machines generate Big 
Data through sensors, and thereby simulate and automate human experience. 
At the same time, ethical rationality is increasingly perceived as residing in 
machines, which results in automated decision-making. Knowing and sensing 
seem to become a unified algorithmic procedure that resides across the human/ 
machinic divide. This volume takes a deeper look at digital transformations 
and asks what their consequences are for our understanding of what subjects 
and objects are, and how they operate in society.
Big Data studies is a rapidly expanding research field (see Mayer-Schönberger 
and Cukier 2013, Kitchin 2014, Mosco 2014) that deals with how Big Data and 
algorithmic knowledge transform the economy, politics, culture and the envi-
ronment. This growing volume of research is matched by publications about Big 
Data. In the summer of 2017, Web of Science listed approximately 5,800  articles 
published in the years 2014, 2015, 2016 that have ‘Big Data’ in their titles. Impor-
tant fields where Big Data research has had an impact include disaster research, 
media/communication studies, smart cities, and management and organisation 
studies.
In disaster research, Big Data is increasingly deployed to predict and pre-
vent disasters and minimise their impacts on humans and nature. Big Data is 
also used in disaster response, where Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (also called 
drones) gather data about disaster sites, while machine-learning algorithms 
identify patterns in disaster-related data. Digital humanitarianism is increas-
ingly deployed before and after disasters. Digital humanitarianism ‘examines 
how new uses of technology and vast quantities of digital data are transforming 
the way societies prepare for, respond to, cope with, and ultimately understand 
humanitarian disasters’ (Meier 2015, xi). In disaster and political research, Big 
Data analytics and new information technologies are increasingly perceived 
as essential when it comes to dealing with a wide range of international issues, 
such as development (Coyle and Meier 2009), conflict (Karlsrud 2014, USIP 
2013, Himelfarb 2014) and natural disasters (Meier 2015). Big Data analytics 
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are key to the implementation of the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals: ‘More diverse, integrated, timely and trustworthy information 
can lead to better decision-making and real-time citizen feedback. This in turn 
enables individuals, public and private institutions, and companies to make 
choices that are good for them and for the world they live in (UN 2014)’. The 
United Nations has called for ‘a data revolution for sustainable development’, 
arguing that ‘improving data is a development agenda in its own right’, and that 
the divides between rich and poor can be mitigated through the provision of 
more data that will enable more efficient adaptation to the emergence of prob-
lems at all levels of society (UN 2014). Indeed, the ‘data gap’ is increasingly held 
to be the cause of growing inequalities (Stuart et al. 2015).
In media and communication studies, Big Data is used for generating new un-
derstandings of political, economic and everyday life through communication 
on Twitter, Facebook and other social media platforms. Big Data has changed 
human communication’s actors, structures, systems, contents, effects, contexts, 
and power structures. boyd and Crawford (2012) argue that Big Data creates 
challenges and opportunities for communication research, knowledge, research 
ethics and power structures. Communication research about Big Data has, 
for example, focused on online agenda-setting and online attention (Neuman 
et al. 2014), Big Data analytics in targeted online advertising (Couldry & Turow 
2014), Big Data’s aspects of communication power (Andrejevic 2014), data jour-
nalism (Fink & Anderson 2015), automated text extraction and classification as 
tools for measuring culture (Bail 2014), the analysis of political communication 
during election campaigns (Larsson & Moe 2012), and the prediction of users’ 
attitudes and behaviours (such as their political affiliation, see Colleoni et al. 
2014). In 2014, the journal Big Data & Society was founded. Between 2014 and 
2016 it published more than 130 articles, demonstrating that Big Data com-
munication research is a booming sub-field of media/communication studies.
The study of smart cities and citizen sensors analyses how Big Data is trans-
forming urban life (Greenfield 2013, Kitchin 2014, Krivy 2016, Thrift 2014, 
Townsend 2013). The development and application of Big Data is driving a 
transformation in the understanding of city governance and planning. This 
transformation is taking place with the aid of ubiquitous sensing technology, 
often termed the Internet of Things, whereby digital devices connected to 
every day objects, such as roads, litterbins and street lights, enable new forms of 
city management. Much of the research into these applications of Big Data ar-
gues that new digital technologies can enable citizens and governments to con-
nect in more meaningful ways, empower communities, distribute knowledge, 
and allow better control over public goods and services. Already the majority 
of the world’s population live in cities, and by 2050 it is projected that 75% of 
the global population will be urban. Many cities around the world are seeking 
to become ‘smart’ by using networked, digital technologies and urban Big Data 
to tackle a range of issues, such as improving governance and service deliv-
ery, creating more resilient critical infrastructure, growing the local economy, 
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becoming more sustainable, improving mobility, offering greater transparency 
and accountability for collective activities, enhancing the quality of life, and 
increasing safety and security. In short, the desire is to use digital technology 
to improve the lives of citizens, advance city management and foster economic 
development.
In the field of management and organisation studies, Big Data is deployed 
for understanding consumers and users’ individual preferences, tastes, life-
styles, behavioural choices, attitudes, interests, and so on. This application 
of Big Data to the individual enables differentiated pricing and targeted and 
personalised advertising. Big Data also transforms every aspect of the pro-
duction process, including the surveillance of employees and the monitoring 
and datafication of products, transport and logistics. Big Data is also used for 
understanding and predicting the development of financial markets. George 
et al. (2014) argue that Big Data enables organisations to identity new mar-
kets and products, gather new management knowledge, and track members 
of workgroups. Other research focuses on how to use Big Data for manag-
ing a product’s lifecycle (Li et al. 2015) as well as managing the supply chain 
(Hazen et al. 2014). Google’s chief economist Hal R. Varian (2014) argues 
that Big Data analytics should be used as a standard research method in eco-
nomics (see also Einav & Levin 2014). Another strand of research has been 
termed consumer analytics (Erevelles et al. 2016). This focuses on the analy-
sis of consumer interests and satisfaction, and on identifying brand strategies 
(Tirunillai & Tellis 2014).
Even this brief summary shows that Big Data research is a rapidly growing 
research field. At the same time, however, it is highly fragmented. Big Data 
researchers are often preoccupied with their complex data collection and analy-
sis processes. They rarely find the time or opportunity to reflect on the broad 
changes that theory, methodologies, knowledge and society are undergoing 
in the age of algorithmic knowledge. This collection seeks to rectify this gap 
through surveying the application of Big Data and new forms of algorithmic 
governance through the lenses of digital capitalism, labour, and politics. 
The former editor of Wired magazine, Chris Anderson, famously claimed 
that Big Data and the development of algorithmic knowledge puts an end 
to  the need for theory, causal modelling and hypothesising: ‘With enough 
data, the numbers speak for themselves […] [When] faced with massive data, 
this [traditional] approach to science – hypothesize, model, test – is becoming 
obsolete’ (Anderson, 2008). Big Data promises an epistemological revolution. 
It is claimed that Big Data will make existing methodological approaches in 
the social and natural sciences obsolete, and will mean the death of theory. At 
any rate Big Data, with its focus on context and revealing unseen relations, is 
increasingly breaking down disciplinary boundaries.
Savage and Burrows (2007) discuss how research methods, theories and epis-
temologies have changed in the age of Big Data. They argue that ‘the repertoires’ 
of research methods ‘need to be rethought’ so that there is ‘greater reflection on 
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[…] the proliferation of social data gathered by others […] [and] a radical mix-
ture of methods coupled with renewed critical reflection’ (Savage and Burrows 
2007, 895–896). Evgeny Morozov (2014) points out that Big Data also poses 
fundamental challenges to ethics and political regulation: ‘Why rely on laws 
when one has sensors and feedback mechanisms? If policy interventions are to 
be – to use the buzzwords of the day – ‘evidence-based’ and ‘results-oriented,’ 
technology is here to help.’ Savage and Burrows stress the importance of Big 
Data methodologies, whereas Morozov (2014) reminds us of the political and 
ethical implications of algorithmic knowledge.
The diverse processes that constitute digital transformations and Big Data 
capitalism have not been adequately engaged with in terms of their episte-
mological, ontological and ethical implications. This volume seeks to address 
this deficiency through nine presentations and responses, which collectively 
use and develop conceptual tools from the fields of critical political economy, 
governmentality studies, political theory and communication theory. Political 
economy is ‘a distinct way of understanding how economies work and how 
they interact with the larger societies around them’ (Wolff and Resnick 2012, 
1). Governmentality studies is a field of inquiry that analyses ‘any method of 
government’ (Foucault 2008, 13), ‘the development of real governmental prac-
tice’ and its rationalisation in ‘the exercise of sovereignty’ (22).
This volume provides an overview of the difference that digital and Big Data 
capitalism has made to politics, activism and theory. It engages with key episte-
mological, ontological and ethical questions arising from the transformations 
of digital subjects and objects. These questions include the following:
• How does the digital impact the logic of governance and power?
• How does the digital change the nature of knowledge and the understand-
ing of causation?
• How does the digital deal with new problems of uncertainty, risk, complex-
ity and unpredictability?
• How does the digital impact critique, activism and political organisation?
• How does the digital interact with changes within capitalism and labour?
• How can critical theories explain the role of the digital in society?
• How does the digital impact reproduction and gender relations?
• How does the digital change the relationship between culture and nature, as 
well as between humans and their environment? How does the digital shape 
the Anthropocene?
3. Big Data Capitalism 2
Although most observers of society will agree that capitalism concerns the ac-
cumulation of capital, there is no general agreement on how to define capital or 
who produces it. Marx (1867) and Marxists tend to argue that capital is money 
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that is increased through exploitation of labour and the sale of commodities. 
Followers of Bourdieu (1986) argue that capital is more general, extending to 
the realms of politics and culture. Bourdieu distinguishes between economic, 
political/social and cultural capital, and also uses the notion of symbolic capi-
tal, which he claims interacts with all other forms of capital.
No matter how one defines capital and capitalism, many scholars and observ-
ers agree that capitalism is a societal formation that is based on the logic of the 
accumulation of money and power. It tries to instrumentalise everything for 
this purpose, and therefore produces a highly instrumental society based on 
what Horkheimer (2004) terms instrumental reason.
If capitalism is a societal formation, then digital capitalism may be a stage 
and phase of its development and/or a dimension and mode of the production 
of life and society. In turn, Big Data capitalism is a way of signifying the latest 
development of the digital within the broader context of the economy, politics, 
culture, ideology, domination and exploitation.
The basic sociological question concerning the digital asks at what level of capi-
talism and society we should situate digital transformations. We can speak of four 
main positions. The first argues that the digital constitutes a radical transforma-
tion of society, such that we no longer live in a capitalist or modern society, but 
in a radically new type of society. So for example Nico Stehr (1994) argues that 
the knowledge society means that ‘the age of labor and property is at an end’ 
(iix), and that the ‘emergence of knowledge societies signals first and foremost a 
radical transformation in the structure of the economy’ (10) and, as a result, the 
‘emergence of a new structure and organization of economic activity’ (122). For 
Manuel Castells, writing at the turn of the millennium, the rise of the ‘network 
society’ means that a ‘new world is taking shape’ (Castells 2000, 367). Castells also 
argues that the ‘information technology revolution induced the emergence of in-
formationalism, as the material foundation of a new society’ (Castells 2000, 367).
The second, more critical, position argues that information society dis-
course is a neoliberal ideology that presents information technology as con-
stituting a radically new society, one which promotes techno-optimism and 
techno-determinism. Garnham (1998/2004, 165), for example says that infor-
mation society theory is ‘the favoured legitimating ideology for the dominant 
economic and political powerholders’. Walter Runciman (1993, 65) argues that 
‘it cannot be claimed that any new sub-type of the capitalist mode of produc-
tion has emerged […] ‘Terms such as ‘managerial’ capitalism, or ‘late’ capital-
ism, or ‘finance’ capitalism, or ‘corporatist’ capitalism have all generated more 
confusion than illumination’ (Runciman 1993, 54; see also Freedman 2002).
This sceptical line of thought, while recognising that society has undergone 
profound changes, questions the assumption that we live in a radically new 
society. There is, however, also a variety within this approach. So, third, we 
find positions that argue that digital capitalism is the dominant dimension or 
type of contemporary capitalism. And fourth, there are positions that argue 
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that digital society/capitalism is a form or development that is subsumed under 
other modes of capitalist development.
The third type of argument argues that digital capitalism is the dominant di-
mension or type of contemporary capitalism. This assumption can be found in 
approaches that speak of cognitive capitalism. Cognitive capitalism theory has 
been advanced in particular by autonomist Marxist approaches. Yann Moulier- 
Boutang (2011) argues that cognitive capitalism is ‘founded on the accumula-
tion of immaterial capital, the dissemination of knowledge and the driving role 
of the knowledge economy’ (50). ‘We can distinguish three principal configura-
tions in the history of capitalism: first, mercantile capitalism, which was based 
on the hegemony of mechanisms of merchant and finance accumulation and 
developed between the start of the sixteenth century and the end of the seven-
teenth. Next came industrial capitalism, which was based on the accumulation 
of physical capital and the driving role of the large Manchester-style factory in 
mass-producing standardised goods. Then came cognitive capitalism’ (50) as 
the ‘third type of capitalism’ (56).
Jean-Marie Monnier and Carlo Vercellone (2010) argue that cognitive capi-
talism is ‘a new historical system of accumulation’, in which ‘the cognitive 
and intellectual dimensions of labour take on an increasingly important role 
and displace the previous centrality of fixed capital and material labour’ (76). 
‘[I]ndustrial capitalism succeeded mercantile capitalism, and then gave rise to 
a new historical system of accumulation called cognitive capitalism’ (76). ‘Cog-
nitive capitalism is the result of a restructuring process through which capital 
attempts to control collective conditions of knowledge production and tends to 
absorb and redirect its energy toward a new logic of capital accumulation’ (83).
Toni Negri (2008) speaks of ‘the era of cognitive capitalism’ that followed 
‘the phase of manufacturing and the subsequent phase of heavy industry. In 
this cognitive era the production of value depends increasingly on creative 
intellectual activity’ (64). ‘[I]mmaterial labor power (involved in communica-
tion, cooperation, and the production and reproduction of affects) occupies 
an increasingly central position in both the schema of capitalist production 
and the composition of the proletariat’ (Hardt and Negri 2000, 53). Immaterial 
 labour constitutes ‘a third and current paradigm in which providing services 
and manipulating information are at the heart of economic production’ (Hardt 
and Negri 2000, 280). The ‘dominant figures of property in the contemporary 
era – including code, images, cultural products, patents, knowledge, and the 
like – are largely immaterial and, more important, indefinitely reproducible’ 
(Hardt and Negri 2017, 187). Toni Negri characterises the digital aspects of im-
material production as a digital assemblage (see his contribution to this book).
For Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi, the move to digital capitalism ‘marks a shift from 
the cognitive model of conjunctive concatenation to a model of connective 
concatenation’ (2015, 11), by which he means a negation of embodied experi-
ence. Thus ‘with the digital, we have reached the end-point of this process of 
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increasing abstraction, and an apex in the increasing dissociation of under-
standing from empathy’ (17). This is of fundamental importance in under-
standing algorithmic governance through the reduction of the world to code 
and the digitalisation of the sign. For Beradi, the contemporary stage of capital-
ism is ‘semiocapitalism’, where language and economy combine. This is because 
any kind of production (whether material and immaterial) is a process of ‘com-
bination and recombination of information (algorithms, figures, digital differ-
ences)’ (113). Therefore, in this new stage, ‘digital abstraction adds a second 
layer to capitalist abstraction’’ (161). In this process of abstraction (following 
Baudrillard), signs proliferate and interact, losing any links to their original 
referents or meanings.
Berardi makes the important point that Big Data capitalism has implica-
tions for governance, in that the ‘abstract concatenation of technical functions 
replaces conscious elaboration, social negotiation, and democratic decision’ 
(Berardi 2015, 217). In other words, ‘the automatic connection of a-signifying 
segments replaces the dialogic elaboration of an order, and adaptation replaces 
consensus’ (Berardi 2015, 217). Algorithmic governance responds or adapts to 
perturbations and changes through pattern recognition rather than the crea-
tion of knowledge or an act of interpretation.
This separation or alienation from embodied processes of creativity and 
judgement is also taken up in Maurizio Lazzarato’s (2014) Signs and Machines. 
Lazzarato argues that Big Data capitalism can be understood as the production 
of subjectivity through machinic enslavement, a concept he takes from Deleuze 
and Guattari: an assemblage, which ‘no longer distinguishes between human 
and non-human, subject and object, or words and things’ (Lazzarato 2014, 13). 
By ‘enslavement’, Lazzarato means the cybernetic conception of automated 
governance, control and regulation, ‘ensuring the cohesion and equilibrium of 
the functioning whole’ (25). In this process, the human does not stand separate 
to or above the machine, but is contiguous with machines and inside machinic 
processes, as one more molecular component to be combined and recombined 
with others.
For Lazzarato, the rise of digital capitalism means that ‘one always acts within 
an assemblage, a collective, where machines, objects and signs are at the same 
time “agents’’’ (30). Capitalism is thus a ‘semiotic operator’ managing the flow 
of asignifying signs (without a subject as referent) which act directly on mate-
rial flows: ‘The sign machines of money, economics, science, technology, art, 
and so on, function in parallel or independently because they produce or con-
vey meaning and in this way bypass language, significations, and representa-
tion’ (60). Lazzarato also identifies transformative effects that produce Being 
and go beyond the Anthropocene. In this context he draws on the work of 
Bruno Latour:
Through asignifying semiotics machines ‘speak’, ‘express themselves’, 
and ‘communicate’ with man, other machines, and ‘real’ phenomena. 
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Through ‘power signs’ they interact with the expression and content of 
the atomic and chemical strata of matter, the biological strata of liv-
ing being […] Machines and asignifying semiotics are able to ‘see’ these 
strata, ‘hear’ them, ‘smell’ them, record them, order them, and tran-
scribe them, something that is impossible for human senses and lan-
guage. (87–88)
In the new forms of being and thought instantiated by digital capitalism, the 
subject is no longer interpolated as homo oeconomicus – a rational reflective 
subject. For Lazzarato, ‘we have moved beyond ‘“cognitive capitalism’’’ (100) 
and its privileging of dualistic linguistic and representational constructions of 
digital objects and digital subjects. Instead, we must take into full account the 
shift from ‘work’ to ‘process’ and from ‘subjection’ to ‘enslavement’ (119).
David Harvey is a representative of the fourth type of argument in relation 
to the question at what level of capitalism and society digital transformations 
should be situated. He has characterised contemporary capitalism as a regime 
of flexible accumulation (Harvey 1989), a new imperialism (Harvey 2003) and 
a form of neoliberal capitalism (Harvey 2005) that are based on the processes 
of accumulation by dispossession and financialisation. These constitute poten-
tials for actual crisis because real accumulation diverges from the accumula-
tion of fictitious capital. Digital technologies within this overall transformation 
of capitalism play, for Harvey, a mediating role. They are tools of time-space 
compression. ‘I use the word ‘compression’ because a strong case can be made 
that the history of capitalism has been characterized by speed-up in the pace of 
life, while so overcoming spatial barriers that the world sometimes seems to 
collapse inwards upon us’ (Harvey 1989, 240). For Harvey, these transformed 
conditions of capitalism require and call forth the development of digital 
technologies: ‘Computerization and electronic communications have pressed 
home the significance of instantaneous international coordination of financial 
flows’ (Harvey 1989, 161). ‘The production of space examines how new sys-
tems (actual or imagined) of land use, transport and communications, terri-
torial organization, etc. are produced, and how new modes of representation 
(e.g. information technology, computerized mapping, or design) arise’ (Harvey 
1989, 222).
In his most recent work Marx, Capital and the Madness of Economic Rea­
son, Harvey (2017) elaborates on the role of the digital in contemporary cap-
italism. ‘What was initially conceived as a liberatory regime of collaborative 
production of an open access commons has been transformed into a regime 
of hyper-exploitation upon which capital freely feeds. The unrestrained pil-
lage by big capital (like Amazon and Google) of the free goods produced by a 
self-skilled labour force has become a major feature of our times. This carries 
over into the so-called cultural industries’ (Harvey 2017, 96). ‘It is also interest-
ing that some of the most vigorous sectors of development in our times – like 
Google and Facebook and the rest of the digital labour sector – have grown 
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very fast on the back of free labour’ (Harvey 2017, 102). ‘Factory labour still 
dominates in some parts of the world (e.g. East Asia) but in North America and 
Europe it is much diminished and replaced by various other labour systems 
(digital labour and the like)’ (Harvey 2017, 57).
Harvey acknowledges the relevance of digital labour and digital capital today, 
but at the same time cautions against assuming that they constitute a new stage 
of development. He stresses the continued relevance of physical labour and 
the old inequality between capital and labour within the digital industries, as 
well as within capitalism as a whole. ‘In the case of digital labour, for example, 
labour practices have emerged that are uncannily similar to the putting out 
system of early textile manufacturing in Britain in the late eighteenth century’ 
(Harvey 2017, 104). This adds up to a redefinition of capital:
as money in motion rather than value in motion. Such a redefinition 
facilitates concentration on the churning speculative market in property 
rights to culture, knowledge and entrepreneurial endeavours as well as 
to the widespread practices of speculation in asset markets as the dis-
tinctive form of contemporary capitalism. Hence the claim that we are 
entering a new phase of capitalism in which knowledge is pre-eminent, 
and that a brilliant techno-utopia based on that knowledge and all its 
labour-saving innovations (such as automation and artificial intelli-
gence) is just around the corner or, as someone like Paul Mason main-
tains, already here. Such a redefinition may look about right from the 
perspective of Silicon Valley, but it falls flat on its face in the collaps-
ing factories of Bangladesh and the suicide-ridden employment zones 
of both industrial Shenzhen and rural India where microfinance has 
spread its net to foster the mother of all sub-prime lending crises.  
(Harvey 2017, 105).
Harvey also stresses that Big Data has turned into an ideological fetish: ‘The 
idea, for example, that the construction of smart cities managed through the 
mining of vast data sets can be the answer to all urban ills such that poverty, in-
equalities, class and racial discriminations and the extraction of wealth through 
evictions and other forms of accumulation by dispossession will all disappear is 
plainly ludicrous. It is counter-productive if not counter-revolutionary. It cre-
ates a fetish fog – a vast distraction – between political activism and the urban 
realities, pleasures and travails of daily life that need to be addressed’ (Harvey 
2017, 126).
These, then, are the main positions taken by authors in relation to the ef-
fect of Big Data capitalism upon society. There is ample evidence, however, to 
contest the first two positions (Fuchs 2008, 2014). The first one underestimates 
the continuities of power and capital. If we lived in a new type of society that 
was non-capitalist, then the crises of capitalism that usher in unemployment, 
precarity, nationalism and international conflicts would necessarily need to 
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have been abolished. But today we are experiencing an ongoing economic cri-
sis of capitalism, accompanied by a crisis of the state and political crises that 
have together constituted a legitimation crisis of political formations such as 
the European Union. The second position overestimates continuity and ends 
up with a static model of economic, political and societal development. It was 
one of Marx’s main insights that capitalism is a dynamic, complex, evolutionary 
system that lives and develops through the exploitation of labour, social strug-
gles and crises. Capitalism remains the same by changing itself. It develops the 
productive forces and differentiates the relations of economic and social pro-
duction in order to reproduce what Marx called ‘the whole old shit’3 (Marx and 
Engels 1845/1846a/1959, 35) of alienation and exploitation.
The emergence and differentiation of digital technologies is the consequence 
of the development of the productive forces that increase the organic composi-
tion of capital. Developing the productive forces requires an increasing role 
knowledge (the general intellect) and education in society and the economy 
so that quantitative increases at a certain point turn into new qualities (Fuchs 
2016b, 2014, 2008). The third and fourth positions do not agree at which level 
of capitalist organisation this shift takes place, but they do agree that capitalism 
is a dynamic system and that the emergence of digital machines, digital capital 
and digital labour is an expression of capitalist differentiation that today consti-
tutes a significant dimension of the capitalist economy and society.
The computer is a universal machine because it can turn many aspects of the 
world into digital patterns. This characteristic explains the ubiquity of com-
puting in everyday life. The apps on your smartphone have something to tell 
you about almost every situation you may find yourself in, from telling you 
what to do when you get lost in the streets to playing games on the Tube as a 
pastime. But the computer’s universality is not universal enough. It reduces life 
to calculability: zeros, ones and quantities. Computer algorithms cannot un-
derstand love, ethics, morals, solidarity, care, affects, and other distinct human 
qualities. The reduction of the human to computing and instrumental reason 
therefore also brings with it certain dangers, such as the application of digital 
machines for exploitation and domination. At the same time, the human use of 
computing also advances new potentials for cooperation, community, solidar-
ity, resistance and sociality that, even from within capitalism, point beyond it. 
The computer within capitalism is therefore the antagonistic digital machine. 
Digital and Big Data capitalism is an antagonistic societal formation that deep-
ens alienation and exploitation while at the same time advancing potentials for 
liberation (Fuchs 2017).
Contemporary capitalism is a complex unity of diverse interacting and 
mutually encroaching capitalisms, including finance capitalism, neoliberal 
capitalism, imperialism, digital/communicative capitalism, hyper-industrial 
capitalism, mobility capitalism, authoritarian capitalism and Big Data capi-
talism. (Fuchs 2014, Chapter 5). The relation of these dimensions is variable. 
Empirical studies of concrete capitalist phenomena in specific regimes of 
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space-time show which dimension is dominant for this specific phenomenon. 
For example, in 2014, 33.5% of the world’s largest 2,000 corporations’ profits 
were situated in the FIRE sector (finance, insurance and real estate), 19.0% in 
the mobility industries, 18.6% in the assemblage and manufacturing indus-
try, and 17.3% in the communication and information industry (see Fuchs 
2016a, Table 1). The data indicates that transnational corporations’ structures 
are to varying degrees characterised by finance capitalism, mobility capital-
ism, hyper-industrial capitalism and informational/communicative/digital 
capitalism. And these dimensions interpenetrate: digital media corporations 
in Silicon Valley and elsewhere are based on large injections of venture capital 
(a specific type of finance capital). Their goal is to make an initial public offer-
ing on the stock market. They are prone to creating financial bubbles. Digital 
communication is both cause and effect of mobility and time-space compres-
sion (Harvey 1989). As a consequence, the transportation of people and com-
modities has been growing and accelerating. Digital commodities and digital 
commons are not weightless goods. They require not just information labour, 
but also capital’s exploitation of the physical labour of miners and assemblers 
in Africa and China, who are situated in an international division of digital 
labour (Fuchs 2014).
Finance capitalism, mobility capitalism, hyper-industrial capitalism, digi-
tal capitalism and further capitalisms constitute a dialectical capitalist unity 
that consists of interrelated, contradictory moments. Capitalism is a unity of 
many capitalisms that develops dynamically and historically. A dimension that 
makes the picture even more complex is authoritarian capitalism. Authoritar-
ian capitalism is a form of capitalism that in recent times, in the context of the 
economic and political crisis of capitalism, has become strengthened, which 
poses the question of how neoliberal capitalism and authoritarian capitalism 
are related (Fuchs 2018).
Notes
 1 See: https://icts-and-society.net/events/digital-objects-digital-subjects-a-sym 
posium-on-activism-research-critique-in-the-age-of-big-data-capitalism- 
the-6th-icts-society-conference/
  2 This section was authored solely by Christian Fuchs.  
3 Translation from German to English [CF]. The English translation of 
this passage from The German Ideology in the Marx and Engels-Collected 
Works is, as in many other cases, imprecise, as it translates ‘die ganze alte 
Scheiße’ (Marx and Engels 1845/1846a/1957, 35) as ‘old filthy  business’ 
(Marx and Engels 1845/1846b/1976, 49). There are different types of 
filth, including dust, mould, rubble, rust, cigarette butts, food particles 
and shit. So shit is just one type of filth, although certainly a particularly 
unpleasant one that you do not want to find mixed into your food, which 
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of course happens under unsanitary industrial conditions that aim at the 
maximisation of profit at the expense of human health, which is why the 
Richard Linklater movie Fast Food Nation asks how the shit comes into 
the burgers that school children and others eat. There are indications that 
fast food sold in major chains is indeed poo fast food (MacDougall 2017). 
To just say that capitalism produces and reproduces filth is therefore an 
 underestimation. Marx’s original formulation got it right by stressing the 
connection of capitalism and shit. Capitalism is not just shit, but makes us 
get treated like shit, produce shit, consume and eat shit.
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SECTION I




Digital Governance in the Anthropocene : 
The Rise of the Correlational Machine
David Chandler
1. Introduction
Digital governance is a new mode of governance that is highly dependent on 
the application of new technologies for data analysis. These have been devel-
oped across contemporary society, from the technologies of the quantified self 
to the application of data analysis in schools and businesses, to the develop-
ment of new sensing capacities through international collaborative initiatives. 
The latter include the United Nations’ Global Pulse, established by the UN 
Secretary-General to research and coordinate the use of Big Data for devel-
opment;1 the World Bank’s Open Data for Resilience initiative (OpenDRI), 
designed to see the emergence of natural hazards and the impacts of climate 
change in real time;2 and the PopTech and Rockefeller Foundation initiatives 
on Big Data and community resilience.3 Big Data approaches, as will be in-
troduced this chapter, can be usefully understood on the basis of governance 
through ‘correlational machines’. Digital governance is increasingly developing 
through non-modern ontologies which construct the world through processes 
How to cite this book chapter:
Chandler, D. 2019. Digital Governance in the Anthropocene: The Rise of the Correla-
tional Machine. In: Chandler, D. and Fuchs, C. (eds.) Digital Objects, Digital Subjects: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Capitalism, Labour and Politics in the Age of Big Data. 
Pp. 23–42. London: University of Westminster Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.16997/
book29.b. License: CC‐BY‐NC‐ND 4.0
24 Digital Objects, Digital Subjects
of emergence and highlight the development of new post-epistemological ap-
proaches that view correlation as a more reliable and more objective ‘empirical’ 
method than the extrapolations and predictions of causal analysis.
This chapter argues that digital governance works on the surface, on the ‘ac-
tualist’ notion that ‘only the actual is real’ (Harman 2010, 180; see also Harman 
2009, 127). As Roy Bhaskar, the originator of the philosophy of critical real-
ism, has argued, ‘actualism’ can be seen to be problematic in that hierarchies 
of structures and assemblages disappear and the scientific search for ‘essences’ 
under the appearance of things loses its value (Bhaskar 1998, 7–8). It is for 
pragmatic reasons, though, that a new mode of governance through ‘the digital’ 
appears to be emerging. Digital governance accepts that little can be done to 
prevent problems (understood as emergent or interactive effects) or to learn 
from problems, and that aspirations to transformation are much more likely 
to exacerbate these problems than solve them. Rather than attempt to ‘solve’ 
a problem, or adapt societies, entities or ecosystems in the hope that they will 
be better able to cope with problems and shocks, digital governance seeks to 
establish how relational understandings can help in the present by sensing and 
responding to the process of emergence.
This chapter is organised in four further sections. The first introduces digital 
governance as the governance of effects rather than causation, focusing on the 
work of Ulrich Beck and Bruno Latour in establishing the problematic of con-
tingent interaction, rather than causal depth, as key to emergent effects, which 
can be unexpected and catastrophic. The second section considers in more 
depth how digital governance puts greater emphasis on relations of interaction 
than on ontologies of being, and links this methodological approach closely to 
actor network assumptions that disavow structures of causation. The final two 
sections analyse how correlation works to reveal new agencies and processes of 
emergence, and how new technologies have been deployed in this area, provid-
ing some examples of how the shift from causal relations to sensing effects has 
begun to alter governmental approaches.
2. The Digital Governance of Effects
Digital governance understands problems in terms of their effects rather than 
their causation. Today, analysts are much more likely to highlight that the com-
plexity of global interactions and processes militate against ambitious schemas 
for intervention that aim at finding the root causes of problems or developing 
solutions through ambitious projects of social and political engineering from 
the ground up (see, for example, Ramalingam et al. 2008; Ramalingam 2013). 
In a more complex world, linear or causal ontologies can appear to be reduc-
tionist, and are easily discredited by the growing awareness that any forms of 
governance intervention will have unintended side effects. It is in the attempt to 
minimise these unintended consequences that the focus of policy-makers has 
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shifted to ‘digital governance’, which focuses on the responsive governance of 
effects rather than the attempt to address ostensible root causes. For example, 
rather than seeking to solve conflict or to end it (which might result in pos-
sibly problematic unintended consequences), international policy intervention 
is increasingly articulated as ‘managing’ conflict, developing societal strategies 
to cope with it better and thereby limit its effects (Department for International 
Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence 
2011). This focus on managing effects rather than engaging with causative 
chains makes the forms and practices of policy intervention quite different to 
addressing the causes of problems directly.
The link between conceptual discussions of governance and epistemic ques-
tions of knowledge is usefully highlighted by developing Giorgio Agamben’s 
framing of a shift of concern from causation to effects, which he understands as 
a depoliticising move (Agamben 2014). Debates about addressing causation in-
volve socio-political analysis and policy choices, putting decision-making and 
the question of sovereign power and political accountability at the forefront. 
Causal relations assume that power operates in a hierarchy, with policy out-
comes understood to be products of conscious choices, powers and capacities. 
But Agamben argues that, whilst the governance of causes is the essence of 
politics, the governance of effects reverses the political process:
We should not neglect the philosophical implications of this reversal. 
It means an epoch-making transformation in the very idea of govern-
ment, which overturns the traditional hierarchical relation between 
causes and effects. Since governing the causes is difficult and expensive, 
it is more safe and useful to try to govern the effects. (Agamben 2014)
The governance of effects can therefore be seen as a retreat from modernist or 
causal assumptions of governance. However, the shift from causation to effects 
involves a corresponding shift in the conceptualisation of governance itself. 
Digital governance — governing by attempting to enhance system and com-
munity responsivity to effects — shifts the focus away from the formal public, 
legal and political sphere to the capacities and abilities of systems or societies 
for responsiveness to changes in their environmental context. The management 
of effects involves redistributing agency, understood as responsive capacity, and 
thereby evades the question of the responsibility or accountability for prob-
lems or the need to intervene on the basis of government as a form of political 
decision-making (see further, Chandler 2014b; 2014c).
Policy interventions have shifted to digital modes of governance as govern-
ing agencies have sought to respond to the effects of indeterminacy and risk 
as inherent in the complex and interdependent world, rather than understand-
ing problems in a modernist telos of solutionism and progress. Problems in 
their emergence are the ontological product of complex feedback loops and 
systemic interactions that often cannot be predicted or foreseen. Surprising and 
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catastrophic effects therefore call for new ways of thinking and governing, ways 
that go beyond modernist linear cause-and-effect assumptions and that can 
potentially cope with unexpected shocks and unseen threats.
As ‘effects’ become more central than causes, ‘solutions-thinking’ becomes 
less useful. It even has the potential to act as a a barrier to responsiveness, be-
cause ‘problem-solving’ tends to affirm current practices and approaches rather 
than emphasising the need to be alert to emergent effects.4 The promise of ‘so-
lutions’ seems to deny our entangled responsibilities and commitments, while 
greater sensitivity to effects enables us to become increasingly aware of them. 
Initially, the leading theorist to problematise ‘problem-solving’ approaches was 
perhaps Ulrich Beck, who argued that the risk of unintended effects could no 
longer be bracketed off, compartmentalised or excluded in what he called the 
‘Second Modernity’ (Beck 1992). Beck argued that unexpected feedback effects 
from policy-making were an inevitable result of globalisation and interconnec-
tivity, suggesting that the boundaries of liberal modernity – between the state 
and society and between culture and nature – were increasingly blurring. Sur-
prises and shock events could no longer be treated as exceptions to the norm, 
to be quantified and insured against.5
The radical awareness of interconnectivity and feedback effects articulated 
by Beck was initially presented as purely negative, as a factor to be addressed, 
and potentially minimised, through governing under the ‘precautionary prin-
ciple’.6 The awareness of entanglements that might lead to unintentional effects 
thus began to integrate concerns of contingency into the practices of govern-
ance. Beck’s precautionary principle still had a modernist legacy in the positing 
of a potentially knowing and controlling subject able to manage unintended 
 effects, but as the assumptions of modernity began to ebb away and discourses 
of globalisation morphed into those of the Anthropocene, this subject increas-
ingly had to act more humbly and cautiously, testing and experimenting rather 
than assuming cause and effect modalities.7 Unfortunately, Beck focused on the 
regulation of effects through ways of predicting or imagining the consequences 
of human actions, which seemed logically impossible to foresee. For example, 
even if scientists reached a consensus on the safety of a new procedure or initia-
tive before its application, scientific experimentation in the laboratory cannot 
reproduce the same conditions as those of real, differentiated and complex life. 
This vulnerability led critics like Bruno Latour to convincingly argue that, once 
included, effects could not be prevented or minimised through precautions, but 
instead had to be followed through ‘all the way’ (Latour 2011, 27; Latour’s thesis 
will be considered in greater detail below).
Towards the end of his life, Beck – in line with the times – shifted the pres-
entation of his approach, stating that the appreciation of effects enables gov-
ernance rather than merely constraining it (Beck 2015, 79). There were also 
positive feedback effects of the entanglements of culture and nature, indicating 
the need to adequately understand the new anthropogenic manufacture of risks 
such as global climate change. Thus, the awareness of the catastrophic effects 
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of climate change and other risks could be seen to be potentially positive (Beck 
2015, 76). For Beck,
Anthropological shocks provide a new way of being in the world, seeing 
the world and doing politics. The anthropological shock of Hurricane 
Katrina is a useful example […] Until Hurricane Katrina, flooding had 
not been positioned as an issue of environmental justice – despite the 
existence of a substantial body of research documenting inequalities 
and vulnerability to flooding. It took the reflection both in the publics 
and in academia on the devastating but highly uneven ‘racial floods’ of 
Hurricane Katrina to bring back the strong ‘Anthropocene’ of slavery, 
institutionalized racism, and connect it to vulnerability and floods. This 
kind of connecting the disconnected is the way the cosmopolitan side 
effects of bads are real, e.g. the invisibility of side effects is made visible. 
(Beck 2015, 80)
The flooding of New Orleans illustrated how devastating emergent effects could 
be, but it also had the consequence of enabling governing authorities to recog-
nise the connection between risks that were thought to be natural or external, 
and racial, social and economic inequalities which were thought to be purely 
social. This necessitated bringing together governance expertise on the basis 
that the natural and the social were intermingled, and that the politics of race 
was not disconnected from the politics of ecology.8 In the same way, the natural 
and the social sciences needed to be brought together in rethinking how to 
engage with the world beyond this posited culture/nature divide (see also Beck 
2016). For Beck, this ‘Metamorphosis is not social change […]. [It] is a mode of 
changing the mode of change. It signifies the age of side effects. It challenges the 
way of being in the world, thinking about the world and imagining and doing 
politics.’ (Beck 2015, 78)
A new form of governance thus emerges from the inclusion of effects: the 
understanding of crises and disasters no longer sees them as purely natural 
or purely social, but as contingent and emergent processes beyond governing 
control:
Metamorphosis is deeply connected with the idea of unawareness, 
which embeds a deep and enduring paradox. On the one hand, it em-
phasizes the inherent limitations in knowledge […]. [N]ano-technology, 
bio-engineering, and other types of emergent technology contain not 
only knowable risks but also risks we cannot yet know, providing a 
window of fundamental limitations to society’s ability to perceive and 
 govern risks. (Beck 2016, 104)
Beck’s understanding of the Anthropocene as ‘the age of side effects’ (Beck 2015, 
78) nicely encapsulates how the contingent and unforeseeable emergence of 
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effects has been captured and incorporated into governance under discourses 
of the digital. Beck had not much more to offer than that the ‘imagination of 
a threatening future’ would focus attention on the ways in which contingent 
processes interacted.
Bruno Latour has sought to go beyond the limits of Beck’s work in this area 
by seeking to trace the effects of human actions in real time feedback loops, a 
method requiring less of the imagination and more of digital science and tech-
nology. Latour has deployed to great effect the radical discourse of understand-
ing problems in their emergence, having long waged war on modernist binary 
understandings, particularly that of the separation of culture and nature. For 
Latour, just as humanity has become more entangled with nature than ever 
before, ecologists have sought to emphasise the need for separation to protect 
‘nature’, and modernist science aspires to know the world of ‘nature’ as a some-
how separate and fixed reality (see, for example, Latour 1993a; 2004). There-
fore, along similar lines to Beck’s later work, Latour sees global warming, not so 
much as a sign of the failure of modernity, but an enabler of new forms of digi-
tal governance in the Anthropocene. The awareness of emergent effects such as 
climate change reveals the entanglements of humanity and the environment, 
and is a critical stimulus to radically reorganise the governance of the planet 
on the basis of a more inclusive understanding that ‘nature’ cannot just be left 
alone, but must be ‘even more managed, taken up, cared for, stewarded, in brief, 
integrated and internalized into the very fabric of policy’ (Latour 2011, 25).
Digital governance is crucial for Latour’s project of enfolding the unintended 
effects of planetary interaction into the everyday governance of the Anthro-
pocene. The effects of interaction are understood to be concrete and contin-
gent, and thus depend on an ability to trace the surface of interactive relations 
through seeing effects, to follow the unintended and unforeseen consequences 
of human actions ‘all the way’. Latour enthuses,
[T]he principle of precaution, properly understood, is exactly the change 
of zeitgeist needed: not a principle of abstention – as many have come 
to see it – but a change in the way any action is considered, a deep tidal 
change in the linkage modernism established between science and poli-
tics. From now on, thanks to this principle, unexpected consequences 
are attached to their initiators and have to be followed through all the 
way. (Latour 2011, 27)
Latour’s subject is the initiator of actions, and is thereby responsible for the 
interactive consequences of this initiation.9 For Latour, the consequences of 
human actions can be traced by seeing or being sensitive to the network formed 
through their effects.10 Thus digital governance seeks to trace these links on the 
surface. The need to be responsive to effects also drives debates that seek to de-
termine the networks of entanglement of the Anthropocene, calling for greater 
sensitivity to the everyday feedbacks that bring these relations and interactions 
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to light.11 For some authors, extreme weather events or outbreaks of new vi-
ruses, for example, indicate networked interactions spanning the globe, reveal-
ing contingent linkages, interconnections and feedback loops (see, for example, 
Haraway 2015; Tsing 2015, 37–43; Gillings 2015).
The ability to see or sense the actual effects of relational interactions becomes 
more enabling the more connections can be established or imagined across 
greater distances and across more varied forms of interactive life. These com-
plex and intricate feedback loops also call for greater technological capacities. 
Thus, these tasks can be accomplished, according to Latour,
[B]y crisscrossing their [the loops’] potential paths with as many in-
struments as possible to have a chance of detecting in what ways they 
are connected […] laying down the networks of equipment that render 
the consequences of action visible to all the various agencies that do 
the acting […]. ‘[S]ensitivity’ is a term that applies to all the agencies 
able to spread their loops further and to feel the consequences of what 
they do come back to haunt them […] but only as long and as far that it 
[humanity] is fully equipped with enough sensors to feel the feedbacks. 
(Latour 2013, 96)
Latour’s framework sees the ability to sense effects as crucial to revealing the 
unseen and unknown interconnections of the Anthropocene, involving the 
technology and regulatory mechanisms necessary to ‘trace and ceaselessly re-
trace again the lines made by all those loops’ with a ‘strong injunction: keep 
the loop traceable and publically visible’ so that ‘whatever is reacting to your 
actions, loop after loop […] weighs on you as a force to be taken into account’ 
(Latour 2013, 135).
New sensorial forms of digital governance are given a material political form 
as a new set of political competencies and responsibilities are established: ‘Such 
an accumulation of responses requires a responsible agency to which you, your-
self, have to become in turn responsible.’ (Latour 2013, 96) Unlike earlier modes 
of governance, digital governance does not seek to make causal claims;12 the 
emergence of effects can be traced to reveal new relations of interaction and 
new agencies or actants to be taken into account, but there is no assumption 
that effects can be understood and manipulated or governed through transcen-
dental policy goals.13 Real time responsive forms of management through digi-
tal sensing increasingly focus on the ‘what is’ (Latour 2013, 126) of the world in 
its complex and plural emergence.
The fact that the ‘what is-ness’ of the world is not a concern within a modern-
ist ontology of being and causation is often neglected in considerations of the 
digital as a mode of governance, so it will be considered here and in more detail 
in the following section. Latour, in the ‘Facing Gaia’ lectures, argues that na-
ture has to be understood in ‘post-epistemological’ terms (Latour 2013, 26). By 
this he means that modernist forms of representation, reduction, abstraction 
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and exclusion cannot know a world that is plural, lively and interactive. This 
is post-epistemological because knowledge can no longer be extracted from 
its concrete context of interaction in time and space. In this framing, knowl-
edge, to be ‘objective’ – to be real – has to be plural, fluid and concrete (Latour 
2013, 49). This is very similar to Donna Haraway’s understanding of ‘situated 
epistemology’, which rejects modernist drives to extract knowledge, i.e. to turn 
knowing into abstractions from real emergent processes through methods of 
scaling up, generalising and universalising, and to fix knowledge apart from its 
plural, changing and overlapping context of meaning (Haraway 1988). In this 
way of rethinking knowledge, the modernist divisions between subjective and 
objective, and qualitative and quantitative, are dissolved (see further, Venturini 
and Latour 2010).
Latour’s is a flat ontology, where speed, size and scale are momentary 
and contingent products of interaction, unable to construct and shape 
path-dependencies. As Latour repeats, in a world of unknowable contingen-
cies ‘it is the what is that obstinately requests its due’ (Latour 2013, 126). This 
‘empirical’ displacement of causal understandings can also be intimated from 
Beck’s later work. Beck imagined the development of real-time empirics as able 
to evade both the dangers of critical immanent approaches – which tended 
to reproduce the knowledge scepticism of postmodernism – and the hubristic 
knowledge claims of transcendental frameworks of cause-and-effect. Thus, the 
world could be governed in its complex emergence by focusing on effects as the 
starting point for governance:
Seen this way, climate change risk is far more than a problem of meas-
ures of carbon dioxide and the production of pollution. It does not even 
only signal a crisis of human self-understanding. More than that, global 
climate risk creates new ways of being, looking, hearing and acting in 
the world – highly conflictual and ambivalent, open-ended, without any 
foreseeable outcome. As a result, a compass for the 21st century arises. 
This compass is different from the postmodern ‘everything goes’ and 
different from false universalism. This is a new variant of critical theory, 
which does not set the normative horizon itself but takes it from empiri-
cal analyses. Hence, it is an empirical analysis of the normative horizon 
of the self-critical world risk society. (Beck 2015, 83)
In the digital governance mode of sensing, the focus on empirical analysis 
to facilitate real-time responsiveness enables emergent effects to discursively 
frame governance without an external subject ‘setting the normative horizon’. 
This new ‘normative horizon’ would now be set by the world itself, and ac-
cessed through the development of new mechanisms and techniques sensitised 
and responsive to the world in its emergence. The post-epistemological im-
plications of frameworks of digital governance seem to underlie the fascina-
tion with Big Data approaches as a way of generating increasingly sensitive 
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real-time responses to emergent effects (see, for example, Mayer-Schönberger 
and Cukier 2013; Kitchin 2014).
3. Big Data, Objects and Relations
As already intimated in the consideration of Latour’s work in the previous sec-
tion, digital governance can be usefully engaged with as a mode of govern-
ance that necessarily shares the ontopolitical assumptions of Actor-Network 
Theory (ANT) and can be informed by a consideration of the long-running 
engagement between Bruno Latour (the leading proponent of ANT) and Gra-
ham Harman (a leading speculative realist) over the conceptualisation of this 
approach (see Latour et al. 2011). Harman takes Latour to task precisely for the 
‘actualism’ at the heart of the ANT approach, stating that, for Latour, momen-
tary relations are more important than the substance of entities (or ‘actants’):
For Latour an actant is always an event, and events are always com-
pletely specific: ‘everything happens only once, and at one place.’ An 
actant […] is always completely deployed in the world, fully implicated 
in the sum of its dealings at any given moment. Unlike a substance, an 
actant is not distinct from its qualities, since for Latour this would imply 
an indefensible featureless lump lying beneath its tangible properties… 
And unlike a substance, actants are not different from their relations. 
Indeed, Latour’s central thesis is that an actor is its relations. All features 
of an object belong to it; everything happens only once, at one time, in 
one place. (Harman 2009, 17)
This focus on relations in the present and actual, and not on the possibilities 
that may lie latent or virtual in entities, ecosystems or assemblages, is crucial to 
the distinction with a causal ontology:
Since Latour is committed to a model of actants fully deployed in al-
liances with nothing held in reserve, he cannot concede any slumber-
ing potency lying in the things that is currently unexpressed. To view a 
thing in terms of potential is to grant it something beyond its current 
status as a fully specific event. (Harman 2009, 28)
As Harman argues, ‘Latour is the ultimate philosopher of relations’, and in 
this his philosophy inverts the assemblage theory of DeLanda (Harman 2010, 
176), which understands assemblages as never fully actualised and thus ena-
bling the possibility for causal interactions to bring forward alternative paths 
of emergence. For Harman and object-oriented ontologists, ANT falls down 
because of its failure to distinguish between objects and their relations. Harman 
argues that ANT makes the mistake of ‘flattening everything out too much, 
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so that everything is just on the level of its manifestation’. As a consequence, 
this approach ‘can’t explain the change of the things’ or the hidden potential 
of alternative outcomes (Latour et al. 2011, 95). For actor network theory, the 
emergence of new aspects of reality is not a matter of causal depth but of see-
ing what actually exists, but is consigned to the background. As Latour argues,
I call this background plasma, namely that which is not yet formatted, 
not yet measured, not yet socialized, not yet engaged in metrological 
chains, and not yet covered, surveyed, mobilized, or subjectified. How 
big is it? Take a map of London and imagine that the social world visited 
so far occupies no more room than the subway. The plasma would be the  
rest of London, all its buildings, inhabitants, climates, plants, cats, 
 palaces, horse guards […]. [Sociologists] were right to look for ‘some-
thing hidden behind’, but It is neither behind nor especially hidden. 
It is in between and not made of social stuff. It is not hidden, simply 
 unknown. It resembles a vast hinterland providing the resources for 
every single course of action to be fulfilled, much like the countryside 
for the urban dweller, much like the missing masses for a cosmologist 
trying to balance out the weight of the universe. (Latour 2005, 244, 
 emphasis in original).
For ANT, as an alternative science of relationality, what is missing in terms 
of governmental understanding is not relational depth but relationality on the 
surface, the presence of actual relations which give entities and systems their 
coherence or weight in the present moment. Thus, for ANT, modernist un-
derstandings of the world, whether those of natural or of social science, give 
too much credence to entities, as if these entities had fixed essences (allowing 
causal relations) rather than shifting relations to other actants:
The world is not a solid continent of facts sprinkled by a few lakes of 
uncertainties, but a vast ocean of uncertainties speckled by a few islands 
of calibrated and stabilized forms… Do we really know that little? We 
know even less. Paradoxically, this ‘astronomical’ ignorance explains a 
lot of things. Why do fierce armies disappear in a week? Why do whole 
empires like the Soviet one vanish in a few months? Why do companies 
who cover the world go bankrupt after their quarterly report? (Latour 
2005, 245)
In February 2008, Latour and Harman participated in a public seminar at the 
LSE, in which the differences between what are heuristically described here as 
the ontopolitical assumptions behind digital governance were brought to the 
surface. At the seminar Noortje Marres made some useful interventions regard-
ing the importance of ANT for the discovery of new ways of seeing agency in 
the world on the pragmatic basis of ‘effect’ rather than a concern for emergent 
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causation: ‘because pragmatists are not contemplative metaphysicians, because 
they say “we will not decide in advance what the world is made up of ”, this is 
why they go with this weak signal of the effect. Because that is the only way to 
get to a new object, an object that is not yet met nor defined’ (Latour et al. 2011, 
62). Marres argued that taking ‘as our starting point stuff that is happening’ was 
a way of ‘suspending’ or of ‘undoing’ ontology, in order to study change (Latour 
et al. 2011, 89). This aspect is vital to digital sensing as a mode of governance, 
as it enables a focus upon the surface appearances of change, which are not 
considered so important in an ontology of causality:
It is about saying that we have a world where continuously new enti-
ties are added to the range of existing entities, everything continually 
changes and yet in this modern technological world everything stays 
the same. We have stabilized regimes […]. But if we engage in study-
ing specific objects, we do not find this singularized thing that is well 
put-together, as an object. We do not find it at the foundation but we 
find it as an emergent effect (Latour et al. 2011, 90–91).
The appearances of things are continually changing as their relationships do, 
not through an ontology of depth but in plain sight through networks and in-
teractions on the surface, As Latour states, regarding the ‘plasma’ or the ‘miss-
ing masses’ of ANT: ‘It is not the unformatted that’s the difficulty here. It is what 
is in between the formatting. Maybe this is not a very good metaphor. But it’s a 
very, very different landscape, once the background and foreground have been 
reversed.’ (Latour et al. 2011, 84)
My argument here is that the ontopolitical assumptions of digital governance 
can be usefully grasped in terms of actor network theory in that the focus is not 
upon on the nature of systems or substances, but on the ways in which change 
can be detected through seeing processes of emergence as relational. Relational 
processes without a conception of depth are co-relational rather than causal, 
as the processes of relation may be contingent and separate conjunctions. The 
fact that all forms of being are co-relational means that new opportunities 
arise to see with and through these relations and co-dependencies: whether 
it is the co-relation of pines and matsutake mushrooms (mobilised by Anna 
Tsing 2015, 176) or the co-relation between sunny weather and purchases of 
barbecue equipment, or the co-relation between Google search terms and flu 
outbreaks (Madrigal 2014). These are relations of ‘effects’ rather than of causa-
tion: when some entities or processes have an effect on others, they can be seen 
as ‘networked’ or ‘assembled’ but they have no relation of immanent or linear 
causation which can be mapped and reproduced or intervened in.
The co-relational rather than causal aspect of actor network theory distin-
guishes it from assemblage theory or the neo-institutional or ecosystem ap-
proaches with their ontology of causal depth. Actor network approaches 
therefore lack the temporal and spatial boundedness of assemblages or of 
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nested adaptive systems, and make no assumptions of iterative interactions 
producing state changes to higher levels of complex ordering.14 They say noth-
ing of ‘ontology’ or of the essences of things, merely focusing on the transmis-
sion of effects at particular moments; thus they can draw together ‘litanies’ of 
actors and actants – the plasma, or ‘missing masses’ – crucial for describing or 
understanding how change occurs in systems or states. Suspending or ‘undo-
ing’ ontology, opens ANT approaches to the world of interaction in the actual, 
or brings the open-ended processual understanding of the virtual into the ac-
tual. New actors or agencies are those brought into being or into relation to 
explain ‘effects’ and to see processes of emergence through ‘co-relation’. In this 
respect, new technological advances, driving algorithmic machine learning, 
Big Data capabilities and the Internet of Things, seem perfectly timed to enable 
the digital as a mode of governance.
4. The Rise of the Correlational Machine
Human–non-human assemblages of sensors enable new forms of responsivity, 
but this advance is not concerned with causal knowledge but with the capaci-
ties to see through the breaking down of processes via the development of ‘cor-
relational machines’. I use the term ‘correlational machines’ to distinguish the 
mode of digital governance as a very distinct paradigm in contrast to causal on-
tologies of depth and immanence. The development of correlational machines 
is not new to the Anthropocene, but is part-and-parcel of the extension of hu-
man agency through the use of artificial prostheses to enable sensing the en-
vironment. Perhaps the classic example, provided by Merleau-Ponty’s work on 
the phenomenology of perception, would be the walking stick, which enables 
the blind to sense the obstacles around them, through the resistance to touch 
and the sounds made (Merleau-Ponty 1989). Another example would be the 
deployment of canaries as sensors for carbon monoxide in mineshafts.
Human, non-human and technological aids thus have long histories in en-
abling the extension of human responsivity to effects, through the power of 
co-relation or correlation. It is important to illustrate why this is correlation 
and not causation, as this is key to digital modes of governance. Digital gov-
ernance relies on causal laws or regularities, but the key aspect is that they are 
secondary to correlation rather than primary. As Latour would argue, the key 
concerns are not ontological but relational: the causal becomes background to 
the relational foreground. Take the example of the canary in the mineshaft. The 
precondition for the canary signalling the existence of carbon monoxide is the 
causal regularity of poisonous gas killing the canary before mine workers are 
aware of its existence and prone to its effects. However, the problem of carbon 
monoxide is not addressed at the level of causation (predicting it or preventing 
it from appearing or solving the problem afterwards) but through developing a 
method of signalling the existence of poisonous fumes and of increasing human 
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sense-ability through the power of correlation. The canary is a non-human cor-
relational machine for signalling the existence of carbon monoxide. The canary 
enables the unseen to be seen: it brings the ‘missing masses’, which exist in 
the mineshaft, into perception. The addition of the canary into the situational 
context reveals the existence of other actants, the poisonous gases, which were 
there but which previously operated unseen.
Two everyday examples that draw out more clearly the ‘machinic’ nature of 
artificial prosthetics for digital governance are the development of the ther-
mometer and the compass. Both the thermometer and the compass enable the 
extension of human sensitivity and agency. The prosthetic support they provide 
is correlational, although based upon causal laws or regularities. The compass, 
based originally on the magnetic qualities of the naturally occurring mineral 
magnetite or lodestone, can enable a magnetised needle to point a course in 
relation to the geomagnetic north pole. Thus mariners could see or sense their 
direction through the power of the compass as a ‘correlational machine’, ena-
bling new ‘actants’ (magnetic fields of attraction) to be enrolled in navigation 
through their correlational effects (Dill 2003).
The story of the thermometer is similar: it relies on a causal relation between 
an increase in temperature and the thermal expansion of solids or liquids, 
such as water, alcohol and mercury. These thermal properties of expansion 
were known to the ancient Greeks and applied or ‘machinised’ in the eight-
eenth century with the development of the Fahrenheit scale (Radford 2003). A 
thermo meter is an artificially constructed correlational machine that enables 
the seeing or sensing of atmospheric changes that would otherwise be unseen. 
New ‘correlational machines’ are being developed all the time, enabled by a va-
riety of new technologies. For example, more accurate quantum thermometers 
can now measure thermal changes at the quantum level. This example shows 
how new actants – in this case, intrinsic quantum motions – can be enrolled to 
create new machinic prostheses for seeing changes in temperature at ever more 
precise levels (NIST 2016).
Correlational machines have proliferated under digital governance, enabling 
new high-tech assemblages involving the extensive use of new sensing tech-
nologies, often termed ‘the Internet of Things’, where sensors can be connected 
to the Internet and provide real time detection of changes in air and water 
quality, earth tremors or parking capacity, and so forth. The potential use of 
sensing technologies is extensive. At the MIT Senseable City Lab, for example, 
researchers informed me of work being carried out using robotic sensors in 
sewers to track minute quantities of bio-chemical material. Potentially, local 
authorities could receive real time information on localised health profiles and 
illegal drug use.15 If sewers can be turned into key information generators for 
bio-sensing and drug and health profiling, it is clear that new digital modes of 
governing can provide a whole range of new avenues for monitoring and regu-
latory policing.16 Thus new assemblages are being artificially constructed that 
enable new actants to be enrolled in governance, including non-human and 
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non-living actants, and in doing so, changes can be seen or sensed and there-
fore responded to, often revealing new threats or dangers or expanding human 
sensitivity to existing ones.
While these ‘more-than-human’ machinic assemblages are constructed on 
the basis of causal laws and regularities, their purpose is a correlational one: 
seeing what exists in the present, in the actual, but is unknown or unseen. To 
take one contemporary example of new forms of digital governance, Elizabeth 
Johnson has done insightful work on more-than-human forms of governance 
in her analysis of the work of commercial biosensing and the use of organic 
life to monitor fresh and marine water sources for pollution (Johnson 2017). 
Here an array of animal species, including small fish, worms, molluscs, crusta-
ceans and micro-organisms are monitored intensively to discover their norms 
of functionality and to develop ways of measuring changes in these indicators. 
They are then ready for use as ‘correlational machines’:
[The company] monitors a suite of ‘behavioral fingerprints’ as these 
organisms are exposed to different systems. Locomotor activity, repro-
ductive rates, and embryonic developments are measured together to 
indicate the severity of hazardous anthropogenic chemicals as well as 
biologically produced toxins, such as blue-green algae. In this way the 
company boasts, it can make ‘pollution measurable.’ (Johnson 2017, 284)
As Johnson notes, the mode of digital governance is less about causation than 
seeing the unseen: ‘making imperceptible harms perceptible’ (Johnson 2017). 
This approach sees through correlation, which enables new problems and 
possibilities to be detected. For example, changes in the bodily indicators of 
the animal organs can alert human agents to potential problems, even if the 
sources of those problems are unknown. Thus the company concerned argues 
that problems can be detected ‘in due time before pollution irreversibly spreads 
in the environment or even harms human health’ (Johnson 2017). In a techno-
logical extension of the non-human prosthesis of the canary down a coalmine, 
‘biosensing enables a way of seeing with non-human life’ (Johnson 2017, 286).
Just as the properties of mercury needed to be understood for the thermo-
meter to work as a correlational machine for biosensing technologies, green 
florescent protein (GFP) has been a widely used tool to enable organic life to 
be modified into correlational machines, potentially signalling a wide range 
of changes in acidity and alkalinity, as well as the presence of pathogens, tox-
ins and cancer-causing agents (Johnson 2017, 285). Digital governance, on the 
basis of developing new forms of correlational sight, enables a fundamental 
shift from governance on the basis of ‘problem-solving’ and analysis of ‘root 
causes’ to the governance of effects. In this mode of governance, distinctions 
between scientific disciplines and individual entities, which historically de-
pended upon organic conceptions of causation, tend to disappear. In contrast, 
the ontopolitics informing digital governance is not concerned with entities 
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or with causation, enabling ‘more-than-human’ assemblages of responsivity to 
become the new governmental norm.17
5. Conclusion
Digital governance is less concerned with adaptive change (preventing prob-
lems before they occur or with their resolution afterwards) than with re-
sponsiveness to problems understood as emergent effects. Responsiveness, in 
resilience discourses, is increasingly seen as a real-time necessity: living with 
and being sensitive to problems and threats is understood to be the best way of 
ameliorating their impact (Evans and Reid 2014). Sensing as a mode of govern-
ance thus appears to have a lot in common with Deleuze’s conceptualisation of 
a ‘control society’, where time is held constant: instead of a before (prevention) 
or an after (reaction) there is the continual modulation of responsiveness, an 
‘endless postponement’ of a problem (Deleuze 1995, 179). The essence of en-
tities, be they systems, societies or individuals becomes much less important 
than the emergent appearance of surface ‘effects’, which are to be modulated 
and responded to.
This is usefully highlighted in Stephanie Wakefield and Bruce Braun’s work 
on the deployment of ‘green infrastructure’, which relies on the agency of 
non-human actors, such as the deployment of oysters as seawall infrastructure, 
to enable sensing that is grounded on the ontopolitics of responsivity rather 
than adaptation (Wakefield and Braun 2018). Thus non-human life is managed 
as a way of securing human life. The ‘oystertecture’ approach fits excellently 
with the ontopolitics of digital governance laid out here, as it seeks to respond 
to rather than adapt to climate change. This responsive approach is correla-
tional rather than causal in its response to rising sea levels. Most importantly, 
Wakefield and Braun highlight the distinctiveness of this mode of governance, 
which rather than seeking to adapt and learn on the basis of causal relations that 
are oriented towards the future, has a very different temporality or approach to 
the future in that it seeks to ‘ward it off ’, attempting to keep everything as it is 
by ‘cancelling out or absorbing events’ (emphasis in original) (Wakefield and 
Braun 2018). Rather than seeking to reform or adapt existing modes of infra-
structure, digital governance seeks to maintain existing forms of infrastructure 
but to add other forms of sensing and responsivity. While modernist or causal 
understandings assumed a hierarchy of centralised reporting and adaptation, 
digital governance has a much flatter ontology of self-generated responses, 
whether at the level of society, community or the quantified self.
Thus, with digital modes of governance, there is no longer a ‘line’ of causal-
ity but a ‘plane’ of relationality – this shift is fundamental in terms of govern-
ance, which, as analysed above, no longer needs to assume a normative horizon 
or normative goals external to the actuality of the world. As Agamben has 
highlighted, the governance of effects can thereby be seen to be thoroughly 
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depoliticised, as the tasks of governance are discursively derived ‘empirically’ 
from the world, rather than from human actors as subjects.
Notes
 1 United Nations Global Pulse initiative website can be accessed at: http://
www.unglobalpulse.org/.
 2 The World Bank’s OpenDRI webpages can be accessed at: https://www.
gfdrr.org/opendri.
 3 For information on the Data-Pop Alliance see: http://www.datapopalliance.
org/; and for the Rockefeller Foundation: http://www.rockefellerfoundation. 
org/our-work/current-work/resilience.
 4 Robert Cox (1981) prepared the ground, famously differentiating ap-
proaches that saw problems from a narrow status-quo perspective from 
those that sought to critically rethink the bigger picture.
 5 On the importance of the normalising effects of insurance see, for example, 
Ewald (1991), Defert (1991), Dillon (2008).
 6 He argued: ‘If we anticipate catastrophes whose destructive potential threat-
ens everybody, then the risk calculation based on experience and rationality 
breaks down. Now all possible, to a greater or lesser degree improbable, 
scenarios must be taken into consideration; to knowledge drawn from ex-
perience and science we must add imagination, suspicion, fiction and fear.’ 
(Beck 2009, 53)
 7 For the critics of the principle, which has been taken up in a number of 
ways in international policy documents, the problem was the paralysing 
aspects of ‘possibilistic’ thinking (see, for example, Sunstein 2002).
 8 See also the analysis of Hurricane Katrina in Protevi (2009, 163–83).
 9 Exemplified in the example of Frankenstein’s failure to care for his creation, 
which then turned into a tragic monster. Latour (2011).
 10 See, for example, Clark 2010; or Klein 2014, 1–3, which opens with the 
ironies of anthropogenic feedback loops, for example, when extreme hot 
weather, caused by the profligate burning of fossil fuels, melted the tarmac 
and grounded aircraft at Washington DC in the summer of 2012.
 11 Latour (2013, 94–95); see also, Connolly (2013), Bennett (2010). Latour 
(2013, 112) echoes Connolly and Bennett on the cultivation of sensitivity: 
‘To become sensitive, that is to feel responsible, and thus to make the loops 
feedback on our own action, we need, by a set of totally artificial operations, 
to place ourselves as if we were at the End of Time.’ (emphasis in original)
 12 As Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (2014, 11–22) note, tracing causal 
chains could only be a ‘selective’, ‘artificial’ and ‘restrictive’ procedure, ‘over-
coding’ and reproducing its starting assumptions in a transcendent manner.
 13 Deleuze (1988, 128) nicely captures the difference between transcendent 
and immanent approaches in his suggestion that transcendent approaches 
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introduce a ‘dimension supplementary to the dimensions of the given’; i.e. 
ideas of goals, direction and causal connections, which separate the human 
subject from the object of governance. Whereas, on the plane of imma-
nence: ‘There is no longer a subject, but only individuating affective states 
of an anonymous force. Here [governance] is concerned only with motions 
and rests, with dynamic affective charges. It will be perceived with that 
which it makes perceptible to us, as we proceed.’
 14 Harman calls this ‘occasionalism’ and argues that Latour (2009, 228) pro-
vides the first known example of ‘secular occasionalism’, where there is 
no fixed way of explaining causation or the continuity of events. In ANT, 
nothing follows from anything else: ‘Nothing is by itself either reducible or 
irreducible to anything else’ (Latour 1993b, 169). The work of composing 
relations begins again ‘every morning’ (Latour et al. 2011, 76). Regarding 
complexity theory, see Chandler (2014a).
 15 As Charlotte Heath-Kelly (2016) notes, Big Data ontologies of complexity 
lead to universal rather than targeted surveillance parameters.
 16 Personal interview, researcher, Senseable City Lab, Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, 30 March 2017.
 17 This form of governance through the modulation of effects can be usefully 
grasped in terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of ‘machinic enslave-
ment’, derived from cybernetics, where responses are automated to manage 
or govern on the basis of maintaining equilibrium. In this process there is 
no distinction between using a machine and being part of the informational 
input to the machinic process: the process itself is more important than dis-
tinctions between entities or individuals. See Deleuze and Guattari (2014, 
531–36); Lazzarato (2014, 23–34).
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CHAPTER 3
Beyond Big Data Capitalism, Towards 
Dialectical Digital Modernity : Reflections 
on David Chandler’s Chapter
Christian Fuchs
1. Introduction
David Chandler’s chapter studies changes of onto-epistemology and govern-
ance in the age of digitality and Big Data. He argues that the logic of dual-
ism, reductionism, linear causation and mechanic determinism has advanced 
problems of society and is unable to give a proper response to the world’s com-
plexity. The implication is that we need a different kind of onto-epistemology 
that moves beyond dualism and enables new forms of governing society and 
the digital. David Chandler argues in this volume that the ‘ontopolitical as-
sumptions of digital governance can be usefully grasped in terms of actor net-
work theory’, and in this context he is particularly interested in Bruno Latour’s 
works and new materialist theories in general, including the works of Donna 
Haraway and others. David Chandler says that these approaches allow us 
to move beyond dualism and to conceive the world and the digital as being 
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co-relational, instead of as dualistic and based on linear causality. Big Data 
would be part of new correlational machines of sensing and seeing the world 
that have resulted in new forms of digital governance focusing on co-relation 
and correlation.
David Chandler’s general approach is to search for and analyse 
onto-epistemologies that go, or claim to go, beyond dualism. He is in this context 
particularly interested in complexity theory and resilience studies. ‘[E]mergent 
or general complexity […] appears to be the leading contender as an alterna-
tive ontological vision of the world’ (Chandler 2014, 51). ‘[R]esilience-thinking 
claims to have the solution to the apparent conundrum of governing without as-
sumptions of Cartesian certainty or Newtonian necessity’ (Chandler 2014, 63).
2. (Post-)Modernity and (Post-)Modernism
I certainly agree that the dualist logic of subject/object, culture/nature, humans/ 
technology, mind/body, society/economy, communication/work, reproduction/ 
production, and so on, is a key aspect of an instrumental reason that has back-
fired and created global problems that society is not easily able to govern. But 
I am not convinced that it is theoretically feasible to term instrumental rea-
son and dualism ‘modernist binary understandings’, ‘modernist understand-
ings of the world’ or ‘modernist divisions’, and to characterise the alternative as 
‘non-modern ontologies’ and post-epistemology.
The implication of such a terminology is that the alternative to modernity 
is either premodernity or postmodernity. A premodern onto-epistemology, as 
advanced for example by Martin Heidegger, often ends up in techno-pessimism 
that rejects any form of advanced technology use. For example, Heidegger saw 
newspapers, electronic communication and public transport as inauthentic 
forms of modernism that should be abolished (see Fuchs 2015). The other op-
tion, indicated for example by the term post-epistemology, is to see the alterna-
tive in a form of postmodernity.
Questioning binaries and determinism is certainly a feature of the works of 
postmodern thinkers such as Latour, Haraway, Lyotard, Baudrillard, Derrida, 
and Deleuze and Guattari. In postmodern thought, there is a stress on chance 
instead of design, deconstruction instead of totality, absence instead of pres-
ence, networks instead of hierarchies, indeterminacy instead of determinacy, 
immanence instead of transcendence, and so on. (See Table 1.1. in Harvey 
1989, 43).
‘[B]reaking through dualism appears to be the key to new materialism’ and 
postmodern thought (Dolphin and van der Tuin 2012, 97). These approaches 
advance ‘a monist perspective’ (Dolphin and van der Tuin 2012, 85) that involves 
not only the flat ontology advocated by Chandler and others, but also what 
could be characterised as a new collapsism that collapses human/non-human, 
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society/technology, the human/the machine, class/non-class binaries into one. 
Posthumanism collapses the human and the non-human and humanoid ro-
bots into the posthuman cyborg. Bruno Latour’s Actor Network Theory col-
lapses technology and society into the actant as the social. Deep Ecology and 
animal liberation theory collapse nature and society into an undifferentiated 
whole. Postmodernism collapses class/non-class into identity, and culture/ 
economy into culture. The consequence is that postmodernism has not just 
tried to displace and purge Marxist humanism from the academic world over 
the past decades, but has also been the ideology of capitalism’s regime of flexible 
accumulation (Harvey 1989). There is a ‘connection between this postmodern-
ist burst and the image-making of Ronald Reagan, the attempt to deconstruct 
traditional institutions of working-class power (the trade unions and the politi-
cal parties of the left), the masking of the social effects of the economic politics 
of privilege, ought to be evident enough’ (Harvey 1989, 336). The danger of 
postmodern approaches is that proclaiming the ‘farewell to modernity’ can ad-
vance ‘counter-Enlightenment in the garb of post-Enlightenment’ (Habermas 
1990, 5).
3. Dialectical Modernity
I agree with David Chandler that we need to move beyond dualist logic and 
analyse the world as a complex, dynamic whole. But postmodern thought lacks 
the necessary power of differentiation. Modernity is not the same as capitalism, 
instrumental reason and liberalism. Assuming the identity of these phenomena 
overlooks that modernity is in itself contradictory and contains the seeds of, 
and potentials for, post-capitalism.
Modernity is the project that aims at using knowledge ‘for the pursuit of hu-
man emancipation and the enrichment of daily life’ (Harvey 1989, 12). The 
type of modernity that is based on dualism, reductionism, mechanistic causal-
ity, positivism, instrumental reason, calculability, and determinism has back-
fired as a negative dialectic of the Enlightenment (Horkheimer and Adorno 
1944/2002) and created a history of modern catastrophes.
But modernity is not just domination from above, but also manifests through 
hegemony as domination from below as well as resistance. This resistance to 
instrumental reason does not stand outside modernity but constitutes an al-
ternative modernity. An alternative project can be based on the antagonistic 
features of modernity. Jürgen Habermas (1990) and Frederic Jameson (1991) 
agree that modernity is therefore incomplete. For Jameson (1991, 309-10), this 
means that postmodernity is more modern than modernity, whereas Haber-
mas argues for a different, alternative modern project. Critical, dialectical mo-
dernity is an alternative to capitalist, instrumental modernity. Modernity is an 
unfinished project, because it lacks certainty and finitude and always remains 
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open and developing. Modernity is always unfinished because it is an open, 
contradictory, dynamic societal formation.
I find the tradition of Hegelian and humanist Marxism a much more fea-
sible approach than postmodernism. Postmodernists have often tried to pre-
sent humanist and Hegelian Marxism as being part of the dualist tradition. But 
in reality, such versions of Marxism have advanced the onto-epistemology of 
dialectical modernity, in which categories and phenomena are identical and 
non-identical at the same time, posing a contradictory logic out of which dy-
namics, complexity and open development emerge. Hegel characterises the 
emergence of complexity and new properties as Aufhebung (sublation) taking 
place in an event, where contradictions (negations) are negated. Hegel describes 
the dialectical process as an open system of the encapsulated construction of 
triangles, so that a contradiction is sublated into a new emergent property that 
is itself part of a contradictory relation that constitutes the base of a new tri-
angle that comes about through a further sublation, and so on. ‘Something be-
comes an other, but the other is itself a something, so it likewise becomes an 
other, and so on ad infinitum’ (Hegel 1830, §93). The logic of dialectical moder-
nity is therefore complex, open and fractal in nature (see http://www.hegel.net/
en/e-poster.htm; Fuchs 2003; 2004; 2008; Fuchs and Schlemm 2005). Dialecti-
cal modernity consists of different organisational levels that are constituted by 
encapsulated dialectical triangles that develop dynamically. Each triangle is a 
dialectic of subject and object. The more one zooms into this fractal dialectic, 
the more dynamic the system is. At its inner level there is constant change. 
The more one zooms out, the more continuity you will find. This encapsulated 
triangle structure is based on a dialectic of continuity and inner change/discon-
tinuity. Human practice and praxis is the activity that produces society’s dialec-
tic and the changes at different organisational levels of this dialectic (Marcuse 
1941a). It is an unsubstantiated prejudice often labelled against Hegelianism 
and Hegelian Marxism that they advance closure and determinism. Concepts 
of complexity theory such as emergence and bifurcation points can be seen as a 
manifestation of Hegelian dialectical logic and its principles such as Aufhebung, 
the negation of the negation, and the turn from quantity into new qualities 
(Fuchs 2003; 2008).
There are different ways of overcoming dualist logic. Postmodernism is one 
way, Hegelian humanist Marxism another. The two act as dialectical conversa-
tional poles. In some cases, they sublate each other and productively fuse into 
a new emergent whole – as is the case with the book you are holding in your 
hands or reading on your screen.
The dualisms of instrumental reason are at the foundation of capitalist 
domination that in a negative dialectic again and again turns against itself 
and so destroys capitalism’s promises and produces crises and societal prob-
lems. Instrumental reason is the attempt to make society undialectical and 
one-dimensional. We never know when a major crisis will emerge, but we can 
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be certain that as long as society is based on instrumental reason, sooner or 
later such a crisis will appear (Fuchs 2004). Immanuel Wallerstein has com-
bined Marxist crisis theory and complexity theory, arguing that:
The modern world-system in which we are living, which is that of a 
capitalist world-economy, is currently in precisely such a crisis, and has 
been for a while now. This crisis may go on another twenty-five to fifty 
years. Since one central feature of such a transitional period is that we 
face wild oscillations of all those structures and processes we have come 
to know as an inherent part of the existing world-system, we find that 
our short-term expectations are necessarily quite unstable. This instabil-
ity can lead to considerable anxiety and therefore violence as people try 
to preserve acquired privileges and hierarchical rank in a very unstable 
situation. In general, this process can lead to social conflicts that take a 
quite unpleasant form (Wallerstein 2004, 77).
Wolfgang Streeck (2016) argues that the long phase of the complex world 
crisis that Wallerstein describes has resulted in a catastrophic crisis of capi-
talism. He says that capitalism’s contradictions are exploding and that the sys-
tem can no longer defer the crisis into the future by buying time. Streeck (12) 
confirms Wallerstein’s analysis that capitalism has ‘entered a period of deep 
indeterminacy – a period in which unexpected things can happen any time’. 
Streeck goes on to argue that we have entered a phase of prolonged chaos that 
he calls the interregnum – ‘no new world system equilibrium à la Wallerstein, 
but a prolonged period of social entropy, or disorder’ (13), in which social 
structures and institutions dissolve and leave society’s ‘members alone’ (36), 
and the logic of the survival of the fittest rules. Streeck’s position is in contrast 
to Wallerstein’s somewhat defeatist. He sees the logic of indeterminacy as re-
sulting in societal doom and gloom without a way out. Michael Hardt and Toni 
Negri (2017, 202) note that for Streeck ‘all antagonistic subjects capable of chal-
lenging capitalist rule have now disappeared’.
In contrast to Streeck, Wallerstein sees uncertainty as a new principle of hope 
that should motivate political movements to attempt the impossible in pursu-
ance of establishing a new system. Such optimism is based on the fact that the 
outcome of praxis is undetermined in bifurcation points and can intensify in 
unpredictable manners. Wallerstein implicitly advances a new notion of praxis 
that operates on the basis of relative chance, dialectical logic, and dialectical 
indeterminancy. ‘The period of transition from one system to another is a pe-
riod of great struggle, of great uncertainty, and of great questioning about the 
structures of knowledge. […] And we must finally figure out how we can act in 
the present so that it is likely to go in the direction we prefer’ (Wallerstein 2004, 
89–90). Praxis faces uncertainty, but it is also the attempt to increase the likeli-
hood of certain preferable options at bifurcation points.
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4. Big Data Capitalism’s Solutionism
Computing is embedded into the crises that have emerged from capitalism’s 
contradictions. And arguably, it has to some degree made the occurrence of 
crises and catastrophes even more likely. Algorithmic trading, for example, has 
intensified the likelihood of financial crises. Together with the general logic 
of fictitious capital underpinning financial derivatives, it has made financial 
markets more unpredictable. User-generated fake news and fake online atten-
tion are forms of a semi-automatic online politics that uses social media bots 
and artificial intelligence. In the world of Big Data, it has become more difficult 
to discern which actions are initiated by humans and which by bots and algo-
rithms. The conjunction of algorithmic politics and right-wing extremist ideol-
ogy has increased the uncertainty and unpredictability of politics. Not many 
people thought that Donald Trump would become US president, but the polls’ 
models of prediction failed: it was precisely this conjunction that won Trump 
the election (Fuchs 2018).
Big Data has not moved us towards dialectical modernity, but has rather 
tended to deepen the logic of mechanic determinism, reductionism and dual-
ism, and the division of mental and manual labour that Alfred Sohn-Rethel 
(1978) considers characteristic of class societies, particularly capitalist ones. 
In contemporary capitalism, Big Data has been embedded into what Evgeny 
Morozov (2013) calls technological solutionism. Digital solutionism is based 
on the logic to save everything, click here. It assumes that digital technologies 
make society completely controllable, steerable and governable, and therefore 
provide a fix for global problems, economic and political crises, terrorism, 
crime and so forth.
The logic of technological solutionism is not new. It is a capitalist logic that 
Horkheimer (2004) called instrumental reason and Marcuse (1941b) techno-
logical rationality. Digital solutionism intensified and accelerated after the 9/11 
attacks. Unable to respond to political complexity, governments advanced the 
solutionist ideology that large-scale data and online surveillance can predict, 
prevent and control terrorism and organised crime. The logic of determinism 
was thereby further extended and intensified. The surveillance society com-
bines surveillance ideology, the surveillance state and surveillance capitalism 
(Trottier and Fuchs 2015). The rise of Big Data has added a new dimension to 
digital solutionism, advancing Big Data solutionism, which is the idea that Big 
Data sets can control, solve and overcome economic and political crises. Big 
Data capitalism does not overcome, but instead deepens the logic of dualism, 
determinism and linearity. It is an intensification of instrumental reason that 
has created new qualities of domination and exploitation. So for example, ‘tech-
niques and ideologies of Big Data make another appearance, promising that a 
greater, deeper analysis of data about past crimes, combined with sophisticated 
algorithms, can predict – and prevent – future ones. This is a practice known 
as “predictive policing”, and even though it is just a few years old, many tout 
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it as a revolution in how police work is done. It is the epitome of solutionism’ 
(Morozov 2013, 182).
David Chandler hints at such a critique of Big Data solutionism when at the 
very end of his chapter he argues, drawing on Giorgio Agamben, that digital and 
Big Data governance can ‘be seen to be thoroughly depoliticizing, as the tasks 
of governance are discursively derived “empirically” from the world, rather than 
from human actors as subjects’. The end of the story turns back against the main 
thread of the story, which in a discursive logic typical for David’s writings, creates 
an openness and uncertainty regarding the whole story itself.
5. Towards Dialectical Digital Modernity
The escalation of the antagonisms inherent in capitalism’s instrumental reason 
has intensified the complexity, unpredictability and uncertainty of societal de-
velopment. This phase of the deep economic, political and legitimation crisis 
coincides with the rise of Big Data capitalism. Big Data technologies promise 
to create certainty in a highly uncertain world, yet through their logic of digital 
solutionism they exacerbate the crises. But pointing this out does not mean 
that we should abolish digital technologies and revert to pre-modern technolo-
gies. It is also no way forward to try to create radically new postmodern technolo-
gies that completely break with the technologies we have. The digital technologies 
we have are internally antagonistic. They advance solutionism and domination, 
yet at the same time they contain new potentials for cooperation and liberation. 
The point is that capitalism, class, power structures, domination and exploitation 
have never allowed society and technology to become fully dialectical.
Again and again, modernity turns against itself and destroys its own poten-
tials, calling forth catastrophes and crises. The point is then to shape technol-
ogy and society differently and dialectically, so that digital objects and digital 
subjects are no longer separated but, based on the logic of dialectical moder-
nity, form a differentiated, complex unity in diversity. Our societal and digital 
future is uncertain. But this does not mean that technology can determine or 
compute the future. That society is complex, dynamic, open, non-linear, un-
predictable and dialectical is an impetus for praxis as political hope that aims 
at transforming the whole by perpetuating the system and trying to increase 
the likelihood of certain potential development paths of our societal and digital 
future. Such a future is not pre- or postmodern, but an alternative, dialectical 
(digital) modernity that realises its own potentials. It is the revolt against capi-
talism in general, and the transcendence and sublation of digital capitalism in 
particular. Such a society will also transform and sublate today’s digital tech-
nologies, which means that it will abolish destructive technologies and tech-
nological qualities, preserve technologies of cooperation, reconstruct existing 
technologies and create new dialectical technologies that transcend the logic of 
instrumental reason.
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CHAPTER 4
Karl Marx in the Age of  
Big Data  Capitalism
Christian Fuchs
1. Introduction
Computers operate based on digital data. They convert information into 
streams of bits (zeros and ones) in order to store, process and transmit it. The 
logic of capitalist and bureaucratic administration has driven the development 
of computing. As a result of political-economic interests and needs and techno-
logical development, the volume, velocity and variety of data (Kitchin 2014, 68) 
have increased to a degree where quantity turns into a new quality. In short, we 
have seen the rise of Big Data. Increasingly, algorithms and digital machines are 
generating, collecting, storing, processing and assessing Big Data, and making 
decisions that sideline humans in economic, political and everyday life. This 
development has resulted in the emergence of a specific quality of digital capi-
talism: Big Data capitalism. Big Data capitalism requires that we assess how 
thought systems, forms of knowledge, political economy, governmentalities, 
materialities, infrastructures, practices, organisations, institutions, subjectivi-
ties, spaces (Kitchin 2014, 25), temporalities, and discourses and ideologies are 
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changing. The task of this chapter is to show how Karl Marx’s theory matters for 
understanding and criticising Big Data capitalism’s political economy.
The chapter first engages with why Marx matters today (Section 2), then in-
troduces the notion of Big Data capitalism (Section 3), analyses digital labour’s 
contradictions (Section 4), digital capitalism’s crisis (Section 5), ideology today 
(Section 6), and concludes with some thoughts on alternatives to Big Data capi-
talism (Section 7).
2. Why Marx Matters Today
There are at least fourteen reasons why we need Marx today. As long as capital-
ism and class exist, his analysis remains absolutely crucial for understanding, 
criticising and changing society. Just as Marx analysed capitalism and society as 
historical, based on a dialectic of continuity and change, so his own approach is 
also subject to such a dialectic.
A first aspect of Marx’s works that we need today is the analysis of the com-
modity form and capital. ‘The wealth of societies in which the capitalist mode of 
production prevails appears as an “immense collection of commodities”’ (Marx 
1867/1976, 125). Neoliberal capitalism has resulted in the commodification 
of almost everything, including communication. In the world of digital 
 commodities, we find the commodification of digital labour–power, digital 
 content, digital technologies and online audiences. Information is non-rivalrous 
in consumption (as a resource, information is not used up when consumed). 
It is difficult to exclude others from access. Information can be easily  copied. 
It is  therefore an antagonistic commodity type that can be turned into a 
 commodity, but that can also relatively easily resist commodification and be 
turned into a common good. Digital capitalism faces a contradiction between 
digital capital and the digital commons.
Second, Marx can inform our understanding of the exploitation of labour 
today. ‘The proletarian is merely a machine for the production of surplus-value, 
the capitalist too, is merely a machine for the transformation of this surplus-value 
into surplus capital’ (Marx 1867/1976, 742). The proletariat today takes on new 
forms, including precarious labour – such as the unpaid labour of interns and 
shadow workers, whose labour may not resemble more familiar forms of  labour, 
but which nevertheless produces value – and workers in the  international 
division of digital labour (IDDL) (Fuchs 2014; 2015).
Third, Marx analysed the globalisation of capitalism. Capital ‘must nestle 
everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere’ (Marx and 
Engels 1848/2010, 486–487). Since the late twentieth century, capitalism has 
become more global in comparison to its Fordist development stage, and has 
entered a new stage of imperialist capitalism.
Fourth, Marx matters today for understanding capitalism’s crisis. He stressed 
that the capitalist economy and capitalist society’s contradictions again and 
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again produce crises. ‘The fact that the movement of capitalist society is full 
of contradictions impresses itself most strikingly on the practical bourgeois in 
the changes of the periodic cycle through which modern industry passes, the 
 summit of which is the general crisis’ (Marx 1867/1976, 103).
Fifth, Marx’s stress on the dialectic of technology and society helps us to un-
derstand contemporary technologies. He worked out this analysis in Capital 
Vol. 1’s Chapter 15 (Machinery and Large­Scale Industry) and The Grundrisse’s 
Fragment on Machines (Fuchs 2016c, Chapter 15 & appendix 2). Marx’s analy-
sis of technology is based on Hegel’s dialectic of essence and existence. In the 
machinery chapter in Capital Vol. 1, he argues that ‘machinery in itself shortens 
the hours of labour, but when employed by capital it lengthens them; […] in 
itself it lightens labour, but when employed by capital it heightens its intensity; 
[…] in itself it is a victory of man over the forces of nature but in the hands 
of capital it makes man the slave of those forces; […] in itself it increases the 
wealth of the producers, but in the hands of capital it makes them into paupers 
(Marx 1867/1976, 568–569). Figure 1 visualises some of the dialectics of tech-
nology in capitalism.
Sixth, Marx’s analysis of the general intellect matters today. The notion of 
general intellect indicates that ‘general social knowledge has become a direct 
force of production’ (Marx 1857/1858/1973, 706). Universal labour produces 
the general intellect. ‘Universal labour is all scientific work, all discovery and 
invention’ (Marx 1894/1981, 199). Knowledge, communication and technology 
thereby become common goods.
Marx anticipated the emergence of the information economy. The capital-
ist profit imperative creates the need to increase productivity. Technological 
Subject:
Labour-power
Increase of society‘s wealth
Appropriation of nature
Ease of work
Shortening of the working day
Object: 
Means of production
ESSENCE:   EXISTENCE: 





Impoverishment of the producers
Subjugation of humans, destruction of nature
Intensification of labour
Prolongation of the working day
STRUGGLES (historical: machine destroyers) 
TRUTH: TECHNOLOGY IN COMMUNISM
Figure 1: Marx’s analysis of the dialectics of technology in capitalism.
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progress progressively increases the relevance of science, technology and 
knowledge in production. At one stage of capitalist development, quantity 
turns into the new quality of informational capitalism.
Seventh, Marx matters for understanding digital capitalism. In the Grun­
drisse, he conceptually anticipated the Internet, arguing that institutions 
‘emerge whereby each individual can acquire information about the activity 
of all others and attempt to adjust his own accordingly […] Interconnections 
[…] [are established] through the mails, telegraphs etc.’ (Marx 1857/1858/1973, 
161). This formulation anticipates the Internet as a global system of informa-
tion, communication and social networking.
The eighth dimension of Marx’s works that is crucial for understanding con-
temporary capitalism’s political economy is the antagonism between produc-
tive forces and relations of production. ‘The contradiction between the general 
social power into which capital develops and the private power of the indi-
vidual capitalists over these social conditions of production develops ever more 
blatantly, while this development also contains the solution to this situation, in 
that it simultaneously raises the conditions of production into general, com-
munal, social conditions. This transformation is brought about by the develop-
ment of the productive forces under capitalist production and by the manner 
and form in which this development is accomplished’ (Marx 1894/1981, 373).
In digital capitalism, there is an antagonism between networked digital pro-
ductive forces and class relations. Networked digital technologies create new 
forms of commodification and exploitation, and new problems for accumula-
tion. However, digital information as a commodity also has features that resist 
commodification. Digital capitalism is grounded in an antagonism between 
digital commons and digital commodities. Digitalisation shapes, and is shaped 
by, the ‘antagonism between the social cooperation of the proletariat and the 
(economic and political) command of capital’ (Negri 2017, 25).
The ninth reason why Marx matters today is that his theory, along with 
 various approaches in the tradition of Marxist theory, allows us to ground a 
critical theory of communication and language (Fuchs 2016a, 2016c). He says, 
for example, that ‘Peter only relates to himself as a man through his relation to 
another man, Paul, in whom he recognizes his likeness’ (Marx 1867/1976, 144). 
Communication is the way that humans relate to each other symbolically in 
order to interpret the social world, make sense of each other, construct joint 
meaning and transform social reality. Lukács’ Ontology of Social Being, Raymond 
Williams’s cultural materialism, and other Marxist theory approaches allow the 
construction of dialectical critical theories of communication that pose alter-
natives to Habermas’s dualist theory of communication and Luhmann’s instru-
mental systems theory of communication (Fuchs 2016a).
Tenth, Marx makes us think about the notions of the base and the superstruc-
ture, which pose the question of how to reflect on the role of communication 
in capitalism. Marx reminds us that it is crucial to think about how economy/
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society, work/communication, capital/power, labour/ideology, body/mind, 
physical/mental work, production/reproduction are related. The dualities of so-
ciety and capitalism are simultaneously identical and non-identical. They form 
dialectics. Raymond Williams has ‘solved’ the base/superstructure problem in a 
materialist and dialectical manner. Williams (1977) argues that there is an iden-
tical economic moment of all social systems and subsystems of society: humans 
produce sociality through the communication processes. Communication is 
the process of the social production and reproduction of sociality and soci-
ety. At the same time, each societal subsystem and social system also features a 
non-identical moment: these are emergent, non-economic qualities.
Ideology and fetishism form the eleventh dimension of Marx’s relevance 
today. In commodity fetishism, the ‘definite social relation between men 
themselves’ assumes ‘the fantastic form of a relation between things’ (Marx 
1867/1976, 165). In political fetishism, the nation is a fetish: nationalism is the 
ideology that constructs fictive ethnicity (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, 49, 
96–100). In the realm of the media, advertising fetishises the commodity form 
and ideological tabloid journalism fetishises domination and exploitation. We 
have experienced the rise of new nationalisms and xenophobia directed against 
immigrant workers and refugees. Nationalism distracts from class contradic-
tion by portraying capital and labour as non-contradictory and united in ‘one 
nation’. Marx, in his analysis of authoritarianism, coined the notion of ‘Bona-
partism’ that entails the ideological project ‘to unite all classes by reviving for 
all the chimera of national glory’ (Marx 1871/2010, 330).
Twelfth, Marx is a role model for critical journalism and critical public in-
tellectuals. Thirteenth, Marx stresses the importance of social struggles for a 
better society. His humanism was practical. He speaks of ‘the categorical im-
perative to overthrow all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, for-
saken, despicable being’ (Marx 1844/2010, 182). Today, there are discussions 
about the role of digital technologies as tools for social struggle. Practical hu-
manism is related to the fourteenth dimension: Marx foregrounds the need 
for alternatives, namely social systems that transcend the profit imperative and 
focus on human cooperation.
3. Big Data Capitalism
The rise of Big Data capitalism stands in a broader societal – economic, politi-
cal, ideological – context. In the economy, we have experienced the neoliberal 
commodification and privatisation of (almost) everything, including data and 
communication(s). In the political system, a surveillance-industrial complex 
has emerged. This political–economic complex has been accompanied by an 
ideology that promotes the idea that surveillance technologies will prevent and 
detect crime and terrorism. Surveillance ideology has helped create a culture 
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of control, fearmongering, scapegoating, suspicion, competition and individu-
alisation.
The collection, storage, control and analysis of Big Data stands in the context 
of political-economic interests that aim at the economic and political control 
and targeting of individuals. They are targeted as consumers and as potential 
terrorists and criminals. Edward Snowden has revealed the existence of a global 
communication surveillance system that secret services use to monitor and an-
alyse communication flows in real time. The companies implicated in this sur-
veillance system include AOL, Apple, Facebook, Google/YouTube, Microsoft, 
Paltalk, Skype/Microsoft, and Yahoo!.
C. Wright Mills argued in 1956 that there is an ‘ever-increasing interlock-
ing of economic, military, and political structures’ (Mills 1956, 8). In this 
context, he spoke of the existence of a power elite. Today, the power elite 
makes use of a surveillance-industrial complex in order to exert control. In 
the surveillance-industrial complex, users make data public or semi-public on the 
Internet. Corporations commodify this data and users’ activities to accumulate 
capital. Secret services and the police aim to gain access to the Big Data flows in 
order to securitise data and society. In doing so, they partly outsource surveillance 
to private security services, for whom surveillance is a profitable business. The 
NSA subcontracts surveillance to more than 2,000 private security companies. In 
the surveillance-industrial complex, surveillance capital and the surveillance state 
are fused together. Big Data means Big Brother power and big capitalist business.
Marx speaks of surveillance labour as how the ‘work of directing, super-
intending and adjusting becomes one of the functions of capital’ (1867/1976, 
448). Foucault, who states that ‘we live in a society where panopticism reigns’ 
(Foucault 1994, 58), goes on to argue that the ‘panoptic mechanism basi-
cally involves putting someone in the center – an eye, a gaze, a principle of 
surveillance – who will be able to make its sovereignty function over all the 
individuals [placed] within this machine of power’ (Foucault 2007, 93–94). The 
surveillance-industrial complex shows that around ‘the concept of power […], 
Marx and Foucault coincide’ (Negri 2017, 184) and that ‘capital and power […] 
become unified […] and constitute a chiasm between two contradictory ac-
tions that are forced to join together and yet are intransitive’ (Negri 2017, 12).
Some scholars in the field of surveillance studies claim that surveillance has 
become post-panoptic, and that digital surveillance has not resulted in a digital 
panopticon. They stress that surveillance has become decentralised, and argue 
that Foucault’s panopticism should be theoretically smashed. Such approaches 
disregard the emergence of surveillance technologies’ decentralised central-
ism. Decentralised surveillance technologies collect Big Data in many places. 
This data is networked and controlled by two central panoptic collective actors: 
capital and the state.
Big Data capitalism and algorithmic power could result in the world turn-
ing into a huge shopping mall in which humans are targeted by ads almost 
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everywhere, and where commercial logic colonises society. In the world of Big 
Data, algorithms that use instrumental logic for calculating human needs can 
automate human activities and decision-making in order to meet those needs. 
The problem is that algorithms and machines do not have ethics and morals. 
Data commodification means the emergence of new social inequalities, and 
intensifies the exploitative tendencies of the Internet. Big Data entails a ‘Big 
Data divide’ (Andrejevic 2014) in respect to data ownership and data control. 
Big Data also features new types of rational discrimination and cumulative 
disadvantage (Gandy 2009). Big Data’s logic of digital positivism overlooks 
that technology is no fix for social and political problems. Big Data surveil-
lance’s logic of categorical suspicions abolishes the presumption of innocence; 
instead, a presumption of guilt emerges, based on the principle ‘You’re a crim-
inal and terrorist until proven innocent’– this despite the fact that most ter-
rorists do not communicate their plans online. Günther Anders (1980, 221) 
stresses surveillance’s totalitarian character: ‘As surveillance devices are used 
routinely, the main premise of totalitarianism is already created and, with it, 
totalitarianism itself ’. Surveillance and surveillance ideology are often em-
bedded into law and order politics, resulting in fascist potentials being ad-
vanced. Big Data means that massive amounts of data are stored on servers 
and transmitted over the Internet, which under the current energy regime 
means an exacerbation of environmental problems. E-waste is being dumped 
into developing countries.
In 2012, data centres used electricity equalling the output of 30 nuclear 
power plants (Glanz 2012). Running the Internet accounts for about 10% of all 
electricity produced globally (De Decker 2015). Outsourcing data and software 
use, and crowdsourcing labour to the Cloud, can increase unemployment and 
precarious labour.
The rise of Big Data in research has resulted in new approaches such as com-
putational social science and digital humanities. These are forms of Big Data 
positivism. Such research obtains large amounts of funding, and is obsessed 
with quantification. Big Data analytics entails the danger that the ‘convergence 
of social-scientific methods toward those of the natural sciences is itself the 
child of a society that reifies people’ (Pollock and Adorno 2011, 20). Big Data 
positivism is an ‘immunization of the [Internet] sciences against philosophy’ 
(Habermas 1971, 67). Computer science colonises the social sciences and 
humanities. The danger is that computational social science brings about the 
death of theory and roots out critical qualitative, theory-oriented research. 
Georg Lukács (1971, 88) warned in this context that mathematics and posi-
tivism reduce qualities to quantities that ‘can be calculated’ and reify human 
activities. The digital machine that organises Big Data creates a new form of 
reification that destroys qualities, dialectics, critique and non-instrumental ac-
tion. We need alternatives to Big Data analytics; we need critical digital media 
studies instead of computational social science.
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4. Digital Labour’s Contradictions
In 2016, Google made profits of US$19.5 billion and was the world’s 
twenty-seventh largest transnational company. In the same year, Facebook reg-
istered profits of US$ 10.2 billion and was the world’s 188th largest global corpo-
ration1. But not all social media corporations are as profitable. Twitter reported 
losses of US$ 456.9 million in 20162. In the US economy, the share of profits in 
the GDP was 24.8% and the share of the wage sum 53.1% (Fuchs 2015, Chapter 
5). Facebook’s wage share (i.e. the share of the wages it paid from its revenues) 
was 11.0%. Why are the company’s wages so low in comparison to the total US 
economy, and its profits so high? The social media economy is based on the 
exploitation of users’ unpaid digital labour. Marx (1885/1978) described the 
capital accumulation cycle in the form M – C .. P .. C’ – M’. In the social me-
dia economy, this cycle changes into M – C .. P1 (v1, c) .. P2 (v2=0) .. C’ – M’. 
The platforms are products (P1) that are not commodities, but a ‘free lunch’. 
Personal data (P2) is a commodity generated by users’ digital labour that is sold 
to advertising clients who are enabled to present targeted ads on users’ profiles.
Toni Negri argues that we need ‘a new theory of labour value as a common 
potentiality’ (Negri 2017, 29). Marx stresses that technological and capitalist 
development has resulted in the emergence of the collective worker: ‘With the 
progressive accentuation of the cooperative character of the labour process, 
there necessarily occurs a progressive extension of the concept of productive 
labour, and of the concept of the bearer of that labour, the productive worker. In 
order to work productively, it is no longer necessary for the individual himself 
to put his hand to the object; it is sufficient for him to be an organ of the collec-
tive labourer, and to perform any one of its subordinate functions’ (Marx 1867, 
643–644). Marx also speaks of the collective worker as an ‘aggregate worker’: 
‘An ever increasing number of types of labour are included in the immediate 
concept of productive labour, and those who perform it are classed as produc-
tive workers, workers directly exploited by capital and subordinated to its pro-
cess of production and expansion’ (Marx 1867, 1039).
Marx argues that the cooperative character of labour requires an extension 
of the concept of productive labour. It is not just the unpaid labour time con-
nected to wage-labour that is exploited and productive, but also the unwaged 
labour that contributes to the production of commodities and capital accumu-
lation. Expressions of this insight have been made independently of each other 
in, among other fields, autonomist theory, socialist feminism, and audience 
labour theory.
In autonomist theory, the concept of the social worker, ‘a new working class’ 
that is ‘now extended throughout the entire span of production and reproduc-
tion’ (Negri 1988, 209) creates an ‘interconnection between productive labour 
and the labour of reproduction’ (Negri 1988, 209). Socialist feminism stresses 
orthodox Marxism’s common assumption that ‘women in domestic labor are 
not productive’ (Dalla Costa and James 1973, 31). This assumption denies 
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‘women’s potential social power’ (6). Domestic and reproductive labour ‘pro-
duces not merely use values, but is essential to the production of surplus value’ 
(31). It produces a commodity ‘unique to capitalism: the living human being – 
‘the labourer himself ’ (6). Dallas Smythe’s audience labour theory argues that 
audiences of advertising-funded media are unpaid audience workers conduct-
ing labour that creates an audience commodity. The ‘material reality under 
monopoly capitalism is that all non-sleeping time of most of the population is 
work time. […] Of the off-the-job work time, the largest single block is time of 
the audiences, which is sold to advertisers’ (Smythe 1977, 3).
Digital labour on commercial social media is in certain respects different 
from audience labour on commercial broadcast media. Social media uses tar-
geted advertising that is based on a Big Data commodity. Audiences make 
meanings out of content. Social media users also create social relations, con-
tent and data. Users’ digital labour on social media is based on prosumption 
(productive consumption), constant surveillance of personal data, targeted 
and personalised advertising, predictive algorithms and algorithmic auctions. 
Facebook and Google are the world’s largest advertising agencies utilizing 
such labour and the harvesting of the Big Data commodity of audience in-
formation.
Digital labour is alienated digital work organised in an international divi-
sion of digital labour that entails the slave-labour of miners extracting minerals 
that form the physical foundations of digital tools, Taylorist assemblage labour, 
e-waste labour, software engineering, various forms of online labour, users’ la-
bour, and so on. (Fuchs 2014, 2015, 2017b).
In the United States, the average reproductive labour time per week per per-
son was 44.53 hours in 2015 (for detailed data on the following calculations, see 
Fuchs 2017a). The average annual hours of wage-labour were 1,778. 232 billion 
total hours of wage-labour were performed, of which 113 billion were surplus 
labour hours, and 119 billion were necessary labour time. The traditional rate 
of surplus value is calculated as the relationship of the surplus labour time of 
wage labour (s) to its necessary labour time (v). In monetary terms, it is calcu-
lated as the relationship of total annual profits (p) to total wages (v). In the case 
of the US economy, the traditional rate of surplus value in 2015 was 0.942. But 
the classical formula does not take unwaged labour into account. According 
to statistics, 579 billion hours of unpaid reproductive labour hours were per-
formed in the USA in 2015. The organic composition of labour (the corrected 
rate of surplus value) can be calculated in the following formula (Fuchs 2017a):
Organic composition of labour =
Wage labour’s unpaid labour time + Unwaged labour’s unpaid labour time
Paid labour time
Such an effect of capital is not just to increase wage labour’s unpaid labour time, 
but also to increase the unpaid labour time of unwaged labour. Reproductive 
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labour is productive because it is a form of unpaid, surplus labour time. Capital 
exploits wage labour and reproductive labour. The organic composition of la-
bour in the USA in 2015 was (579 + 113) / 119 = 5.8 (Fuchs 2017a). Per waged 
hour of labour, 5.8 hours of unpaid reproductive labour were performed. 
 Reproductive labour made up 83.7% of all unpaid labour time, and 16.3% of 
labour’s surplus labour time.
In the same year of 2015, the average reproductive labour time in the USA 
was 44.5 hours per week per person. On average, 4.9 hours were spent watch-
ing advertisements, and 12.4 hours using commercial social media (Fuchs 
2017a). Audience labour and users’ digital labour constitute significant shares 
of reproductive labour time. Moreover, reproductive labour is gendered. In the 
US, women on average conduct 60% of reproductive labour (Fuchs 2017a). 
 Facebook’s algorithm uses racist and sexist logic segmenting market data using 
crude distinctions, generalisations and assumptions. Users in poorer countries, 
and poorer users in general, are treated as being less valuable consumers, i.e. 
as being less likely to purchase advertised commodities when clicking on ads 
(Fuchs 2017a).
Digital capitalism deepens exploitation while at the same time creating 
new foundations for autonomous realms that transcend the logic of capital-
ism. It creates the foundations for new relations of production that germinate 
within capitalism. With digitalisation, ‘the commodity becomes increasingly 
transparent’ (Negri 2017, 25) and ‘there begin to emerge sectors that are increas-
ingly sensitive to the autonomy of social cooperation, to the self-valorisation of 
proletarian subjects’ (Negri 2017, 25). Digital capitalism is founded on an an-
tagonism between the digital commodity created by digital labour on the one 
side, and the digital commons on the other.
Open access publishing is a good example of digital antagonism. Open access 
is to a certain degree a reaction to the high profit rates of academic publish-
ing corporations, and the monopolisation tendencies in this industry. In 2016, 
Reed Elsevier achieved a net profit before tax of £1.934 billion and revenues of 
£6.895 billion. Thus its profit rate was 1.934/(6.895–1.934) = 39.0%. In the same 
year, Springer made profits of €296.4 million and revenues of €833.1 million. 
Its profit rate was 296.4/(833.1–296.4) = 55.2%3. Such profit rates are extremely 
high. They are achieved by the sale of expensive bundles of article subscrip-
tions, databases and journals to libraries, and content access to individuals.
Universities and the academic system use public funding to a significant de-
gree. Academic knowledge is a commons that is ‘brought about partly by the 
cooperation of men now living, but partly also by building on earlier work’ 
(Marx 1894, 199). Monopoly capital privatises and commodifies the academic 
commons. Open access is a counter-reaction to monopoly publishing capital.
‘Open access (OA) literature is digital, online, free of charge, and free of most 
copyright and licensing restrictions’ (Suber 2012, 4). The majority of open ac-
cess projects are non-profit and run by academics or academic associations. A 
minority of open access projects are for-profit. They achieve profits by article 
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and book processing charges (APCs, BPCs). Authors pay high publishing 
charges (sometimes thousands of €/£/$) for publication of their works. APCs 
and BPCs are like going to a restaurant where you pay for being allowed to cook 
and eat your own meal. In the Diamond Open Access Model, not-for-profit, 
non-commercial organisations, associations or networks publish material 
that is made available online in digital format, is free of charge for readers 
and  authors and does not allow commercial and for-profit re-use (Fuchs and 
 Sandoval 2013).
On March 20, 2017, the Directory of Open Access Journals listed 9,423 
open access journals. 1,866 of these used the CC-BY-NC-ND licence, 1,328 
CC-BY-NC, 522 CC-BY-NC-SA. A total of 3,716 (39.4%) did not allow com-
mercial re-use. 5,134 (54.5%) did not use APCs4. These data indicate the exist-
ence of digital academic commons that are autonomous of capital.
There is a variety of political positions on open access (Fuchs and Sandoval 
2013). The policy and industry perspective argues that ‘open access is a great 
new business model’. The trade union perspective holds that ‘open access is 
constituted by voluntary non-resource projects that destroy the jobs of pub-
lishing workers’. The radical open access perspective says that ‘non-profit open 
access requires struggles against capitalist publishing that mobilises resources’.
Radical open access can only work properly by achieving material support in 
the form of funds from foundations and the public, help from volunteers, uni-
versities acting as open access publishing houses, and universities and research 
councils establishing policies that favour publishing in OA journals.
Lawrence & Wishart (L&W) is the publisher of Marx and Engels Collected 
Works. The Marxists Internet Archive (MIA, https://www.marxists.org) is an 
open access library of classical Marxist texts, including Marx and Engels’s writ-
ings. In 2014, a conflict arose between L&W and MIA about whether or not 
Marx and Engels’s works should be available online in open access format.
L&W argued that ‘infringement of this copyright has the effect of depriving a 
small radical publisher of the funds it needs to remain in existence. […] [MIA] 
is reproducing the norms and expectations not of the socialist and communist 
traditions, but of a consumer culture which expects cultural content to be deliv-
ered free to consumers, leaving cultural workers such as publishers, editors and 
writers unpaid’. MIA disagreed, and said that the Internet ‘is a new media for 
information. Specifically, the history of the workers movement should in fact be 
‘free.’ […] The point of any communist publishing house, which the MIA lives 
up to, is to assure the widest distribution of these works, not, again, to restrict 
them. That is the opposite of communist publishing’.
The conflict is one between the digital commons-Left and the copyright-Left. 
It is an expression of the antagonism between networked digital productive 
forces and alternative projects’ operation within capitalism. Making Marx’s and 
Engels’s works available online is not simply an economic, but also a political 
question. These works should be accessible online without payment for politi-
cal reasons. Wide accessibility is a good foundation for making Marxist ideas a 
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material force, and the Internet is an excellent medium for this task. Because of 
the ‘Streisand effect’, copyright enforcement is counterproductive on the Inter-
net. Competition between left-wing projects is self-defeating. The Left should 
concentrate on cooperation that challenges for-profit corporate publishing. 
Cooperation could also entail the struggle for and development of alternative 
forms of funding (public funding, donation models, charges for commercial 
re-use, making works available open access once a specific level of donations is 
achieved, and so forth).
5. Digital Capitalism’s Crisis
Paul Mason (2015) connects Marx’s theorem of the Law of the Tendency of the 
Rate of Profit to Fall, Schumpeter’s long wave theory, and the analysis of digi-
tal media. The result is a breakdown theory of capitalism, a new version of 
Henryk Grossmann’s breakdown theory of capitalism in the digital age. Gross-
mann (1992, 119) argued that ‘the capitalist system inevitably breaks down due 
to the relative decline in the mass of profit’ (Grossmann 1992, 119). Mason 
writes that information technology results in zero marginal costs of informa-
tion. As a result, the rate of profit would fall until capitalism breaks down and 
post-capitalism emerges (see Fuchs 2016b).
Such analyses disregard how class struggle influences the rate of profit and 
surplus value. The Marxian rate of profit is calculated the following way:
Rate of profit = sc + v
s … surplus value, profit
c … constant capital
v … variable capital
By dividing the fraction’s enumerator and the denominator by variable capital, 
we get the following transformation:





s/v … Rate of surplus value
c/v … Organic composition of capital
The rate of surplus value measures the intensity of labour exploitation, and the 
organic composition of capital measures the technology and resource intensity 
of production. Since the 1970s, computerisation has had ambivalent, contra-
dictory effects on the rate of profit. It has increased both the organic composi-
tion of capital and the rate of surplus value. These two ratios have contradic-
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tory effects on the rate of profit. A rise of the organic composition decreases 
the rate of profit, a rise of the rate of surplus value increases it. Capitalist class 
struggle against the working class has decreased the wage share (the share of 
wages in the GDP). The total effect has been that in many countries, and at the 
global level, the general profit rate has fluctuated. The fluctuation has encour-
aged financialisation, which increases the volatility of the economy. The relative 
drop in wages has resulted in an increase of household debts and a weakening 
of purchasing power. The 2008 crisis was an expression of neoliberal finance 
capitalism’s accumulated contradictions. Ever since, the economic crisis in 
many parts of the world has also turned into an ideological crisis of liberal-
ism, giving rise to authoritarian ideology, nationalism and, to a certain degree, 
authoritarian capitalism.
6. Ideology Today
Commodity producers do not relate to each other directly. Exchange value 
means the exchange of particular quantities of commodities in the form x 
commodity A = y commodity B (e.g. 1 banana = £0.15). The social relations 
of production are not visible in the produced and purchased commodities, 
which is what Marx terms commodity fetishism. A commodity is ‘a social 
 hieroglyphic’ (Marx 1867/1976, 167). ‘The emergence and diffusion of ideolo-
gies appears as the general characteristic of class societies’ (Lukács 1986, 405, 
translation from German).
Nationalism is an ideology that treats the nation as a political fetish object. 
Nationalism veils class relations. It presents capital and labour as united by a 
(fictive) national interest. ‘[N]ation and nationhood are central components 
of fascist political discourse’ (Woodley 2010, 185). ‘[F]ascism must itself be 
understood as a political commodity: […] fetishization of communal identi-
ties which conceal the true nature of the commodity’ (Woodley 2010, 17–18). 
Fascism is ‘a populist ideology which seeks, through a mythology of unity and 
identity, to project a ‘common instinctual fate’ (uniform social status) between 
bourgeois and proletarianized groups, eliding the reality of social distinction in 
differentiated class societies’ (Woodley 2010, 17). Capitalist crisis can produce 
fascism, which is why we cannot rule out that the new nationalisms will turn 
into new fascisms and a new world war.
Figure 2 shows a model of right-wing authoritarianism (see Fuchs 2018 
for more details). This model uses authoritarian leadership, nationalism, the 
friend/enemy-scheme, patriarchy and militarism to distract attention from 
class structures.
Donald Trump is a typical example of right-wing authoritarianism. He is not 
just a politician and a capitalist, but also a media personality who uses Twitter 
and reality TV to spread ideology and brand himself. Social media is a realm 
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Figure 2: A model of right-wing authoritarianism.
of symbolic, communicative and ideological struggle. In the information age, 
the realm of online communication is an important domain of class struggle. 
With more than 30 million followers on Twitter, more than 20 million likes on 
Facebook, and more than 7 million followers on Instagram, Trump uses social 
media as a tool for spreading right-wing authoritarian ideology.
On 5 September 2016, US-Americans celebrated Labor Day. Trump posted a 
video on Twitter and Facebook, in which he addressed American workers (see 
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http://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/statuses/772798809508372480, https://t.
co/RNl7cfzkmN). In the video, he says:
The American worker built the foundation for the country we love and 
have today. But the American worker is getting crushed. Bad trade deals 
like NAFTA and TPP, such high and inexcusable taxes and fees on small 
businesses that employ so many good people. This Labor Day, let’s honour 
our American workers, the men and women who proudly keep  America 
working. They are the absolute best anywhere in the world. There is 
 nobody like ‘em. I’m ready to make America work again and to make 
America great again. That’s what we are going to do on November 8.
This passage contains several ideological elements. It presents US-Americans 
as a mythic collective. It constructs a unified national interest of capital and 
labour. He presents the US nation as being under attack by foreign enemies. 
Social conflict is portrayed as a conflict between nations, which deflects atten-
tion from class conflicts. Trump’s use of Twitter makes evident how national-
ism works as political fetishism. Rosa Luxemburg argues in this context that 
nationalism is a ‘misty veil’ that ‘conceals in every case a definite historical con-
tent’ (Luxemburg 1976, 135). ‘[B]lood, community, folk, are devices for hiding 
the real constellation of power’ (Neumann 1994/2009, 464).
7. Alternatives
The twenty-first century is reaching a historical bifurcation point character-
ised by turbulence and an intensification of political polarisation. The future is 
uncertain. We could head towards hyper-neoliberal capitalism, authoritarian 
capitalism, fascism, the total destruction of the Earth and the annihilation of 
humanity in a nuclear world war, or an alternative society of the commons.
In their tetraology Empire, Multitude, Commonwealth, Assembly Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000, 2004, 2009, 2017) describe a stage in capi-
talist development in which global capital (the Empire) faces a new working 
class (the multitude). New common potentials emerge that could become the 
foundation of a society of the commons, the commonwealth. Commonwealth 
is, however, just one possible outcome of twenty-first-century society’s devel-
opment. There could also be negative developments such as a new fascism or 
the end of humanity. Which option prevails depends on how social struggles 
will develop. The truth of what Rosa Luxemburg wrote in 1918 has today again 
become very urgent: ‘In this hour, socialism is the only salvation for humanity’ 
(Luxemburg 1971, 367).
Right-wing authoritarian movements advance particularistic politics of na-
ture, of the social, and of communication. In respect to nature, they fetishise na-
tional identity, the family, and conservative traditions, and see immigrants and 
global identity as environmental problems disrupting the nation. Right-wing 
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authoritarianism’s social policies are a combination of neoliberal ideology that 
propagates survival of the fittest and a national-‘socialist’ rhetoric that reserves 
welfare for the autochthonous, national population. In respect to communi-
cation, right-wing authoritarianism combines conservative techno-pessimism 
that sees traditional values under threat on the Internet and argues in favour of 
law-and-order control of the Internet, with a neoliberal techno-capitalist ideol-
ogy that celebrates the corporate media and the corporate Internet.
Progressive forces are today often split and fragmented. The commons con-
sist of social, natural and communicative commons. All of these commons have 
become increasingly commodified and privatised. Left-wing parties and move-
ments predominantly struggle for the defence of the social commons, Green 
movements for the defence of the natural commons, and tech movements for 
the defence of the communicative commons. In order to challenge right-wing 
authoritarianism, progressive forces should learn from the failures of the Left 
in the 1920s when various factions, especially Social Democrats and Commu-
nists, opposed each other and did not unite against the fascist threat. We need 
a united political front against right-wing authoritarianism where the defence 
of the social, natural and communicative commons becomes one movement 
associated with one progressive party and an associated movement. Social de-
mocracy needs a renewal in the form of social democracy 2.0; a movement for 
socialist democracy and democratic socialism. To the convergence of capital 
and right-wing authoritarianism, the only feasible answer is left-wing conver-
gence into an internationalist progressive movement (see Figure 4).
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Figure 3: The contradictory development options of society resulting from the 
antagonism between the capitalist empire and the multitude.
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In respect of communications, the perspective of the commons-based society 
stands for the advancement of the digital commons, platform cooperatives, and 
a public-service Internet. Democratic communications shape and are shaped 
by ‘an association of free men, working with the means of production held in 
common, and expending their many different forms of labour-power in full 
self-awareness as one single social labour force’ (Marx 1867, 171).
Franz L. Neumann (1957, 294–295) stresses that in situations of crisis, it is 
important that academics act as critical public intellectuals: ‘Hence there re-
mains for us as citizens of the university and of the state the dual offensive on 
anxiety and for liberty: that of education and that of politics. Politics, again, 
should be a dual thing for us: the penetration of the subject matter of our aca-
demic discipline with the problems of politics […] and the taking of positions 
on political questions. If we are serious about the humanization of politics; if 
we wish to prevent a demagogue from using anxiety and apathy, then we – as 
teachers and students – must not be silent. […] We must speak and write’.
Notes
 1 Data sources: SEC-filings for the year 2016, forms 10-K (Alphabet, Face-
book); Forbes 2000 list of the world’s biggest public companies.
 2 Data source: Twitter SEC-filing, form 10-K for the year 2016.
 3 Data source: Reed Elsevier Investor Relations, Annual Reports, https://
www.relx.com/investors/annual-reports
 4 For a significant share, there was no data available, which means that the 
actual rate of journals not using APCs was actually higher.
Natural Commons       Social Commons      Communication Commons
Political Convergence => 
International Progressive Movement & 
Party for the Commons, Social 
Democracy 2.0: Socialist Democracy & 
Democratic Socialism
Figure 4: Political convergence of movements for the commons.
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CHAPTER 5
What is at Stake in the Critique  




In his chapter, Christian sets out a powerful overall analytic of the relevance 
of a critical theory approach for understanding and engaging with the context 
and alternatives to Big Data capitalism. Here, Big Data plays a fundamental 
role in the surveillance society, which potentially constitutes a new form of 
totalitarian controlling ideology: ‘The digital machine that organises Big Data 
creates a new form of reification that destroys qualities, dialectics, critique, 
and non-instrumental action.’ Against this dehumanising ideological control, 
Christian argues that we require a Marxist critical humanism to put the human 
back at the centre of the world. I shall not engage with this chapter at the for-
mal level of Marxist argumentation, and have a lot of time for Marxist critical 
humanism; where I differ from Christian is as to the relevance of these ideas in 
our contemporary moment and their usefulness as a way of engaging with and 
critiquing ‘Big Data capitalism’.
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2. Critical Marxism
Firstly, I would like to put Marxist critical humanism into context. Perhaps the 
classic critical work on the problem of digitalisation in capitalist modernity 
is the one that established the reputation of critical theory and the Frankfurt 
School: Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment 
(1947). For Adorno and Horkheimer, modernist thinking was dehumanising: 
the Enlightenment was problematic in denaturalising the world and the human, 
and in reducing, universalising, and equalising the experience of the world. For 
critical theory, the Enlightenment was problematic and oppressive rather than 
liberating. The Enlightenment view of reason contained its own seeds of de-
struction. Enlightenment was seen as a history of the separation of humanity 
from nature through the power of rationality – based on the subsumption of 
difference to the rule of equivalences. This cast the Enlightenment as a totali-
tarian project with no inherent limits (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 6), very 
much along the lines of the presentation in Christian’s chapter. So, for Adorno 
and Horkheimer: ‘Bourgeois society is ruled by equivalence. It makes the dis-
similar comparable by reducing it to abstract quantities’ (1997, 7).
What was different is equalized. That is the verdict which critically de-
termines the limits of possible experience. The identity of everything 
with everything else is paid for in that nothing may at the same time be 
identical with itself. Enlightenment… excises the incommensurable… 
[u]nder the levelling domination of abstraction. (1997, 12–13)
For this Marxist critical theory approach, rather than being a process of progress 
and reason, the Enlightenment was seen as a machinic, deadening, reduction 
of the world and of the human individual. For Adorno and Horkheimer, this 
was a world with no possibility of an outside, as everything was subsumed into 
equivalence through conceptual abstraction (1997, 16). In other words, this 
meant that nothing new could ever occur as ‘the process is always decided from 
the start’; even unknown values could still be put into equations, dissolving the 
world into mathematics. Everything new was thus already predetermined, pro-
ducing a world of ‘knowledge without hope’ (Adorno and Horkheimer 1997, 
27–28). Similarly, as Christian argues, Big Data capitalism subsumes every-
thing to the laws of market equivalences or to algorithmic surveillance.
Thus, for this line of critique, the (pre-)history of Big Data capitalism is a 
long one, starting with the earliest attempts to bring the outside under control 
through the extension of equivalence, Mauss’s gift economy and pre-modern 
magic and sacrifice being early versions of the exchange of non-equivalents 
(Mauss 2002). The performative exchange of non-equivalents then led to the 
reflection of equivalence in thought – conceptual subsumption – through 
the ratio, i.e. the proportion of conceptual equivalence. Under capitalism this 
process was formalised further, in both practice and thought, through money 
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as the universal equivalent of exchange and through the abstractions of de-
mocracy and universal rights, and the development of science and the digital 
(Sohn-Rethel 1978). The modernist project was thus one of the extension of the 
imaginary of rationalist and bureaucratic control, and with this development 
came an intensification of subject/object and human/nature binaries.
Christian’s chapter is a true inheritor of the critical project in its portrayal of 
Big Data capitalism as the apogee of all that is dehumanising and problematic 
in modernity – from peak capitalism, to peak fascism to peak dehumanisa-
tion. The Enlightenment project thus apparently reaches its peak in Big Data 
capitalism with the equivalence of everything through the market and digital 
algorithmic regulation. Critical theory and its inheritors seek to respond by 
challenging the dominance of this modernist ideology; questioning hierarchies 
of nationalism and fascism established upon the basis of the cuts and distinc-
tions of Eurocentric or modernist forms of reason, with their growing distinc-
tion between Man and Nature; and seeking to contest the telos of progress and 
the rationalising grounds upon which equivalences and subsumptions of dif-
ference are established. For Christian,
Big Data capitalism and algorithmic power could result in the world 
turning into a huge shopping mall in which humans are targeted by ads 
almost everywhere, and where commercial logic colonises society. In 
the world of Big Data, algorithms that use instrumental logic for calcu-
lating decisions and human needs can automate human activities and 
decisions. The problem is that algorithms and machines do not have 
ethics and morals.
For this critical Marxist approach, it is the political struggle against Enlight-
enment or modernist thought – which lacks a soul, its machinic totalitarian-
ism being without ‘ethics and morals’ – which is the emancipatory aspect of 
the contradictions and crises seen to be manifested in Big Data capitalism. The 
critical approach seeks to resolve the problem by bringing man back to the 
world and rejecting the homogenising, commodifying and calculating gaze of 
modernity.
3. Big Data and Modernity
However, the difficulty of squeezing the critique of Big Data into the critical 
theory denunciation of modernity is that critical theory approaches are forced 
to evade the non-modern epistemological claims of Big Data and the modes of 
governance they call forth (focusing on Big Data as an ultra-modernist framing 
of politics and governance). One aspect that stands out about Christian’s ‘left’ 
critique of Big Data is precisely the way he ties it to a long history of modern-
ist drives and understandings in order to maintain a critical approach and the 
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relevance of Karl Marx. While critical of modernist drives to equalise, com-
modify and control, Christian makes little distinction between Big Data as a 
methodological approach and Big Data as just another word for more of the 
same. Where this breaks down is that it reduces Big Data to data. I would sug-
gest that while the modernist positivist assumptions of data have their dangers 
and problems (see Hacking, 1990), Big Data is claiming something different 
(and is thereby differently dangerous and differently problematic). This differ-
ence reflects the ways politics and governance have changed over the last cen-
tury, highlighting the collapse of confidence in modernist and Enlightenment 
approaches.
Big Data claims to provide an insight into the ‘actual’, rather than working 
at a level of modernist knowledge based upon representation or abstraction. 
Big Data capitalism as a mode of governance relies on an ‘actualist’ or surface 
view of appearances, rather than focusing on causal relations, where continui-
ties over time are crucial to establishing trajectories of linear and non-linear 
causation. Thus Big Data claims to transform our everyday reality and our im-
mediate relation to the things around us. It claims to do this by making visible 
unseen but existing processes and effects through ‘datafication’. The process of 
Big Data ‘seeing’ through datafication is straightforward in theory, although 
work on perfecting the correlations required is more complicated. For example, 
if search terms put into Google correlated with processes in the world, such 
as shopping intentions, flu outbreaks or increases in conflict tensions, then 
these processes in the world could be ‘datafied’ i.e. they could be seen indirectly 
through the algorithmic detection and analysis of these terms via Google. This 
would work in the same way as a canary in the coalmine to sense poisonous 
gases, as a real-time indicator enabling responses.
It is this ‘datafication’ of everyday life that leads to a very specific form of 
its ‘commodification’, and it is this process which lies at the heart of the rela-
tional interactions at the core of what we are calling ‘Big Data capitalism’: a 
way of accessing reality by bringing interactions and relationships to the sur-
face and making them visible, readable and thereby governable, rather than 
seeking to understand hidden laws of causality (Anderson 2008; Cukier and 
Mayer-Schöenberger 2013). Big Data as a mode of governance thus relies upon 
increasing the field of vision through the power of correlation. This ability to 
‘see’ better through datafication is imagined to allow the modulation or regula-
tion of processes and thereby to perpetually ‘ward off ’, ‘cancel out’ or ‘absorb’ 
crises or breakdowns (Wakefield and Braun 2018). In this imaginary, it would 
be as if time slowed down, making a shock or crisis governable. For a contem-
porary example, as I write, see how this can be applied to slow and perceive the 
‘blur of colour’ of horse racing (Wood 2017).
Hopefully, the analogy of ‘seeing’ the present in slow-motion enables us to 
grasp that datafication is not about problem-solving through reduction and 
abstraction, but about the particular and the analogue, sensing changes in con-
text which would otherwise go unseen. So, while data can be understood as 
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digital – in terms of binary code – the world itself becomes more analogue 
or less differentiated in terms of distinctive properties or essences of objects. 
Big Data is concerned with the surface of the ‘actual’, not the ontological na-
ture of being or the processes of emergence in complex causal interactions. 
The ‘knowledge’ generated is therefore not something fixed or that can be 
stored and re-used, but is about ‘seeing’ the flux or flow of change through 
mechanisms of correlation. Thus the governance mode of Big Data capitalism 
is enabled through a different type of ‘knowledge’, one that is more akin to the 
translation or interpretation of signs than that of understanding chains of cau-
sation (Esposito 2013).
In science and computer sciences, this increase in data gathering possibilities 
and the development of computational capacity has enabled analysts to talk of 
a ‘fourth paradigm’ of knowledge production (beyond theory, experiment and 
simulation) (Pietsch 2013, 2). Thus Big Data appears to lack certain attributes 
of the modernist ‘production process’ of knowledge, and appears as less medi-
ated by subject-centred conceptual apparatuses. As Rob Kitchin highlights, Big 
Data is unique in that its construction is often not part of a conscious process 
of knowledge production: the data is often already there, in social media or 
other electronic processes of data capture, and it is the discovery of correlations 
which is the key innovation (Kitchin 2014, 2). Thus, it is argued: ‘Big Data ana-
lytics enables an entirely new epistemological approach for making sense of the 
world; rather than testing a theory by analysing relevant data, new data analyt-
ics seek to gain correlational insights “born from the data’’’ (Kitchin 2014, 2).
4. Conclusion
This is a point of fundamental importance regarding a critical stance regarding 
the rise of Big Data. It would appear that, to take a ‘left’ approach of critique, 
Big Data has to be seen as a modernist problematic, one that calls forth and 
intensifies modes of governance of top-down ‘command-and-control’. But it is 
possible to take a different approach, one that engages critically with discourses 
of Big Data, not because these discourses represent a ‘peak’ modernist abstrac-
tion, but rather on the grounds of an epistemological rejection of modernist 
claims of causal processes and the potential for the direction and control of 
human knowledge. Seeing what exists and responding to it is a poor substitute 
for understanding and being able to apply knowledge to change what exists. Big 
Data discourses accept the world as it is, and facilitate adaptation to it, reduc-
ing the human to any other factor to be modulated and regulated. Rather than 
follow a modernist approach which artificially exaggerates the divide between 
human and non-human or subject and object, Big Data approaches seek to 
bypass these crucial distinctions entirely.
In this respect, the epistemological claims of Big Data and their ontological or 
metaphysical underpinning reflect the contemporary exhaustion of modernist 
78 Digital Objects, Digital Subjects
and Enlightenment thought. In fact, for many critical theorists who lack Chris-
tian’s critical Marxist approach, the problem of Big Data is precisely that it does 
not live up to its claims of removing the human from epistemic claims (boyd 
and Crawford 2012). Rather than critiquing modernity for its ‘soullessness’ and 
for man’s separation from the world, contemporary critique wishes to take this 
further. The modernist episteme is critiqued today, not because it is alienating 
and dehumanising, but from the opposite standpoint that it is too humanist or 
human-centred. It is for this reason that Christian’s chapter goes against the 
stream of Big Data critique in its demand for the human to be returned to a 
world of meaning that has been denied it by modernist rationalism and instru-
mentality.
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CHAPTER 6




Posing a connection between philosophy and biography is an exercise fraught 
with predicaments, not least of which is the determinist connection one risks 
between life and thought.1 Keeping this proviso in mind, if we can nevertheless 
assume that ontological statements are somehow associated with the subject 
positions of their authors, then it bears insisting that assessments of theoreti-
cal paradigms not forego analysis of authors’ motivations. Appraisals of theory 
ought not shrink from examining the desires a theory expresses, the cognitive 
or analytical needs it aims to fulfil, and the reasons it might pursue certain 
lines of inquiry and not others. Where theory seeks to formulate judgements 
about its own present, such questions are especially instructive since the po-
litical stakes are all the more immediate. It is with this in mind that I’d like to 
examine what counts among the more prominent delineations of the current 
epoch: those accounts of the ‘posthuman’ which look primarily to contempo-
rary technological developments as the basis for articulations of a fundamental 
82 Digital Objects, Digital Subjects
transformation of existential experience.2 My choice of focus is motivated by 
a belief that such theories tend to neglect the entrenched global divisions in 
access to the rewards, and exposure to the perils, that recent technological ad-
vancements imply, along with the continuity of historical structures of inequal-
ity this entails. In this context I propose recalling the peculiar conditions from 
which our conceptions of digital experience are forged, namely contemporary 
regimes of private property. Not only might this prove valuable for reflection 
upon the historical horizons of our social theories, but it might also help us to 
understand the impulses that animate them.
2. Eroding Boundaries
Remaining with the question of history, it is noteworthy that the assembly of 
theories at issue here cohere around a periodising move. This is a diagnosis of 
contemporary transformations in subjective experience formulated in terms 
of the obsolescence of a bounded anthropocentrism that is seen as the hallmark 
of modern and postmodern philosophising. On this view, ecological crisis is 
taken to intensify the sense that human existence is entangled with a complex 
infrastructure, a growing ability to manipulate biological processes at molecu-
lar level is taken to challenge distinctions between nature and artifice, while 
advances in digital knowledge production enable the automation of a growing 
breadth of cognitive processes. Together these processes are read as evidence 
against the notion that thought is a discrete property of the human. While 
transformations at the level of the ecological, biological and digital are seem-
ingly disparate, they are afforded a certain coherence insofar as they coalesce 
around a figure of ‘hybridity’, signalling technological mutations of the human 
species that erode the symbolic binaries constitutive of modern thought. As 
divisions between the natural and the cultural, the mind and the body, and the 
human and the technological all grow increasingly difficult to maintain, so too, 
it follows, do the anthropocentric terms by which social theory tends to oper-
ate. The new state of hybridity, the argument goes, has disrupted the modern 
ideal of an abstract, rational subject, autonomous over and against the world.
Putting the figure of hybridity momentarily aside, it is worth noting that on 
a theoretical level posthumanism consolidates around what it sees as the ex-
haustion and inability to respond to the new state of hybridity by an earlier 
‘linguistic turn’ associated with Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and 
more recently, Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, amongst others.3 Need-
less to say, the poststructuralist critique of the subject holds an important place 
in theories of the posthuman, but its emphasis upon language or discourse is 
nevertheless regarded as inadequate for reflecting upon the digital mediations 
by which thinking is increasingly conditioned. In this regard the posthuman-
ist’s line of reasoning is relatively straightforward. The poststructuralist critique 
of modern philosophy can be characterised by its critique of the epistemic 
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violence wrought upon the world by a subject endowed with the capacity for 
rational thought who excludes all those ‘others’ he poses as incapable of au-
tonomous reasoning: women, the mad, the subaltern, animals, and so on.4 This 
is an ethical position that, to one degree or another, posthumanist theorists also 
tend to adopt. Yet they also seek to extend it hyperbolically so that the differ-
ence between these standpoints grows rather stark. The postructuralist gesture 
is centred on undermining the authority and self-certainty of the subject by 
dispersing it to the unstable media of his knowledge – whether conceived as 
discourse, différance, or power/knowledge – which precede him and which he 
can never master. Pivotal to the posthumanist argument, however, is the claim 
that even this dispersal remains all too anthropocentric a set of claims insofar 
as it is centred upon the way social constructions condition and mediate sub-
jectivity. Even if poststructuralists posit thought as finite and seek to under-
mine the mind’s mastery over the world, the argument goes, they continue to 
posit the centrality and ontological autonomy of the human as the medium of 
thought. This further entails giving methodological and political priority to hu-
man actors, a consequence which exhibits the persistence of modern thought’s 
anthropocentric hierarchy.
3. The Claim to Hybridity
In what counts as something of an ur-text for such assertions, Donna Haraway’s 
‘A Cyborg Manifesto’ (1991) looks to technological developments in synthetic 
biology, bio-informatics, and cybernetics to articulate the ‘cyborg’ as reflec-
tive of an increasingly prevalent hybrid of machine and organism. Haraway’s 
point is that, as the human body is increasingly structured by its connections 
with cybernetics or with biotechnology, the boundaries definitive of the hu-
man are increasingly dislocated. Hybridity thus triumphs as modern dualisms 
erode. Or, as she writes, ‘[h]umans are always congeries of things. We are not 
self-identical’ (Haraway 1991, 181). It would not be overstating Haraway’s in-
fluence to say that the arguments made in ‘A Cyborg Manifesto’ have been para-
digm forming. Indeed, their impact is rivalled only by a book published two 
years later by the French anthropologist Bruno Latour. While We Have Never 
Been Modern generated parallel, if at times distinct, lines of inquiry, Latour 
(1993, 2) nevertheless echoes Haraway’s central argument when he declares the 
post-Cold War era to be defined by the ‘proliferation of hybrids’. In a further 
resonance, Latour’s opening illustration of such hybridity, the freezing of hu-
man embryos, is also drawn from biotechnology. The cryopreserved organism 
can, for both thinkers, stand in for a broader process whereby hybridity under-
mines the modern critical projection of clear and distinct ontological zones of 
what counts as human and what does not.
Despite the undeniably heterogeneous and complex research programmes 
that Haraway and Latour developed from these basic insights, our concern here 
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is with the widespread adoption of the claim that we inhabit an age of hybridity. 
The view that the subject has been eroded in the current epoch is an ontological 
contention that increasingly shapes an expansive theoretical paradigm and is, 
moreover, often taken as self-evident. But it is worth remarking that this is an 
odd claim – at least where it implies a relation between ontology and history – 
for it insinuates that, in general, while existence itself is defined by hybridity, 
this only becomes self-evident in an epoch where technological change makes 
its manifestation undeniable. To twist a well-known phrase, history here be-
comes the midwife of ontology, where the hybrid entities that emerge from bio- 
and enhancement technologies bear the weight of actualising the ontological 
assertion that the human never was an integral, autonomous being exercising 
control over itself or its surroundings in the first place. Yet such a claim so often 
denotes a move that seeks to rescue technological advancements – which are 
often the product of destructive capitalist compulsions, if not explicitly mili-
tarist impulses – for progressive theoretical ends. It follows that it falls upon 
the theorist’s ontological speculations to salvage and reimagine the techno-
logical for emancipatory purposes, a task which can only be accomplished 
where the deeper truths about existence which these processes harbour can 
be discerned. It is in this way that the posthumanist can be said to collapse 
ontological speculation into ethico-political argument, since it is the affirma-
tion of hybridity and concordant critique of anthropocentrism that acts as the 
starting point for ethical and political thought in this context (Rekret 2016). 
Besides producing a peculiar oscillation between history and ontology, the 
critique of anthropocentrism can sometimes effect a sort of theoretical narcis-
sism which places the theorist at the endpoint of an eschatology wherein the 
true nature of existence is only discernible from the historical instant at which 
they find themselves.
4. The Head and the Hand
At this point, it is necessary to take a step back to examine the parameters of 
this figure of hybridity. Putting aside ontological assessments, it is significant 
that while posthumanist theory’s diagnosis of the present is founded upon me-
ticulous consideration of recent social and technological transformations, this 
tends to come at the expense of an assessment of longer continuities. This is to 
say that much of what counts as posthumanist theorising tends to forego a thor-
ough accounting of the material conditions for the emergence of the symbolic 
dualisms (nature/culture, mental/material, mind/body, human/technological) 
of modernity in the first place.5 This lacuna invites a survey of the attempts that 
have been made to provide just such an account. Taking our cue from a critical 
theoretical tradition concerned with the ways that the emergence of capitalism 
has mediated our cognitive categories allows us to situate the dualisms in ques-
tion as inseparable from processes of dispossession and enclosure.
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One of the more emphatic versions of such a claim originates in Alfred 
Schmidt’s (1971) proposal that the dualist conception of man and nature be 
viewed through the prism of the history of a real interaction. Schmidt here 
reflects a broader field of scholarship that sees the early generalisation of wage 
labour as conditioning a perception of ‘nature’ as an object of conscious and 
planned human interventions. Once labour is separated from its means so that 
its relation to production is mediated by the wage, any abstract unity between 
humanity and nature is severed. This entails that capital ultimately reverses the 
hierarchy between man and nature so that the latter is no longer conceived as 
an object prevailing over a subject.
Schmidt’s fecund insight into the historical conditions for a ‘thought’ that 
takes itself as acting autonomous upon the world can inform our analysis fur-
ther if we bring it to bear on the history of philosophy more directly. In this 
context, in her history of the gendered and racialised nature of processes of 
primitive accumulation, Silvia Federici (2004, 138–40) reads Descartes’ insti-
tution of an ontological division between purely mental and purely physical 
domains as inseparable from a mechanical view of the body suitable to the 
ongoing suppression of pre-capitalist forms of community. A reason that posed 
the body as an ‘intelligible’ object, as Federici (2004) has it, could subordinate 
it to uniform and predictable forms of action, that is, to capital’s discipline over 
labour. Moreover, this separation of the mental and the sensuous went hand 
in hand with a separation of women from the knowledge of reproduction and 
their consequent constitution as natural reproducers of labour (Federici 2004; 
Mies 1998; Merchant 1983).
This reading of the relationship of Cartesian thought to the violent history 
of the origins of capitalism is not far removed from a line of thought in Michel 
Foucault’s (2013, 45–73) History of Madness. It is well known that in that book 
Foucault relates Descartes’ a priori exclusion of madness from the process 
of reasonable thought to the seventeenth-century confinement of the home-
less and unemployed in asylums as a means of regulating unemployment. At 
the very least, not unlike Federici, Foucault understands thought’s becoming 
autonomous – and so the foundations of the modern subject – through the lens 
of anti-capitalist struggle.
A not dissimilar intuition is also apparent in Alfred Sohn-Rethel’s (1978) cri-
tique of modern epistemology. Putting aside his main lines of argument around 
the material sources of cognitive abstraction, in Sohn-Rethel’s reading of 
Descartes the latter’s positing of the world-in-itself as res extensa is tied directly 
to the limitations and frictions of capitalist control over artisanal production.6 
Here the modern philosophical project of grounding thought as autonomous 
from the world is related to the bourgeois need for a mental labour autonomous 
from material labour. That is, the separation of the head and the hand is viewed 
as crucial to capital’s ultimate control over artisanry through automation inso-
far as the latter is grounded upon a form of knowledge whose sources are not 
sensuous (Sohn-Rethel 1978, 113, 122, 141).
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How can these accounts of the history of the mental and sensual dimensions 
of experience inform our understanding of contemporary concepts of hybrid-
ity? At a minimum, they suggest that the conditions for what Latour calls the 
‘modern constitution’ are inseparable from processes associated with capital 
accumulation. This further implies that any argument for the suspension of 
the boundary between them must confront the ways by which capital medi-
ates thought. In the balance is a question of whether thought seeks to avow 
the objective constraints upon it, and whether or not it owns up to the dimen-
sions of historical experience that condition it. Admittedly, this may initially 
appear a dubious claim, inasmuch as the variety of posthumanist scholarship 
of interest here is explicitly a politically progressive enterprise centred upon a 
critique of patriarchy, racial hierarchy, capitalism, and especially the pursuit of 
profits and war, to which technological innovation tends to be directed.7 But 
the resignation from an assessment of capital’s role in the history of the me-
diation of our relation to the world not only puts into question contemporary 
historico-ontological assessments regarding the state of hybridity, it also poses 
still further questions. For if capital’s mediations are patently not only still pre-
sent, but more intensive and expansive than ever, then it bears interrogating 
whether the divisions and separations to which capital compels existence might 
not in fact be fully reflected in the notion of hybridity.
5. Ontological Surgery
It is undeniable that technological developments, whether frozen embryos, 
the coding of DNA, or the manipulation of biological processes at the level of 
molecular fragments, erode or undermine boundaries between what is natu-
ral and what is artificial. In this sense, the posthumanist’s historical narrative 
grasps an increasingly prevalent aspect of contemporary experience. But it 
does so at an ontological level that may not offer a picture faithful to the full 
breadth of contemporary experience. To follow a line of argument proposed by 
Marilyn Strathern (2005), when examined at another level of practice, namely 
the epistemology that dominates contemporary regimes of intellectual 
property – constituting as this does the grounds of much of our knowledge 
of the world – the boundaries or dualisms in question here are not only seen 
not to have been breached, but the boundary between them grows ever wider. 
Strathern’s point is that, insofar as contemporary bio-technological and tech-
nological development is governed by an expansive process of the enclosure of 
knowledge, it is premised upon a conceptual relation to the world conceived as 
a collection of ‘natural’ phenomena standing apart from an autonomous will 
that modifies it in order to produce ‘inventions’.8
Not unlike claims outlined by theorists of posthumanism, and Haraway 
(1991) especially, Strathern diagnoses a ‘natural’ world that is increasingly un-
derstood and related to as information or code. But whereas the posthumanist 
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takes this as evidence of an erosion of the boundary of the natural and tech-
nological, from Strathern’s perspective it entails the opposite. For not only 
are ‘natural’ sources of information transformed into products that come to 
be governed by intellectual property laws, but these in turn enable the ‘dis-
covery’ of further potential sources of information, and accordingly, facilitate 
renewed conceptions of natural processes awaiting transformation and com-
modification by the labour of the human mind. What is considered ‘nature’ 
thus not only grows in scope, but the more it does so, the more extensively is 
it consumed by an intellectual property regime which makes scientific insights 
the objects of privatisation (Strathern 2005, 102). This is the case even where 
agreements such as the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity seek to pro-
tect indigenous practices from patenting by recognising that knowledge may 
be embedded in practice. Such well-intentioned safeguards do not represent 
a challenge to contemporary processes of capital accumulation, but instead 
merely entail, Strathern writes elsewhere, intellectual property’s inclusion or 
‘hybrid embrace’ of pre-modern (or alter-modern) practices as further forms 
of exclusive resources (Strathern 1999, 184).9 It turns out that even sensuous 
forms of knowledge can be abstracted as objects in the current paradigm. Or, 
to put it starkly, everything is a commodity or else commodifiable, and this is a 
stance grounded upon a view of nature as an abstract object manipulated and 
transformed by autonomous subjects.
Its worth repeating that theorists of posthumanism are not naive to the role 
that private property plays in knowledge production, nor are they blind to 
the role that capital plays in the production of the contemporary hybridities 
they observe.10 Capitalism is often explicitly considered inseparable from new 
understandings of life or humanity. However, returning to Strathern’s argu-
ment, this belies a view of processes associated with capitalism through the 
lens of ontological speculation. That is, capitalism is said to produce new fields 
of ‘difference’, new ‘complexity’, or non-human or de-individualising abstract 
conceptions of life (Haraway 1997, 57; Braidotti 2013, 60).11 These sorts of for-
mulations, whereby capital is viewed as reflecting a deeper ontological state 
of hybridity, overlook what legal theorist Sheila Jasanoff (2012) calls, echoing 
Strathern, the ‘ontological surgery’ that intellectual property operates upon the 
world, and that moreover, is conditional of the boundary erosions in question. 
This omission refracts our earlier claims about the history of capitalism inso-
far as the posthumanist neglect of the a priori epistemic distinction between 
nature and artifice is reflected in these theories’ bounded view of the subject’s 
relation to the contemporary world.
These claims are partly echoed by other, longstanding criticisms which view 
valorisations of ‘cyborg’, hybridity, or posthuman, as disavowing global divi-
sions of labour. The argument here is that bodies hinged to assembly lines, 
farm tools or brooms have long functioned as machines in exchange for a 
wage, as indentured labour, or as chattel slaves (Wilkie 2011; Fernandez & 
Malik 2002). To point this out not only puts in question the posthumanist 
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periodisation for an epoch of hybridity, but also the sorts of ethics that it tends 
to occasion. For one thing, it implies that the human relation to the machine 
has a more complex history than recent attempts to valorise or criticise techno-
logical change tend to allow. For another, it suggests that posthumanism offers 
a politics that speaks to the experience of the consumers of digital and bio-
technological advances but not necessarily to its producers. Where consuming 
subjects might have the meaning and boundaries of their agency troubled by 
technological change, this refers to a form of autonomy that has never been 
the property of most of the world’s people in the first place. The latter claim is 
put into stark relief when we consider, as Jessop (2007) shows, that 97% of the 
world’s patents and 80% of R&D funding are located in OECD countries. In 
this light, contemporary technoscience amounts to the reorganisation of the 
separation of an autonomous mind exercising authority over a world conceived 
as separate and natural. Such a division of labour implies the pervasiveness of 
the modern dualism of mind and world, albeit reorganised by contemporary 
technoscience upon a global, neo-colonial scale.
6. The Innocence of Knowledge
The insights garnered from Schmidt, Federici, Sohn-Rethel and others imply 
that when we understand the division of the mental and material or social and 
natural in purely ontological terms, we overlook the imbrications of social 
struggle to which our own categories are subjected. Ironically, this tendency to 
indifference, on the part of ontological speculation, to the material genesis of 
its categories reproduces the very Cartesian binary it claims has been eroded. 
This is so not only insofar as the modern dualisms are seen to persist in prac-
tice where ongoing global processes of the enclosure of ideas and inventions 
are concerned, but it further implies, as I have claimed elsewhere, a view of the 
mind as innocent of any imbrication with those practices (Rekret 2016). 
With this in mind, I’d like to return to my opening query to pose the ques-
tion of what function this posthuman economy of the innocence of knowl-
edge serves. What sort of desire does the now widespread ontological claim 
to the obsolescence of the modern dualisms in the face of an expansive state 
of hybridity express? For it’s worth pointing out that claims to innocence are 
themselves never innocent, but always deployed in particular contexts and 
to particular purposes. To what end then does intellectual postponement of 
an interrogation of thought’s material conditions by an ontology of hybrid-
ity function? One conduit to these questions involves looking back to what is 
likely the initial modern formulation of epistemic innocence in John Locke’s 
theory of knowledge. Reflecting on Locke’s epistemology will permit us to 
glimpse the way in which claims to epistemic innocence are always embedded 
in a political context, and to begin to set the parameters of a further appraisal 
of the posthumanist  argument.
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When he posed the mind as a tabula rasa Locke (2000) did so as a means 
of grounding a hypothetical process of building reason from experience.12 On 
Locke’s formulation, epistemic innocence, for which he posited the child as a 
privileged vessel, offered direct access to objects in the real world, and thus 
evaded what was most problematic about accrued knowledge and language 
(Rose 1984). In her incisive assessment of Locke’s argument, Joanne Faulkner 
(2011a) points out that in posing human knowledge as essentially innocent, 
Locke offered a powerful rejoinder to medieval morality, and the doctrine of 
original sin in particular. To pose the mind as a blank slate served an early 
modern middle class need for freedom from the entrenched values of feudal 
society. Accordingly, Locke’s scepticism and the notion of epistemic purity that 
underlies it amounts, on Faulkner’s reading, to a bourgeois imaginary that re-
jects tradition as a source of authority and hierarchy. In her appraisal Faulkner 
(2011a) goes on to show how, in posing the child’s mind as a privileged instance 
of the claim that ideas are not innate but the result of intercourse with the 
world, Locke also exhibits a fundamental tension within any claim to the in-
nocence of thought. On the one hand, the child functions as a source of critical 
knowledge, one that repudiates superstition and prejudice. On the other hand, 
Locke makes clear that precisely because it is innocent and thus liable to cor-
ruption, the child requires the adult’s control and discipline. As such, the child 
offers an assertion of humanity’s essential innocence, while at the same time al-
lowing the loss of control and ignorance that innocence implies to be projected 
and disowned. In other work Faulkner (2011b, 69–70) relates this unstable in-
clusion of innocence to liberal political philosophy and to the simultaneous 
valorisation and repression of the natural that early incarnations of the social 
contract implied. She explains that Locke permits ‘nature’ to persist in the polis 
both as a check on state power and as a fantasy of original enjoyment. But the 
natural ‘childhood of humanity’, embodied in the peasant or colonial subject or 
the child itself, also poses a risk to a mature modern contractual order since it 
implies the failure to enclose and ‘improve’ the land and to assume the indus-
trious character demanded of the citizen of civil society. In this sense, Locke’s 
formulation of innocence serves the bourgeois imagination with a narrative 
accounting for the legitimacy of its power along with a means of disowning the 
loss of control the quality of innocence risks.
Does Locke’s mobilisation of innocence on behalf of an ascendant merchant 
class shine any light upon posthumanism’s own impulses? After all, as we 
have already affirmed, the posthumanist argument is usually grounded upon 
speculation as to how largely nefarious technological developments might be 
repurposed to emancipatory ends. Notwithstanding these commitments, the 
question here bears on the deeper issue of whether posthumanist theories of 
hybridity reflect or reduce the historical dimensions of existential experience. 
On this point the evidence marshalled above suggests, following Strathern and 
others, that a retraction of reflexivity occurs where thought displaces episte-
mological reflexivity for ontological speculation. It remains to ask, then, why 
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the claim to hybridity has been so predominant in the humanities and social 
sciences in recent years.
7. Posthuman Anxieties
Crucially, for feminist scholarship especially, posthumanism addresses a 
looming anxiety that the poststructuralist critique of the subject, given its 
emphasis on the social construction of gender, left untouched and unscathed 
underlying essentialist biological conceptions of sex.13 In this context notions 
of hybridity can be mobilised to challenge received notions of both cultural 
and biological convention. This can be seen as a significant critical interven-
tion where the poststructuralist assessment of the discursive construction 
of gender circumvents more difficult questions of biology itself. Remaining 
with the issue of the social theorist’s relation to the biological sciences, it is 
also worth noting that the narrative of ‘hybridity’, and the focus upon scien-
tific and technical change it implies, proposes renewed engagement with the 
natural sciences for humanities scholars reeling from the Sokal ‘hoax’ and the 
broader delegitimation of continental philosophy this scandal stood in for, as 
well as broader cultural and institutional attacks upon traditional liberal arts 
pursuits.14
While this is all certainly the case, there seems to be a deeper underlying 
logic to the popularity of the posthumanist paradigm, one which ultimately 
involves the pose of epistemic innocence these theories imply. Recall that for 
Locke epistemic purity served to undermine the legitimacy of feudal knowl-
edge and aristocratic power while at the same time projecting the loss of con-
trol such a purity implied upon the abject subjects of early modern society. 
Similarly, in the case of what we have seen of the posthumanist’s circumven-
tion of the issue of thought’s mediation to the world by private property, the 
rhetoric of hybridity permits the articulation of a critique of capitalism and 
commodification that can nevertheless celebrate capital’s achievements. It only 
does so, however, by ignoring a much thornier problem: that capital might di-
rect or subsume those technological developments down to their very core. 
A full accounting of these questions is not possible here, but suffice it to say 
that the possibility of extracting emancipatory content from new technologi-
cal developments is a much more vexing problem than the figure of hybrid-
ity permits.15 Even more disturbing, posthumanism disavows the anxiety that 
our concepts themselves might also be inseparable from processes associated 
with contemporary capitalism. Ours is an epoch where concern over capitalist 
manipulation of cognitive performance is widespread, and where worry and 
discomfort over the manipulation of what we think and feel, whether by the al-
gorithms organising web platforms or drug therapies designed to increase and 
extend cognitive performance or prevent mental breakdown, is pervasive. In 
this context, it would seem that to avoid asking how thought is conditioned and 
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limited by its social context in the name of an account focused upon the ero-
sion of the hierarchies governed by modern ‘man’ offers a therapeutic to both 
theorists and consumers of the products of contemporary capitalism. This is a 
therapy that permits the expression of critical perspectives on contemporary 
technological development, all the while containing that critique so that it need 
not look back to its own, possibly compromised, subject-position, or indeed, its 
own forms of consumption. In this sense, the risk of ontologies of ‘hybridity’ is 
that they reproduce the withdrawal from, or delegation of, critical thought that 
is characteristic of a world increasingly governed by processes of automation 
and algorithmic organisation.
Notes
 1 I would like to thank Nicholas Beuret and Simon Choat for their critical 
comments on drafts of this essay.
 2 By posthumanist I refer to a particular strand of critical theorising. It is 
important to distinguish this from theories of the ‘posthuman’ grounded 
upon normative critique of the dehumanising effects of technology such as 
Fukuyama (2002) and Habermas (2003). For an overview of ‘critical’ post-
humanism, see Badmington (2003) and Herbrechter(2013).
 3 On this point see Coole & Frost (2010); Braun & Whatmore (2010); Bryant, 
Harman & Srnicek (2011).
 4 On this point see Rekret (2018a).
 5 Latour (1991) is exceptional amongst the thinkers of the ontological or 
posthuman turn in question here insofar as he attends to the historical 
origins of what he calls ‘the modern constitution’. Drawing on Shapin and 
Schaffer (1985), it is ironic that Latour presents a mostly discursive story of 
the separation of the natural and social in the seventeenth century, one that 
overstates a controversy over the terms of the scientific and the political to 
the much broader terms of the natural and the social. In doing so, it hyper-
inflates the relative importance of historical personae, in this case Boyle and 
Hobbes. For a convincing critique of Latour’s history of modernity see Pels 
(1995), Jacob (1995) & Choat (2017).
 6 For a broader accounting of Sohn-Rethel’s argument see Rekret and Choat 
(2016). The argument in this section is developed more extensively in Re-
kret (2016; 2018c).
 7 It ought to be noted that Latour is an exception here insofar as his own 
politics can be characterised as anti-socialist liberal pragmatism. Much of 
the ontological speculation that takes inspiration from his work is more ex-
plicitly concerned with an emancipatory politics. For a critical assessment 
of Latour in this regard see Noys (2011).
 8 Ian Hacking’s (1998) critique of Haraway parallels Strathern’s. Hacking ar-
gues that as developments in medical technology imply that we increasingly 
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treat bodies as assemblages of replaceable parts, so we intensify rather than 
transcend the Cartesian framing of existence.
 9 On this point, see also Parry (2004); Helmreich (2009); Brand & Görg 
(2008).
 10 It is worth insisting that Haraway’s work has not only been crucial to shap-
ing a progressive Science and Technology Studies research paradigm, but 
she has explicitly situated her work within a socialist tradition. Neither 
Haraway’s political commitments nor her research as a whole are at issue 
here. Rather, this essay is interested in the ontology of hybridity upon which 
a whole paradigm of social theory rests and which emanates from her work.
 11 Similar claims are found across a range of work. See for instance Latour 
(1988), Connolly (2013), Barad (2007).
 12 I draw in this section on arguments first outlined in Rekret (2018a).
 13 On this point see Parisi (2008).
 14 For an overview of the Sokal hoax in the context of the ‘culture wars’ see 
Guillory (2002).
 15 For instance, see the exchange between Alberto Toscano (2011; 2014) and 
Jasper Bernes (2013) around logistics.
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CHAPTER 7
Posthumanism as a Spectrum: Reflections 
on Paul Rekret’s Chapter
Robert Cowley
1. Introduction
Paul Rekret explicitly intends to ‘take a step back to examine the parameters’ of 
posthuman thinking. He challenges the assumption that knowledge generated 
by posthuman theorising somehow straightforwardly or ‘innocently’ reflects 
the contemporary world. Instead, he treats posthumanism as a particular ‘story’ 
produced in, and reproduced through, specific circumstances. He proposes 
that posthumanism might not emancipate us from the dilemmas which it ad-
dresses, so much as normalise the conditions of their production.
In order to establish a critical distance from posthumanism, then, Rekret em-
phasises its contingency. There is good reason to suppose that his analysis will 
resonate with those those already uncomfortable with broader tendencies to-
wards ‘hybrid thinking’. We might hypothesise, however, that Rekret will be less 
likely to provoke dialogue with posthumanist thinkers themselves, for whom 
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‘critical distance’ is more a problem to be overcome than a useful diagnostic 
strategy, and contingency is an explicitly celebrated virtue. 
In what follows, I suggest that this problem of incompatibility need not be 
construed in such stark terms. To reach this conclusion, I first reflect further on 
the reasons for, but also question the extent of, posthumanism’s appeal. Relat-
edly, I go on to propose that posthumanism may more usefully be thought of as 
a spectrum, than a discrete mode of thinking. 
2. Situating the Appeal of Posthumanism
It has become clichéd to observe that Donna Haraway’s (1985) famous image 
of the cyborg has only gained resonance over time. It is surely in large part 
due to the wide spread of digital technology that Haraway’s vision, of the ten-
dency for contemporary scientific and technological developments to blur the 
edges of the human, strikes us as so prescient. The digital is no longer the direct 
concern only of distant corporate technicians; its presence in everyday life no 
longer seems optional. Rather, it seems uncontroversial – even banal – to sug-
gest that we have become reflexively aware that our actions, from the moment 
we wake up, are digitally mediated. This change is one of several contemporary 
conditions which collectively shape a ‘posthuman’ sensibility, on which Rekret 
reflects critically in his chapter.
This sensibility, in Rekret’s definition, is characterised primarily by an 
 ontological privileging of ‘hybridity’. And, for those who follow contemporary 
theorising in the humanities or social sciences, it is difficult to ignore the spread 
of various forms of hybrid thinking. The desire to decentre human agency 
seems widespread. Some random examples might include: the recent embrace 
of assemblage theory in urban theory; the growing enthusiasm for placing ob-
jects at the centre of historical research; and the trend even for  anthropologists 
to speculate on the social agency of plants, fungi and microbes (Kirksey and 
Helmreich 2010). The primacy of human ability to think  rationally ‘about’ and 
act ‘on’ the world has been eroded by notions of the entanglement of cognitive 
processes, and expectations of variously dispersed agency. As Timothy Morton 
puts it, there is a growing understanding that humans are ‘no longer in the cen-
tre of the universe, but we are not in the VIP box beyond the edge, either’ (Mor-
ton 2013, 13). Potentially, then, posthumanism not only describes the written 
output of a certain set of scholarly writers, but also the wider appeal of a certain 
ontological orientation across the academy, and perhaps beyond.
To understand this appeal, it may be helpful to think of posthumanism as 
performing three inter-related roles:
  (1) it draws on and reverberates with an existing, dispiriting story relating 
to the end of modernity;
 (2) it reframes this story in optimistic terms; 
 (3) it thereby offers the prospect of a hopeful way forwards.
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The end of modernity is dramatised most conspicuously in widespread expec-
tations of global climate changes, mocking the idea that humans are, or can be, 
in control of the world. The ‘anthropocene’ presents us with both the ‘bizarre 
situation, in which we have become potent enough to change the course of 
the Earth yet seem unable to regulate ourselves’ (Hamilton 2017, vii–viii), and 
the unsettling prospect that ‘over this century humans will, in full knowledge 
of what we are doing, irreparably degrade the conditions of life on our home 
planet’ (ibid, 37). And yet, this dispiriting dilemma is inherited from postmod-
ern theories about the world – a mode of thinking from which posthumanism 
claims to distance itself. Rosi Braidotti, for example, specifically opposes the 
use of theory ‘as a tool to apprehend and represent reality’ (Braidotti 2013, 5). 
The ideal of cognitive distance is devalued when ‘The boundaries between the 
categories of the natural and the cultural have been displaced and to a large ex-
tent blurred’ (Braidotti 2013, 3). Thus, while posthumanism reverberates with 
existing narratives of loss, to articulate a widespread sense of confusion, it does 
not pose as a set of detached observations: its stories are presented as emerging 
from the world.
In its diagnostic mode, then, posthumanism does not aim to impose an ana-
lytical framework on the world, but instead to relate what the world seems to 
be telling us. Simultaneously, however, this reframing of our understanding 
adopts a celebratory register (Chandler 2018), which envigorates what Rekret 
calls an affirmative ‘ethico-political’ argument. Thus, Haraway’s cyborg was 
presented in a playful ‘manifesto’. For Braidotti, the ‘posthuman predicament’ 
is ‘an opportunity to empower the pursuit of alternative schemes of thought, 
knowledge and self-representation’ (Braidotti 2013, 12). Jane Bennett’s influen-
tial book ends indicatively with ‘a litany, a kind of Nicene Creed for would-be 
vital materialists’ (Bennett 2010, 122). The broader celebratory project here is 
captured well by the goal of Kohn’s ‘anthropology of life’: ‘neither to do away 
with the human nor to reinscribe it but to open it’ (Kohn 2013, 6). In short, 
posthuman hybrid thinking reworks existing critiques of human exceptional-
ism into an optimistic sense of expanded agency, and then dwells on the gen-
erative ethical and political implications of this sensibility. 
3. Questioning the Appeal of Posthumanism
Rekret’s response is to treat posthumanism, in effect, as a contingent discourse 
– even if he shies away from that term. In mobilising the discursive category 
of the ‘posthuman’, he might be accused of conflating a variety of bodies of 
theory which in fact proceed as much in contestation as in concert. However, 
his definition does not rest on a delineation of the boundaries of this field: his 
intention is not to specify which thinkers do and do not fall into this category. 
Rather, his definition relates to certain tendencies present across a broad range 
of current thinkers – whether or not they self-identify as posthumanists. This 
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is an uncontroversial mode of definition: the mutual debts among relevant au-
thors have been mapped out elsewhere – both by sceptical commentators (see, 
for example: van Ingen, 2016), and explicitly in the texts themselves. 
More problematically, a strategy that involves defining and labelling discur-
sive trends may not be the best way to win friends. It implies a certain distanc-
ing; it performatively positions the labeller outside the body of discourse in 
question. This move may seem threatening to those living through a given dis-
course, who feel they are narrating their condition in a neutral way. Those who 
have been the victims of injustice, illness, or climate change, may feel bemused, 
or significantly offended, by commentaries treating the resulting afflictions 
as socially constructed ‘stories’ (Hacking 2000). Indeed, from a posthuman-
ist perspective, Rekret’s ‘retreat’ into discourse may seem irresponsibly rela-
tivistic, and indicative of poststructuralist tendencies, which – as Rekret notes 
– are precisely what posthumanism is attempting to go beyond. Braidotti, for 
example, clearly asserts that ‘The posthuman subject is not … poststructural-
ist, because it does not function within the linguistic turn or other forms of 
deconstruction’ (Braidotti 2013, 188). In parallel, as if to preempt the charge 
that posthumanism’s generative potential is constrained by the specificity of 
the conditions of its emergence, Braidotti insists only on its relevance to the 
contemporary world. Posthumanism inoculates itself by transforming con-
tingency into a positive attribute, in rejection of universalist aspirations. One 
might, then, conclude that there is little possibility of Rekret’s critique speaking 
to posthumanists themselves, since it depends on such an alienating method.
At the same time, the reach of posthumanist thinking should not be exag-
gerated. Although it responds to a contemporary dilemma, the sensibility of 
this dilemma is inevitably uneven. This reflection began by rehearsing the idea 
that we have come increasingly to ‘see like a cyborg’ in our post-modern, digi-
tally mediated, anthropocenic era. But who is this ‘we’? Certainly, for the edu-
cated and affluent, who are more likely to follow technological developments 
in the media, it would seem difficult to be unaware of a wider set of concurrent 
advances in robotics, artificial intelligence, big data, genetic engineering, and 
other fields, which collectively disrupt received notions of the boundaries of the 
‘human’ and, by extension, previous assumptions about human agency. How-
ever, those on the prosperous side of the ‘digital divide’ may forget the speci-
ficity of their own conditions. ‘We’ might be surprised that, even in a wealthy 
country such as the UK, 13% of adults have never used the internet (Office for 
National Statistics 2014). Furthermore, if it is permissible to view posthuman-
ism in discursive terms, as tending to frame and represent reality in certain 
ways, there is no reason to suppose that its stories will always be ‘decoded’ (Hall, 
1992) in the same way. Thinking about the triple appeal of posthumanism, as I 
have proposed above, already opens up several positions on a spectrum of pos-
sible responses. This is the case even after we exclude those ‘aggressive nihilists’ 
(Connolly 2017) who, for personal gain, cynically refute the significance of the 
dilemmas which posthumanism addresses.
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First, at one end of this spectrum, sit a range of actors not afflicted with a sense 
of loss of the modern. Some of this group are ‘still’ premodern; for others, the 
dualisms of modernity are comfortably in place. This need not imply naivety on 
their part: engineers and technology innovators, for example, generally seem 
happy to acknowledge that solutions often have unexpected consequences, yet 
retain faith in the possibility of learning lessons and improving techniques over 
time. Policy-makers seem fully aware that plans can rarely be enacted in a lin-
ear way (van Assche and Verschraegen 2008), but still presume that a process of 
approximate societal steering is better than none at all. Belief in ‘progress’ more 
generally is still widespread, and may more typically be understood in incre-
mental, iterative terms, rather than as megalomaniac ambition. For this group, 
there is no strong sense of disillusionment with which posthuman thinking can 
reverberate. The ‘we’ that frets over the demise of human exceptionalism might 
be a smaller constituency than its inhabitants imagine.
A more ambiguous middle position might be imagined. Here, posthuman-
ism’s diagnostic role is positively received, but a pragmatic choice is made to 
proceed in traditional ways regardless. For those who act within particular 
disciplinary spheres, engaging with posthumanism may make little sense at 
the level of everyday practice. Natural scientists may be fully aware of – and 
even enthusiastically curious about – new discoveries which fundamentally call 
modernist assumptions into question, even while the ‘cultural performances’ 
of their day jobs depend on ‘a strong view of the human agent and of nature as 
consisting of nonagentic objects of understanding’ (Connolly 2017, 100). Thus, 
in Rekret’s terms, it seems quite feasible to buy into posthumanism’s ‘specula-
tive ontology’ without embracing its ‘ethico-political project’.
It is the third position, however, which would seem to be in Rekret’s main line 
of fire. This describes a more active embrace of this project: here, an awareness 
of the world’s hybridity becomes a source of optimism, and is translated some-
how into action or new frameworks for everyday thinking. 
4. Conclusion 
 Is it likely, then, that Rekret’s argument will tend to fall on deaf ears among those 
who most actively embrace the logics which he critiques? While he proceeds 
by emphasising the contingency of the conditions giving rise to posthuman 
thinking, posthumanists themselves acknowledge and celebrate contingency. 
The possibility of ‘stepping back’ from the subject matter, furthermore, is epis-
temologically excluded from posthumanist theorising, insofar as the latter re-
fuses to view the world from a cognitive distance. If this means taking sides, 
then the force of Rekret’s argument might be expected to diminish precisely as 
the appeal of posthuman ‘hybridity’ spreads. 
This incompatibility invokes a wider set of questions around the relevance 
of critique to ‘non-representational’ thinking of different types. And yet, I have 
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suggested here not only that the prevalence of the posthuman sensibility is un-
even (and limited), but that we should expect its reception – even among sym-
pathetic audiences – to vary significantly. And perhaps the audience of ‘third 
position’ posthumanists is somewhat chimerical: posthuman writers them-
selves are not so arrogant as to position their own ethico-political proposals 
as definitive; their real-world acolytes no doubt display reflexivity to varying 
degrees. To point to this variety and unevenness is not to undermine Rekret’s 
‘method’: he does not define posthumanism as a discrete body of thought, but 
rather mobilises some of its common tendencies for heuristic purposes. Rather, 
it opens up the possibility – which Rekret does not explicitly deny – that more 
satisfactorily reflexive forms of ‘hybrid thinking’ might be developed in future.
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CHAPTER 8
Through the Reproductive Lens : Labour 




The intersection of the digital with our work and leisure, and the blurring of 
these two categories, has become an increasingly significant field of inquiry in 
Big Data capitalism. Digital labour studies – in which this nexus is explored – 
is fast becoming a field of its own, incorporating analyses of workers in the 
platform-mediated gig economy, users of social media, social media influenc-
ers, and the ways in which various work practices are being re-shaped by digital 
technologies. The importance of this field lies in how the dynamics it traces – 
such as the centrality of immaterial/affective labour, precarious and exploited 
work conditions and the social factory – are emblematic of wider trends in 
contemporary capitalism.
In early 2016, I published Feminism, Labour and Digital Media: The Digital 
Housewife, which contributes to this debate by arguing a case for using Marxist 
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feminist theories of domestic work to explain the economic and cultural logics 
of consumer labour in digital media. By ‘consumer labour,’ I mean the myriad 
ways in which our cultural products are expropriated and alienated from us 
when we upload them to platforms, but also how our data is the cornerstone of 
surplus value generation for digital media companies. The book sought to ad-
dress what I considered a fruitless debate about whether such work is alienated 
and exploited or socially meaningful and a site for self-actualisation. In The 
Digital Housewife, I argue that domestic work, as conceptualised by Marxist 
feminists, gives us a model of work that is both these things – integral to capi-
talism for its productive and reproductive capacity, but always potentially out-
side these same dynamics. Domestic work is labour that straddles the cultural 
and the economic, and thus, I argue, it gives us a mechanism for understanding 
forms of digital labour that perform the same feat of gymnastics.
My book is quite narrowly targeted at a particular theoretical concern – and 
personal bugbear – and focuses on only a limited range of digital labour prac-
tices in making its case. Nevertheless, the central principles from which its ar-
guments are drawn have begun growing in importance in the study of digital 
labour and capitalism more broadly. In this chapter, I want to move away from 
the specific argument in my book and instead focus on this wider context. I 
will engage with wider conversations about activism, struggle and critique into 
which its argument has entered, and attempt to identify contexts where the 
emphasis on alternative labour histories and the politics of social reproduc-
tion that animates my book brings important critical insight. Along the way, 
I’ll describe some elements of The Digital Housewife, but mostly as a means of 
illustrating what bringing reproductive work into view can do for our under-
standing of contemporary capitalism and its sites of struggle. I will do this by 
focusing on three key areas: history, value and subjects.
2. History
One of the orienting feminist concepts in my book is that the social factory has 
a longer history than is usually ascribed to it in studies of digital capitalism. The 
argument is often made that we live in times marked by a peculiar saturation 
of the whole of existence with the dictates of capital – the real subsumption of 
life that constitutes Mario Tronti’s (1973) social factory. This is often attributed 
to the conditions of post-Fordism and the information-intensive industries 
of Big Data capitalism. There is often an implicit assumption that the circum-
stances of the social factory are new.
However, for anyone who is not a white, cis-, het- man, it is difficult to see 
precisely what is novel about the conditions in which all of life is subsumed into 
capital. Private domestic space and interpersonal relations, including sexual 
activity, have historically been considered outside capital, providing arenas in 
which autonomous self-making could happen, and where Marx’s species-being 
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could be realised. In white hetero-patriarchal contexts this has long been 
equated with the private, domestic space of the nuclear family (Berlant and 
Warner 1998; England 1993; Osucha 2009). Yet women, people of colour, 
and LGBTQ+ have never experienced such contexts as places of autonomy or 
agency but rather as venues of (en)forced and uncompensated work, as well as 
situations of domination and surveillance. Moreover, as Marxist feminists such 
as Dalla Costa and James (1975), Federici (2004), Mies et al. (1988) and Davis 
(1983) assert, gender, raced and sexed being and the organisation of labour are 
intimately related, placing human subjectivity at the core of capitalist accumu-
lation. Taking these perspectives into account, the absorption of the whole of 
life – the existence of a social factory – is a fundamental, if not foundational, 
part of the capitalist narrative.
An example of this longer history of the social factory that I have explored 
(Jarrett 2017) is the effective slave labour system of the Magdalene Laundries 
in Ireland between 1922 and 1937. These laundries were carceral institutions 
where women believed dangerous to the middle-class ‘stem-family system’ (In-
glis 1997, 13) through sexual activity outside of patriarchal marriage, deemed 
‘unproductive’ through poverty (Buckley 2016), or otherwise considered un-
ruly by behavioural norms of the day were sent for penance and re-education 
into domestic labour discipline. Women slaved in abject conditions in these 
nun-run commercial, but non-profit, laundries for no pay, typically for years.
The Magdalene Laundries, though, are not merely an aberration of Irish Ca-
tholicism, but must be read as part of a society-wide social, cultural, legal and 
political machinery supporting a state economic agenda to get men – but spe-
cifically men – back to work in a very weak economy (Daly 1995). This was 
achieved through an aggressive re-instatement of the gendered division of la-
bour, both materially – in the forms of regulations controlling women’s labour 
and political rights – and culturally, through sermonising, cultural products 
and the disciplining effect of institutions like the Laundries. These sites en-
forced women’s domesticity by disciplining and policing women’s bodies, sexu-
ality and ‘souls,’ exacting penance to ensure alignment with their constrained 
economic roles. Based on a ‘thematic of sin’ (Inglis 1997) and regimes of shame, 
the cultural logics that animated these institutions and which gave legitimacy 
to their economic effects did not end at the Laundry gate. They were also artic-
ulated in the sensibilities of all in Irish society, as evidenced by claims that key 
advocates of the Magdalene system were women (Crowley and Kitchen 2008). 
The Laundries, and their embedding in everyday Irish society, exemplify the 
idea of the social factory – a society, a cultural fabric and individual embodied 
subjectivities formed by an economic agenda.
Such examples of the long history of capitalist logics manifesting in 
non-market contexts suggest that if we are to understand labour in Big Data 
capitalism, it is vital to recover and incorporate labour histories that do not be-
long to white men in industrialised labour (see also Fuchs 2017). As Alan Sears 
(2016, 139) summarises, different members of the working class ‘face different 
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forms of autonomy and coercion based on their location within dominant di-
visions of labour organised around differentiated processes of dispossession’. 
To understand capitalism holistically we therefore need to know more about 
the histories (and present experiences) of women, people of colour, trans or 
LGBTQ+ people, and people with disabilities, whose experiences in capital are 
marked by saturated regimes of precariousness and oppression. The overt re-
lationship of these subaltern labour conditions to the immersive politics of the 
social factory suggests that they usefully map the experiences of oppression 
found in the precarious social factories of Big Data capitalism.
One suite of labour experiences we need to engage with more effectively and 
extensively is that of paid and unpaid sex work, which Morgane Merteuil (2017) 
has argued offers valuable insight into contemporary labour relations in Big 
Data capitalism. Using camming – webcam-based sex work – as her example, 
she describes a relationship between the dynamics of sex work and platforms 
such as Uber or Taskrabbit. Platforms, Merteuil argues, function similarly to 
pimps in that they broker exchanges between worker and client, take a cut of 
any profits, and also provide certain rules for how labour is to be performed. 
Merteuil argues that rather than the digital housewife that I propose, it is the 
digital whore that provides the best model for understanding labour in plat-
form economies.
But the analogy runs deeper than the neat comparison between platforms and 
pimps. If we examine the long history of sex work, in particular by women and 
women of colour, we see very blurry distinctions between intimacy and econ-
omy, between paid and unpaid work, between agency and control. When your 
core business is to ‘marry well,’ then even unpaid sex with your life partner has 
an economic logic. It is the common and ongoing negotiations of these bound-
aries in interpersonal, legal, political and economic contexts that may reveal 
much about the politics of labour in the digital economy, in which distinctions 
between what we consider legitimate commodification are similarly unfixed 
and mutable. The unequal power relations that shape heterosexual marriage 
and which make unpaid sexual labour, like much labour for platforms, an effect 
of non-market social and economic coercion, may also be useful to consider in 
unpacking the dynamics of exploitation in Big Data capitalism.
Another issue raised by recognising this wider context of the social factory 
is the question of what precisely is new about labour in Big Data capitalism. 
If it is not the case that it uniquely requires and/or produces the saturation 
of life by capitalist principles, then what is its particularity? Is it a question of 
an increased intensity or extensity of capitalism’s exploitative and alienating 
tendencies? Is it merely a matter of enhanced visibility as new mechanisms of 
quantification, such as the workplace tracking technologies explored by Phoebe 
Moore (2017), materialise existing practices of capture? Or is there some other 
substantive difference in how labour is manifested in Big Data capitalism? We 
must know more about the particular qualities of contemporary work if we are 
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to properly critique this labour and, more importantly, identify sites into which 
we may intervene.
I reiterate, though, that in tracing this difference we must not found our dis-
tinction in the work of white cis-, het-, men working in industrialised labour, 
but look to sexed, raced, gendered and sexualised labour practices as well. It 
is in these ‘alt’ labour histories that we find not only difference but continuity 
with how work is constructed today, and so they may provide fruitful avenues 
for critique but also models for struggle. As Isabell Lorey suggests, we need to 
not only interpret precarity as a mechanism for securing domination, but also 
take ‘subjective experiences of precaritization [as a] starting point for political 
struggles’ (2015, 6). Understanding how women, people of colour, people in 
the Global South, trans, queer or disabled people have laboured in, but also 
resisted, conditions of oppression can tell us much. In survival – in what Rema 
Hammami calls ‘the politics of subaltern persistence’ (2016, 172) – we may find 
the forms of action we need today.
3. Value
Working with a longer history of the social factory, and with histories of work 
that are marked by their apparent non-market and cultural dimensions, also 
shifts focus in relation to what is valuable in capitalism. This is part of what I 
am calling ‘the reproductive turn’ in digital labour studies, where emphasis is 
not only on processes of commodification but also on how value, or things that 
are of value to capitalism, are generated through uncommodified dimensions 
of capitalist exchange. It is a direction that explores, as Nancy Fraser (2014, 61) 
has advocated, the ‘indispensable background condition for the possibility of 
capitalist production.’
The key model for understanding consumer labour that I have advocated is 
that described by Leopoldina Fortunati (1995) in The Arcane of Reproduction. 
Fortunati insists that domestic work is integral to capitalism and not a mere 
subsidiary – reproducing workers is a necessary part of the production cycle. 
She argues, though, that the work of unpaid domestic labour is not directly 
exploited but instead involves a multi-phased process of incorporation involv-
ing the production of inalienable goods. Fortunati describes how the unpaid 
housewife’s labour generates uncommodified or non-fungible products such 
as food and healthcare that are consumed by the paid worker. At this point, 
these products are transformed into labour-power and only then can they be 
converted into something with exchange value (labour-time). In this model, 
domestic labour is at a step removed from commodity production. This does 
not mean, however, that the uncommodified phase is outside capitalism; it re-
mains an integral part of its long value chain. Fortunati’s argument allows us 
to see how value can be extracted from labour even without its abstraction 
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and commodification. When applied to forms of labour in Big Data capitalism, 
this model requires consideration of a greater range of activities that produce 
commodifiable outputs but also allows for multiplicity and contradiction in the 
nature of goods produced across that value chain.
A growing body of studies of digital labour, particularly those concerned 
with gendered or racialised activity, also look simultaneously at the economic 
and non-economic dimensions of digital labour, emphasising dimensions of 
subject formation alongside the economic frameworks of digital platforms. 
What is important, though, is that these studies do not assume that the social 
relations and uncommodified dimensions of these exchanges of labour and/
or goods are somehow outside capitalism. Rather they emphasise how they in-
teract, in particular noting the disciplining functions of the uncommodified 
exchanges of these sites – for instance, how affectively charged interactions be-
tween users can be valuable to capitalism in providing normative pressures that 
underpin the desire to contribute this labour.
This focus on longer value chains and the possibilities of contradiction and 
multiplicity along them is prevalent in the work of Julia Velkova (2016), who 
has explored the politics of gift and commodity relations in the open source 
animation community, Blender. Her work (Velkova and Jakobsson 2015; see 
also Jarrett 2015a) draws on the biography of objects (Appadurai 1986; Kopy-
toff 1986), and suggests tracking how the economic relations associated with a 
cultural good change over time and as it circulates in different social relations. 
Velkova notes this multiplicity using the example of Blender, describing how 
exchanges of labour and software between the company and the open source 
community were sometimes conceived and construed as gifts, and at other 
times as commodity exchanges. What Velkova also notes, though, is that at 
all times, and regardless of their form, these exchanges were entrenching the 
hierarchical structures that sustained and supported the capitalist enterprise at 
the core of Blender. In effect, she usefully describes how the practices of gift-
ing, both from producers and the open source user community, demonstrate 
multiplicity, but also the conservative, reproductive qualities of non-market ex-
changes within capitalism.
As I have noted before (Jarrett 2015b), what I refer to as ‘the reproductive 
turn’ is arguably not a turn at all, but really a return to the frameworks that 
guided early Cultural Studies, particularly as it emerged out of the Birmingham 
School, where economics and culture or identity were always conceived as mu-
tually informing. As Velkova’s study emphasises, it is important to a full critique 
of digital labour and contemporary capitalism to grasp this inter-relationship, 
to refuse the false binary between culture/society/identity and economics, and 
to explore the idea of value in broad terms.
Beyond my field of Internet research, the renewal of this perspective is 
crucial as we try to understand contemporary politics such as the ‘aggrieved 
entitlement’ (Kimmel 2013) of the alt-Right in the US (and arguably Donald 
Trump’s election). Just as we cannot understand historical race relations in the 
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US without due consideration of its economic basis and its social and personal 
impacts, we cannot grasp the contemporary politics of online misogyny, re-
newed European fascism or Islamophobia without exploring the intersections 
of precarity economics with the historic privileges of masculinity and white-
ness. It has certainly not been helpful – as was the tenor of my social media 
in the immediate aftermath of Trump’s election – simply to denounce others 
as ‘liberals’ for their emphasis on identity politics, or to reduce everything to 
questions of class. The two cannot be so simply differentiated, and simplistic 
and unproductive binaries cannot move our critique toward positive change. 
Struggles for equality and justice are better served when we integrate our eco-
nomic and identity critiques, examining how these dimensions of society in-
tersect in politicising, valorising and exploiting difference (Alcoff 2006; Fraser 
2014). In the contemporary moment, unless we look at the longer immaterial 
value chains of capitalism where the entitlement of certain actors is produced 
and reproduced, and where that promise has been betrayed and made unstable, 
we cannot come to grips with Trump, the growing threat posed by fascist and 
racist political parties, or even with Brexit.
A focus on the economic logics of social reproduction and the reproduc-
tion of economic logics is also important if we are to identify points of strug-
gle most relevant to the precarious conditions of Big Data capitalism. Silvia 
Federici (2012) says that the ways we produce and reproduce consciousness – 
identity politics and ideological critique in the reproductive sphere – become 
point zero for political activism. Because social reproduction is both the 
production of desired human qualities and an accommodation to the mar-
ket, this means reproductive work is always in tension, involving a ‘potential 
separation, and it suggests a world of conflicts, resistances, and contradictions 
that have political significance’ (2012, 99). It is in cracking open and moving 
between and against these contradictions – in refusing to reproduce regres-
sive embodied interpretive horizons (Alcoff 2006) – that resistant political 
consciousness may develop.
Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams (2016) argue that an old-fashioned Gram-
scian counter-hegemonic project is essential to challenging the politics of 
platform capitalism. Intervention in ideology happens, they say, through trans-
forming mediated political discourse and the material instantiations of those 
ideas: culture and economics. Physical infrastructures such as housing and ur-
ban design, as well as reproductive institutions such as the education system 
or the family, need to be rethought and remade in order to challenge consent 
to the neoliberal hegemony. Fundamentally, this project requires changing 
our suite of tools for self-making, including, and especially, how we articulate 
the concept and practices of work and living. This suggests that rather than 
opposing identity politics to capitalist and economic critique, the task is to 
mobilise these politics to articulate new critical subjects, drawing on the af-
fective and economic excess that inheres to reproductive work to articulate 
awareness of oppression and alternative modes of being, thinking and doing. 
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By digging deep into and transforming reproductive activities we can forge a 
counter-hegemonic project.
4. Subject
This leads directly into the final point that emerges from applying reproductive 
lenses to labour in Big Data capitalism, which is how this application changes 
our conceptualisation of the labouring subject and, in doing so, changes our 
modes of politics. If we assume that the social factory has a long history – and, 
as feminists have argued, one that precedes the origins of capitalism – then our 
critique cannot end when we identify the real subsumption of life. We must as-
sume that this is a feature of all of life in capitalism, albeit differently articulated 
across social groups. But we must also recognise that this capitalist-inflected 
activity doesn’t necessarily reproduce capitalism. This means we need to 
move our critique of labour in Big Data capitalism away from the aliena-
tion of species-being – one of the four forms of alienation described by Marx 
(1961/2013) in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts – which has become 
almost a default critique in studies of digital labour, at least in media studies 
(Jarrett 2016b).
Not only does this emphasis on the impact of digital media on self-making 
reproduce the framework of false consciousness, it is also predicated on 
a subject that is gendered, raced and sexed. The concept of alienation from 
species-being is not universally applicable. Arguably it relies on a humanist 
subject – a self-possessed, singular individual for whom the alienation gener-
ated by capitalism is a formative tragedy (Eisenstein 1979; Braidotti 2013). But 
for women, and all other people constituted as ‘other,’ such a state of autonomy 
and singularity has never been attributed nor achieved either within capitalism 
or without. The entrenchment of power relations and systems of domination 
based in dimensions other than class has historically delimited the capacity to 
articulate ‘species-being’ for certain actors. For many subjects, alienation is the 
condition of existence – hybrid, queer, trans subjectivities, for instance – so 
a politics that seeks simply a return to, or seats its political subjectivity in, a 
coherent, pre-lapsarian species-being becomes exclusive and potentially geno-
cidal.
This critique has two implications. It suggests, as James Reveley (2013) has 
argued, the need to focus more on the more material dimensions of alienation – 
products, other workers, nature – in our critiques of Big Data capitalism. This 
draws attention to how digital labour practices may have negative impacts on 
other workers or citizens, reproduce cycles of waste and obsolescence, or per-
petuate other inequalities or social and environmental damage typical of the 
capitalist system. Shedding a critique of digital labour based in self-possession, 
and instead focusing on the dimensions of material dispossession and degrada-
tion, would manifest a more useful and nuanced critique of digital labour.
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Secondly, this critique allows for the mobilisation of the subjects of Big Data 
capitalism in terms of their relationality and multiplicity, rather than their au-
tonomy. This, in turn, enables politics that are intersectional and fluid. I am 
continually drawn back to Chela Sandoval’s description of the tactical, liminal 
and differential subjectivities of US third-world feminism ‘with the capacity 
to de- and recenter, given the forms of power to be moved’ (2000, 58). This is 
the ‘methodology of the oppressed’, whose locus of possibility is not any one 
ideology but works with and through these differences, adapting tactically to 
power. These are also the dynamic politics of queer discomfort– of not fitting – 
described by Sara Ahmed (2004), that has long been the activist terrain of the 
subaltern. Rather than seeking remedy in a return to a mythic unified form of 
agency or by acting against a singular experience of class oppression, refus-
ing the primacy of the humanist subject allows for this kind of engagement 
through points of difference and commonality, including that of class location.
Eschewing the singular coherence of the political and economic subject al-
lows us to generate coalitional action directed at the ways in which we are all 
made vulnerable (Butler 2004; Butler et al. 2016; Fotopolou 2016) by Big Data 
capitalism, building temporary unions across race, gender, class, ability, sex and 
sexuality to resist those politics. Such a focus on how alliances are built through 
shared feelings of precariousness not only explains the generation of the politi-
cal action of multitude (Hardt and Negri 2005), but also offers a mechanism for 
activating those politics.
We may also use the excessive effects of Big Data capitalism to achieve this 
activation. A moment in my social media use while preparing the preliminary 
paper that lead to this chapter illustrates how activism and precariousness can 
walk hand in hand. In the space of three minutes on my Facebook feed, I re-
ceived three updates that spoke of shared struggle and the capacity to use so-
cial media within a counter-hegemonic project. The first, shared by a friend in 
France, showed the story of Fatima Hajiji, a 16-year-old Palestinian girl shot 
and killed by Israeli forces in Jerusalem. Appearing directly below this were 
Irish media reports of Dublin and Sligo City Councils voting to fly the Pal-
estinian flag over their offices in solidarity with the Palestinian people. A few 
moments later, an Italian friend shared a link to the ‘When I See Them, I See 
Us’ video, which links the US Black Lives Matter cause to that of people in 
Occupied Palestine. The histories and present experiences of Palestinian, Irish 
and African American people are fundamentally different, but they intersect 
through respective vulnerabilities to colonial imperialism and capitalist ne-
cropolitics. In this example we can see alliances being established, not from 
singularity but in a solidarity based in shared precariousness. We also see the 
(potential) activation of critical political subjects aided by the visibility and 
networks provided by Big Data capitalism. Even though the mechanisms of 
capture enrolled by Facebook are encompassing and exhaustive, there remain 
gaps in the reproductive logics of the interface that can be exploited to speak 
back to power.
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It would be absurd, though, to claim that such sharing of ideas through a 
commercial platform is tantamount to real political change – my likes do not 
impact lived conditions in the Gaza strip, for instance – or to claim that so-
cial media created these alliances. These are not my points. What this example 
does articulate, though, is the capacity to document, distribute and amplify the 
existence of counter-politics in ways reminiscent of the consciousness-raising 
activities of second-wave feminist activism or the abolitionist meetings of ear-
lier periods. We can see similar disruptions in reproductive patterns in Jack 
Qiu’s (2016, this volume) descriptions of the use of social media by Chinese 
Appconn workers to articulate discursive change and then to organise material, 
oppositional practices and solidarity amongst workers. These are all interven-
tions that refuse the easy reproduction of class and identity status and are, in 
part, about building new subjectivities.
In my own politics, similar uses of social media are found in the Irish Re-
peal movement – a broad coalition of over 100 groups campaigning for a ref-
erendum to repeal the eighth amendment to the Irish Constitution that denies 
bodily autonomy to pregnant people. Among many material actions, the ex-
pression of this movement’s politics across various media also seeks to produce 
new critical subjects by making abortion visible as a lived experience in Ireland, 
breaking apart the reproduction of silence and shame with which abortion is 
associated on the island, and uniting groups with disparate politics through 
shared recognition of the ways in which the Constitution and Irish laws render 
certain bodies – female, trans, raced, LGBTQ+, asylum seeker bodies – more 
vulnerable than others. Despite the varied political and ideological positions of 
each group or individual, the movement comes together under the badge ‘Re-
pealers,’ as evidenced in the moving, grassroots hashtag campaign #knowyour-
repealers that trended in September 2016. If, as Srnicek and Williams contest, 
both the immaterial and material dimensions of hegemony need to be system-
atically challenged to bring about effective political change, the Repeal move-
ment shows how the reproductive capacity of digital media – its ability to (in)
form critical subjects and shape actions – can be enrolled in the articulation, 
building and mobilisation of alliances to effect social change.
5. Conclusion
There are a lot of threads in this chapter, and they seem to have taken us very 
far from my short book. Little more than a theoretical framework for under-
standing digital users’ labour, The Digital Housewife seems removed from the 
broad political concerns raised in this chapter. However, just as digital labour 
has a greater analytical importance because it exemplifies trends associated 
with Big Data capitalism, so too do the ideas and frameworks upon which my 
book draws. The more I (and others) reflect upon the political and economic 
circumstances of contemporary capitalism, the more resonance is found in the 
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cultural economy of the reproductive sphere. This perspective suggests that la-
bour and life are entwined in complex ways in Big Data capitalism, but articu-
lates this complexity in a manner that is productive for thinking and acting in 
resistance. It allows for work, paid and unpaid, to be simultaneously cultural 
and economic – to be neither fish nor fowl – and to see in this hybridity the 
means through which to understand it better – a crucial preliminary step in 
breaking it apart to use for other ends.
To achieve this, though, requires proper attention to both the arenas of social 
reproduction and the stratification of capitalist dispossession. Only by eschew-
ing the false binary between productive and reproductive labour can we gener-
ate a holistic picture of how Big Data capitalism organises us as economic units 
and as individual subjectivities; this is the mechanism through which we can 
adequately envision the dialectic (Ferguson 2016; Fraser 2014). This in turn 
gives us the political ground from which to generate a critique of capitalism 
that does not merely reproduce inequalities and exclusions. From an under-
standing of the differential distribution of labour and how that is reproduced 
across all social systems we can see more clearly the labour processes that are of 
value to capitalism and how these may not only exist in formal labour settings. 
Different places and modes for intervention into capitalism – such as articulat-
ing the politics of reproductive rights as an identity marker – can subsequently 
open up.
The politics, concepts and framework that I am articulating here are not new. 
Indeed, much of this paper – and indeed the point of the Digital Housewife 
book itself – is merely foregrounding long-standing queer, feminist, decolonial 
and Cultural Studies’ critiques of economic determinism. The call to focus on 
social reproduction that is at its core merely echoes the crucially important 
work of feminist, queer and race activists in expanding the nature of class com-
position. However, this is really the point. Big Data capitalism may be new, but 
capitalism and inequality are not. Valuable critiques from feminists, race and 
queer theorists or activists addressing the complexity of a culturally saturated 
economic system already exist and demand centrality in our responses to Big 
Data capitalism. In drawing on these experiences – on these differential labour 
histories and the insight of a reproductive lens – we may also find valuable tools 
for today’s struggle.
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CHAPTER 9
Contradictions in the Twitter 
Social  Factory : Reflections on  
Kylie Jarrett’s Chapter
Joanna Boehnert
On 2 November 2017 two of New York City’s local digital news sites, The 
Gothamist and DNAinfom, were shut down by owner Joe Ricketts. All articles 
and information generated since 2009 vanished from the sites – to be archived 
elsewhere in less accessible format. 115 people lost their jobs. The destruction 
of the news companies along with the documentation of local history was in-
stigated by Ricketts as an unsubtle response to an event just one week earlier: 
when reporters at DNAinfo and Gothamist had voted to unionise. Twitter ex-
ploded as another source of local news disappeared and union organising was 
dealt a symbolic blow.
On 3 November 2017 interdisciplinary artist Mary Boo Anderson posted a 
new version of the ‘expanding brain’ meme on Twitter (see https://twitter.com/
whoismaryboo/status/926469404199653376, Figures 1 and 2). The sequential 
series of four images and text linked her experience as a Twitter user to the 
collapse of digital platforms after the unionisation of content creators. The text 
also references Anderson’s own feelings of enjoying making content for Twitter 
Figures 1 and 2: Mary Boo Anderson @whoismaryboo Twitter post, 3 November 
2017.
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while simultaneously feeling exploited by Twitter profiting from her labour and 
even from her critique of this exploitation. In the last frame, she speculates 
about unionising content creators and having Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey shut 
down ‘this garbage site’.
Anderson’s artwork powerfully captures what Kylie Jarrett describes as con-
tradictions of digital labour in the social factory of digital media. In Feminism, 
Labour and Digital Media: The Digital Housewife (2016) Jarrett argues that we 
can better understand the role of digital media users in the digital economy 
by using feminist analysis of social reproduction. Jarrett’s essay in this book, 
‘Through the Reproductive Lens: Labour and Struggle at the Intersection of 
Culture and Economy’, expands ideas she developed in The Digital Housewife 
to reflect on the wider context of the politics of social reproduction, speculating 
on alternative digital media practices. In this short commentary, I use Ander-
son’s artwork to reflect on how Jarrett’s ideas can help us understand recent 
dramatic changes on Twitter.
In describing how ideas and even identities and subjectivities are generated 
by communicative labour in society (i.e. ‘the social factory’) Jarrett illustrates 
how unpaid labour in capitalism is beset by tensions, working simultaneously 
in oppressive and liberatory ways. I am interested in how these contradictions 
manifest on Twitter, and what can be done to encounter, break and possibly 
transform the most troubling tensions. My concern here is with the specific 
ways in which Twitter is designed to function, the strategies it uses to achieve 
its goals and the social consequences of these priorities. The social factory 
concept, an autonomist Marxist concept that describes how capitalism not 
only directs our economic lives but also expands its alienating, expropriating 
and commodifying logics into the social domain, is the foundation of this 
analysis.
The expanding brain meme (i.e. four sequential images of an embodied brain, 
accompanied by textual content on a variety of themes) had been used over the 
course of 2017 to imply the evolution of an individual’s intellectual capacities. 
It suggests progress from the reptilian brain to a state with expanded cognitive 
capacities and even cosmic spiritual insights. Normally, the meme is used in an 
ironic or semi-ironic manner. Anderson’s expanded brain meme is harnessed 
to highlight her conflicted feelings of liking Twitter but also feeling exploited by 
the platform, her ideas on disrupting this exploitation, and her vision of being 
‘set free’ by Jack Dorsey’s abolition of Twitter.
Twitter occupies a strategic position in the digital media ecosystem. It has 
gained a massive user base (roughly 330 million active users) due to the plat-
form’s facilitation of user interaction in ways that bring good ideas from the 
margins into prominence. This design amplifies good ideas (Anderson’s tweet 
got over 7000 likes and retweets in the first few days) and disrupts power hi-
erarchies in communication channels and traditional news outlets. Unfortu-
nately, however, things seem to be changing on Twitter in ways that could have 
a profound impact on the role it plays in facilitating marginalised opinions.
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On the same day that Anderson made her artistic intervention, the BBC re-
ported that Twitter has published new rules. Twitter user Tim Peterson noted 
a specific change: ‘Twitter removed its belief ‘in speaking truth to power’ from 
its rules’ (@petersontee, 3 November 2017). Paterson published screenshots of 
the new and old Twitter Rules. Twitter has removed ‘We believe in freedom of 
expression and in speaking truth to power’ and replaced it with ‘We believe 
in freedom of expression and open dialogue’. The implications of this shift in 
priorities will become evident over time, but the change inevitably signals an 
adjustment in priorities and allegiances. Many users have already noted that 
recent changes in the ways Twitter operates diminish its traditional value.
In November 2017, Twitter changed tweet length from 140 characters to 280 
characters, and dramatically transformed the look and feel of the platform. A 
core distinguishing feature of Twitter has always been its requirement that us-
ers express themselves clearly and succinctly. The change in character length 
altered not only individual tweets but the experience of Twitter feeds, which are 
no longer easily scrollable. It now takes longer to engage with multiple tweets. 
This change comes on the back of other modifications. Recently the ‘like’ fea-
ture was changed to function in a similar way to a ‘retweet’. This reduces Twitter 
users’ options to use ‘likes’ and ‘retweets’ for different purposes. I am not the 
only user who is concerned that the platform I rely on to access news and analy-
sis is no longer operating in ways that originally made it so attractive.
Mary Boo Anderson’s expanding brain meme links Twitter users/content 
producers to the journalists from the two recently deleted digital new sites 
(DNAinfo and The Gothamist). Ricketts wrote a blog in September 2017 titled 
‘Why I’m Against Unions at Businesses I Create’, where he said: ‘I believe un-
ions promote a corrosive us-against-them dynamic that destroys the esprit de 
corps businesses need to succeed’. In describing how the value of his company 
comes from his own entrepreneurial skills and the capital that he personally 
generated on Wall Street, Ricketts is articulating a mainstream ideological posi-
tion. In stark contrast to this view, Jarrett’s Marxist feminist analysis describes 
how a wide variety of work enables capitalist profits to take place.
Capitalism depends on many different types of labour, including a vast 
amount of unpaid labour and reproductive labour. Jarrett’s digital housewife 
metaphor links feminist theory on women’s reproductive work to digital work. 
Both Twitter users and the journalists who lost their jobs can be understood 
as digital workers who share information and contribute precarious or un-
paid cognitive and communicative labour that adds value to digital platforms. 
The issue of the boundary of valuation is at the crux of the ideological divide 
in capitalism and in digital capitalism. This has been the case since Marx de-
scribed the collective labourer or Gesamtarbeiter (Fuchs 2017, 4). Christian 
Fuchs explains that ‘in a software company, not just the software engineers who 
produce the software commodity, are productive workers, but also the secretar-
ies, cleaners, janitors, accountants, marketers, etc. Productive labour produces 
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surplus-value’ (2017, 4). Where Ricketts sees value as narrowly created by a 
stock broker and entrepreneur, the feminist Marxist argument describes all the 
other labour that sustains communities of people but is exploited in capitalist 
structures.
In her new text, Jarrett considers Morgane Merteuil’s (2017) argument that 
the digital whore metaphor more accurately describes the extent of capture of 
the subjective domain in platform economies subject to capitalist logics. If the 
social emerges from the result of human activities that are the result of relation-
ships largely structured by capitalism, then subjectivities under capitalism are 
all in profoundly conflicted space. The structures that dominate our lives en-
courage specific identification and ideological affiliations. The whore metaphor 
captures how capitalism envelops the intimate spaces of so many people – but 
especially the most oppressed constituencies.
Jarrett argues that while some media theorists consider the exploitation of 
labour in digital media as a new feature of the digital economy, ‘for anyone who 
is not a white, cis-, het- man, it is difficult to see precisely what is novel about 
the conditions in which all of life is subsumed into capital’ (2018, 104). Since 
people in persecuted groups have had to struggle the hardest against various 
types of oppression, their vantage points can more clearly reveal contradictions 
in capitalism and digital capitalism. These struggles highlight the tensions in 
digital media as users experience both agency and pleasure – in having access 
to more critically engaged news sources; in forming global communities with 
like-minded people; in having marginalised voices amplified; in the humour 
(lols) shared, and so on – and exploitation and anxiety – from the increas-
ingly precarious nature of various types of labour; from fake news; from the 
‘alt-right’ and other reactionary movements on social media; from online har-
assment, and so on. Just as unpaid domestic work has enabled the reproduc-
tion of capitalist relations from the start of capitalism, so unpaid digital work 
enables digital capitalism. But there are serious problems, not just with the in-
justices inherent in this dynamic, but with the robustness of the structures we 
depend on for the reliable news that is fundamental to democratic processes.
Like many digital news platforms, DNAinfo and the Gothamist were strug-
gling financially. Digital media platforms are driven by the value of user data 
and advertising. Twitter has never managed to leverage these in the ways Fa-
cebook has done. Platform capitalism has created data-based social relations 
that have ‘fundamentally altered the landscape of capital accumulation and 
property relations’ (Cole 2017). Matthew Cole references Nick Srnicek’s (2017) 
definition of one of the core attributes of platforms, i.e. ‘proprietary architec-
ture that mediates interaction possibilities’ (2017) and claims that ‘the most 
important asset for platforms is their intellectual property – company software, 
algorithms, and user data’ (2017). It is this intellectual property that enables 
platforms to mediate exchanges between their users. The problem is that it is 
not evident that these platforms and the social relations that they establish can 
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support reliable news and the basic information necessary to enable demo-
cratic decision-making in ways that do not lean towards authoritarian and 
reactionary political positions. Jarrett describes digital platforms within capi-
talism’s modes of accumulation as having an antagonistic relationship to the 
social domain (2016, 3, 33). Troubling digital capitalism by focusing on these 
antagonisms and the dialectical relationships between the alienating and actu-
alising tendencies of digital labour creates space for deeper interventions.
Straddling these tensions, Twitter can be understood as the embodiment of 
the acceleration of polarised positions. My personal experience of Twitter is 
often educational and liberatory. Other Twitter users have expanded my under-
standing of race, gender, class, economics and other issues that have impacted 
my IRL activism, research and friendships. Twitter offers a means to interpret 
and respond to political events, and participate in debates and conversations 
on a global scale. Yet these experiences, and any associated tenuous feelings of 
agency, are precarious. Twitter has facilitated access to news, analysis, commen-
tary and humour from sources that were not easily accessible in the pre-digital 
era. And yet even though Twitter users make these features possible and add 
value to the platform, the important decisions about how Twitter functions are 
not made by its users and content creators. The platform that users contribute 
to and rely on is not ours. A platform that is collectively owned by the users 
would be a genuine emancipatory technology. A more immediate goal is to 
keep Jack Dorsey from destroying Twitter.
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CHAPTER 10
E(a)ffective Precarity, Control and 
 Resistance in the Digitalised Workplace1
Phoebe V. Moore
1. Introduction
‘What makes you tick?’
– Claude Shannon (1961)2
Digitalised methods to calculate an increasing range of activities and 
 expression at work are evidence that management aims to control what has 
been called affective (Hardt 1999, Dowling 2007) and emotional (Hochschild 
2012 [1983]; Brook 2009, 2013) labour. Emotional and affective labour are, 
of course, neither new nor limited to digitalised work, and the long history 
of undervalued labour has been observed and critiqued by several  feminist 
scholars over time. What is new is the trend in uses of technology to control 
areas of unseen labour through newly digitalised workplaces, with the use of 
location and sensory devices that threaten to capture and control our every 
movement, sentiment and thought, thereby blurring the categories between 
work and life themselves. The danger in granularity where the  qualitative 
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work of qualified workers becomes quantified is the rise of barbarism, where 
there is no outside to the vulgarities of capitalism, where there is no culture 
nor civility or dignity, but only brutal, corporate-driven commodification 
and abstraction of labour. The Enlightenment held the promise of reasonable 
lives for all, but modern times have demonstrated that this cannot be taken 
for granted. Adorno warned that ‘to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric’ 
(Adorno 1983, 34). Adorno was not warning against writing poetry, but high-
lighting humanity’s primary condition of barbarism; he stressed later that the 
most important project after such tragic brutality must be to ‘restore an unbar-
baric condition’ (2005, 50) where the ‘sole adequate praxis after Auschwitz is to 
put all energies toward working our way out of barbarism’ (2005, 268).
The present edited collection highlights the ‘hard times’ we now live in. 
While I am not explicitly likening these ‘hard times’ to the Holocaust in the 
way Adorno notes, I argue that workplace surveillance, at its most extreme, is 
a form of barbarism in what are, at the very least, significantly unreasonable 
times. This chapter looks at workers’ attempts to disrupt the new forms of the 
employment relationship that are being created in digitalised and potentially 
barbaric workplaces, where monitored and surveilled work, in gig-like condi-
tions, has rendered people’s lives almost unbearable (Akhtar and Moore 2016).
Building on Blackman and Venn’s call to assess the ‘capitalization or econo-
mization of affect and emotion through teletechnologies’ (2010), this chapter 
looks at employee responses to being asked to use self-tracking and invisiblise 
management technologies at work to improve health and productivity through 
affective labour, taking note of everyday forms of resistance to this invasive level 
of control. New forms of work quantification that involve electronic tracking of 
affective and emotional labour are capital’s latest methods of capturing surplus 
value in unstable conditions of agility, but the examples of workers’ resistance 
in the empirical findings outlined here reveal weaknesses in these methods.
2. Precarity and Gig Work
Postmodern, radical studies of the laws of value postulate that there is an ‘out-
side’ of capital that cannot be quantified, and which thus creates possibilities 
for emancipation (Negri 1999, 86). Federici argues that primitive accumulation 
continues today, and that there is no longer a conceivable ‘outside’ of produc-
tion relations whilst we live in a capitalist hegemony (2004) and our newest 
technologies are instrumental to its pursuits. However, new worker monitor-
ing technologies quantify the qualitative, revealing previously unmeasured as-
pects of the labour process, like mood, fatigue, psychological wellbeing and 
stress. This makes workers permanently visible to management, and renders 
the sites of everyday resistance facilitated by worker-to-worker communica-
tion penetrable by management, meaning it is increasingly difficult to identify 
anything outside capital (Moore and Robinson 2016). New procedures and 
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pursuits exceed scientific management’s studies of physical movement, since 
concrete labour is increasingly subject to abstraction as new ways to identify 
and calculate previously unseen labour become apparent, and more subject 
to commodification in the process. This employer prescription eliminates any 
possibility for negativity by highlighting wellbeing (Davies 2016; Cederström 
and Spicer 2015). With this realisation, and
[E]ven if the measurement of this new productive reality is impossi-
ble, because affect is not measurable, nonetheless in this very produc-
tive context, so rich in productive subjectivity, affect must be controlled. 
(Negri 1999, 87)
Quantification, as pointed out by Jarrett (2015a), recognises unseen labour as 
productive, not as an exchange worthy of consistent or useful reward, but to 
locate profit for capital.
Precarity is the purest form of alienation, where the worker loses all per-
sonal association with the labour she performs. She is dispossessed and loca-
tionless in her working life, and all value is extracted from her in every aspect 
of life. Because precarious digitalised workers are constantly chasing the next 
‘gig’, spatial and temporal consistency in life is largely out of reach. Precarity is 
symptomatic of the fall in wage share of value added as Fordism gave way to 
financialised accumulation, the rise in self-employment, automation (Frey and 
Osborne 2013), the fall of the dotcom bubble and repeated global economic 
crises. In the UK, statistics in 2016 and 2017 indicate that rises in employment 
and economic growth are dependent on self-employment such as is seen in gig 
economy work. More than 900,300 people worked on zero-hour contracts in 
2017, a rise of 20% from the figure for 2016.3
In the gig economy, also called the demand economy (AFL-CIO, 2016), a 
range of new online platforms have emerged where people buy and sell labour 
using digitalised interfaces. The sharing economy, or work in the ‘human cloud’, 
includes such platforms as Upwork, ODesk, Guru, Amazon Mechanical Turks, 
Uber, Deliveroo and Handy, which are called ‘online platforms’ in the Digital 
Single Market European Commission terminology. Huws (2015) and Cherry 
(2011) label this type of exchange and work as ‘crowdsourcing’, and Huws 
defines it as ‘paid work organized through online labour exchanges’ (Huws 
2015, 1). Crowdsourcing has facilitated companies’ outsourcing of labour and 
introduced new platforms for freelance and self-employed work and this trend 
is rising internationally. The platform economy relies on self-employed con-
tracts, and as such its workers have no access to regular employment benefits 
such as health care or maternity leave. Workers have very little legal protection, 
and platforms are designed to reduce employer liability. Taken together, these 
features of gig work can put a great strain on worker’s minds and bodies, lead-
ing to emotional anxiety and panic. Gig workers must be prepared for constant 
change and disruption to their lives, and they must consent to make personal 
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changes, to always be on the move, and to always be trackable. So work, identity 
and life blur in conditions of digitalised precarity. Workers are often in a posi-
tion where we cannot log out or switch off. Gig workers ‘struggle to be left alone 
rather than to be included, a type of refusal that would have looked strange to 
their Fordist predecessors’ (Fleming 2015, 83).
In gig work, subjectivities are required to be resilient to instability, and 
 subjects are expected to take full responsibility for personal wellness, rather 
than associate stress and illness with poor working conditions. In sum, gig 
work is conducted as a process of social reproduction of capitalist labour 
relations within the context of the reproduction of accelerated capitalist sub-
jectivities of competition (Dalla Costa and James 1972, Jarrett 2015a, 2015b, 
Haider and Mohandesi 2015, Kofman and Raghuram 2015, Weeks 2011). 
Affective work reaches below, behind and above the corporeal. Measuring 
unseen labour is a form of control by means of the ‘modulation of affect’, 
carried out by both recording and trying to control bodily capabilities – in 
our study, by providing self-tracking devices, and thus ‘varying the  resistance 
of a body’ (Bogard 2010).
In digitalised and gig work, the inevitability of machinic developments takes 
precedence, even over clients. Pinning to the corporeal, affective gig labour-
ers do not engage in creative production using their own affective capacities. 
They are engaged in a type of affective repression by which the required subor-
dinate performances corrode their own psychosomatic and bodily wellbeing. 
Attempts to regulate and modulate affect, and to externalise its costs, are part 
of this process. Affective labour is, by definition, innumerable and outputs are 
potentially only seen as ‘disembodied “exhaust”’ (Smith 2016). Nonetheless, in 
gig work, every moment of our labour is captured with increasing intensity, 
not so that it can be remunerated, but because worker collapse could result in 
resistance and reduce the ‘bottom line’.
Lorusso (2017) refers to precarity as a form of Derridean ‘hauntology’ and 
Fisher’s Ghost of My Life (2014) because precarity is not ‘fully part of the pre-
sent’ but rides on an ‘anticipation shaping current behavior’, and to the dream 
that present activities will lead to something better, a goal oriented vacuum 
of constant anxious striving given the failure of the present to become what 
we hoped. From an autonomist viewpoint, precarity is a systemic capture of 
the hopeful movements of exodus of the 1960s/70s, when resistance often 
took the form of ‘refusal of work’, by the ‘slacker’ or ‘dropout’ (Shukaitis 2006), 
with refusal to submit to Fordist work routines (Brophy and de Peuter 2007, 
180–181). Capitalism has pursued this exodus into the field of life beyond 
work, and captured escaping flows by expanding labour into these spaces 
 (Mitropoulos 2006, Neilson and Rossiter 2005, Federici 2008, Frassanito 
Network 2005). It has also appropriated radical ideas, introducing a wave of 
flexibilisation and selling it as liberation (Berardi 2009), blurring work-life 
boundaries in the process. In effect, capitalism followed the fleeing workers 
into the autonomous spaces of the qualitative, and restructured these spaces 
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along quantitative lines, to bring the workers back into capitalism. Continu-
ous appropriation manifests capitalism’s continued capability to re-invent itself 
when faced with resistance (Berardi 2009, 77).
3. Affective Control and Resistance
Beller predicted that the development of capital was not likely to proceed 
without the development of technologies for the modulation of affect (Beller 
1998, 91). Affect enables or disables our power to act (through the body), and 
its power lies in its singularity and universality (Negri 1999, 85). These ideas 
prefigure and inspire the Deleuzian distinction between active and reactive 
forms of affect or force. Affective labour is the internal work that takes place 
before emotions are expressed. It is linked to the biological aspects of work, 
whereby:
Labour works directly on the affects; it produces subjectivity, it produces 
society, it produces life. Affective labour, in this sense, is ontological – it 
reveals living labour constituting a form of life (Hardt 1999, 99).
Corporate colonisation of unseen labour is endemic in post-Fordist manage-
ment and post-bureaucratic techniques precisely because affective solidarity 
would lead to the most difficult form of resistance to stop, since affect already 
encompasses all-of-life.
Hardt and Negri (2000) depict affect and immaterial labour from a 
post-Fordist perspective as providing possibilities for resistance, collective sub-
jectivities and formations of communities. The emphasis on control of affect 
in management strategies can be seen to be tied up with labour control and 
social reproduction of capitalist subjectivity and relations of masked coercion 
(Hartmann 1979). When workers become conscious of affect, or their power to 
act, they also become conscious of their ability to impact one another and to 
challenge abuses at work (Moore 2015). One control method that is explicitly 
designed to modulate and regulate affect is seen in health care worker training 
(Ducey 2007). Gregg (2010) outlines the blockages to any affective communi-
cation induced by email and pseudo office intimacy garnered by such activities 
as Secret Santas and other games that prevent affective relationships. Cognitive 
behavioural therapy and related psychology highlight the role of emotional and 
affect regulation for stress management at work, and one group has provided 
the tools titled ‘Affect Regulation’ (Psychology Tools 2017).
Firth defines affect as a ‘necessary part of social and ecological assemblages, 
which passes through the unconscious field’ (Firth 2016, 131). Negri (1999) 
expands on the ‘unseen’ aspects of affect and posits that the use value of such 
labour cannot be quantified in contemporary conditions in the same way that 
work was controlled during previous eras, because such labour exists in a 
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‘non-place’, the immaterial. But affective labour has become a ‘moral’ obliga-
tion imposed by corporate power.
Affective labour is not directly ‘inside’ capital, but neither is it a straight-
forward ‘nonwaged reproduction of the labourer, added to labour’s use value’ 
(Clough 2007, 25). Rather, in real, affective subsumption, work happens con-
stantly, and is both nowhere and everywhere. Work becomes all-of-life. Indeed, 
‘capital produces its own outside from inside the viscera of life, accumulating at 
the level of the preindividual bodily capacities and putting preindividual bodily 
capacities to work’ (ibid). The absenting of management and individual respon-
sibilisation in gig work is a method of controlling affective resistance by putting 
affect to work and reducing labour power, thereby reducing the possibility for 
consciousness of labour’s exploitation.
4. Affective and Everyday Resistance
Many signs of resistance to the worst effects of digitalised affective labour are 
emerging, from everyday forms to trade union organising. Active resistance 
includes workers’ hacking or appropriation of apps; sousveillance where people 
‘watch the watcher’ by using their own methods to gain access to information 
they do not normally have by carrying out information and sharing jamming; 
using personal devices at work; situational leveraging where, for example, 
people may ‘steal’ breaks and mask them as work; or simply dragging their 
feet. Cases have also emerged in which workers use self-tracking for resist-
ance and self-protection. In one case, a project worker without a fixed contract 
used self-tracking to protect himself from unpaid overtime. He tracked time 
spent on projects to prove he was being underpaid and to ensure his employer’s 
compliance with the European Working Time Directive. Ross talks about other 
forms of direct action in the context of exploitative digital labour, naming ‘per-
vasive sabotage, chronic absenteeism and wildcat strikes’ (Ross 2008, 7).
From a labour process perspective, technology itself has not caused the 
conditions of precarity. Rather, the use of data from technologies, and the in-
visibilisation of power relations, has intensified age-old practices of scientific 
management and related worker control. But worker organising and resistance 
has begun to reveal the revived agency in labour power as a response to the 
latest incarnation of Ricardo’s machine question. For solidarity to fully emerge 
amongst digitalised workers, class consciousness in the Marxist sense is nec-
essary. Some have claimed, however, that class has fundamentally changed 
vis-a-vis concepts of labour. Virno (2004) wonders whether the multitude is too 
centrifugal to hold a class consciousness ‘of its own’. Standing (2011) has asked 
whether a ‘multi-class’ configuration that identifies precarity is even necessary, 
since it is identifiable in other ways. Work ascribes worth to our species-being 
(Sayer 2005), and people find dignity and self-worth within labour. Technology 
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and social media has been a medium for social uprising and resistance (Ger-
baudo 2012), and digital activism’s ‘firebrand waves’ have been escalating since 
the early 1990s (Karatzogianni 2015). Fishwick argues that critical subjective 
connections in the labour process are crucial for resistance, where
[C]ontestation in and around the production process is central to the 
formation of the working class as a political subject. Not only does it 
create objective conditions of shared experience, it also allows for a col-
lective subjective interpretation of these experiences that extends be-
yond the workplace and permits the articulation of coherent and salient 
political interests as a class (2015, 215).
Ross notes that the expectations placed upon the precariat are a ‘warmed over 
version of Social Darwinism’ (2008, 36). It is easy to see how this operates in 
practice, as the value of social performances is entirely reduced to managerial 
metrics.
Lordon’s Willing Slaves of Capital looks to the work of Spinoza and Marx to 
ask why people continue to serve capital and have not overcome it, given its 
abuses. Affect and its power to act can be triggered by both the positive and the 
negative (which is often overlooked in the literature on affect). A ‘last straw’ 
can trigger the multitude, when institutional power, in the Spinozan sense of 
‘pouvoir’, can no longer contain people’s ‘sadness’, and our inter-affections and 
enlisted conatus will drive us to revolt. Lordon shares Spinoza’s point of ‘indig-
nation’, where political affect is brought to bear. Joy, desire and passion (and 
unseen labour, as I argue) are classically appropriated by capital. Lordon asks 
whether the social reproduction of capitalism could be appropriated to repro-
duce subjectivities of resistance, where ‘collective human life reproduces itself ’, 
he says, and ‘the passions that work to keep individuals subordinate to institu-
tional relations can also, at times, reconfigure themselves to work against those 
same relations’ (Lordon 2014, 138–139).
Attentive stress and disposability are intensified by unrealistic expectations 
fostered by a quantified, machine-like image of human productivity, and fur-
ther intensified by permanent indebtedness, leading to a sense of permanent 
inadequacy (Gill 1995).  Tracking and monitoring technologies appear to 
provide objective data on human capabilities, but this claim elides their so-
cial context. They measure only users, creating an illusion that the precarious 
worker – constructed by the affective and social field of which these technolo-
gies are a part – is identical with humanity, the defining point of human bod-
ily capabilities, and the point from which we should start – an outer limit of 
‘human nature’ which restricts political and social possibility. While to some 
degree measuring emotion, feeling, and bodily responses, dividing and distrib-
uting work with new technologies at a granular level involves the capture of 
affect  stricto sensu – the very social and psycho-structural underpinnings of 
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affective responses. Such technologies only measure variance within the range 
defined by precarian affect, providing an illusory, pseudo-objective view of 
what might be possible outside this range.
Worse still, the ideology of the quantification of all of life and work perpetu-
ates the image that the mind controls the body, and thus, from a Spinozian 
perspective, serves to contain the body’s power within a mental frame largely 
constituted by neoliberal ideology and subjectivity (the managerial self, quan-
tified productive performance, magical voluntarism).  Butler’s (2004) work 
on Precarious Life looks at the body as containing mortality, vulnerability and 
agency (26). While this text is not about resistance as such, her recognition 
of the shared ‘vulnerability of life’ (Lorey 2010) and her call to leftist politics 
to aim to orient our ‘normative obligations of equality and universal rights’ 
around our corporeality and vulnerability (ibid). Perhaps now is the time for 
the precariat to identify itself (ourselves) and identify a real alternative, an al-
ternative that does not prey on insecurity but builds solidarity, a constituting of 
the political without the requirement for a single leader, a rhizomatic formation 
of activation, without requiring a class identity in the orthodox sense.
Precarity is now used in academic and public discourse to reference the aban-
doned worker, the vulnerable, the person whose life is tied up with ongoing risk 
and stress. At the international level, discussions are ongoing about forming a 
new labour convention based on tackling violence against women and men. At 
the ‘From Precarious Work to Decent Work’-ILO 2011 Workers’ Symposium 
on  Policies and Regulations to Combat Precarious Employment, trade union-
ists, ITUC, the Global Union Federations, workers’ groups, and trade unionists 
met to discuss the symptoms of rising precarity noted by the Occupy Together 
movement, escalating unemployment and underemployment, and the crisis of 
democracy and collapsing economies in the West. The documents produced 
from these meetings outline the problem and highlight strategies for viable re-
sponses, including how to organise and enable informal forms of solidarity and 
resistance among workers. The Labour arm of the ILO, ACTRAV, composed 
the Symposium on Precarious Work  in 2012 to look for ways to mitigate the 
fact that ‘people everywhere, it seems, are suffering from precarity as a result of 
economic and financial crisis, and weak Government policy responses to these’ 
(ACTRAV 2012, 1). What these actions didn’t predict was the dramatic rise in 
gig work which has become ubiquitous in many cities.
In the early 2000s I talked to a range of precarious digital workers about their 
experiences of work at the Fab Lab centre in Manchester. The emerging pic-
ture was one of overwork and stress, which contradicts dominant images of the 
freedoms of creative and digital labour:
I have dealt with unreasonable expectations and impossible management 
cultures in full time work… I would like less stress and more freedom to 
work on what I want, as this is where the real ‘innovation’ happens.
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I deal with constant overwork and funding problems.
The main problems are the economic recession, people losing control 
over their lives.
Play? At the moment it is all work.
Near deadlines stress is a real problem, and whatever the ergonomics, 
sitting for 12+ hours a day is bad for your health and posture.
We need realistic expectations. You can work 80 hours a week for a while, 
but you must remember that it won’t do you good in the long term.
These quotes from IT and creative industries gig workers reveal a set of per-
sistent recurring problems, including unreasonable performance expectations, 
and pressure (through incentives and self-conception of capability and neces-
sity). There is a growing acceptance that jobs require flexibility, volunteering, 
and the extraction of surplus value, and this means that an emerging form of 
self-perception keeps precarious gig workers in a ‘condition of animated sus-
pension’ (Berlant 2011, 256).
5. Pushing Back in Hard Times
5.1. Everyday Forms of Resistance in Gig Work
Mags Dewhurst is a same-day medical pushbike courier for CitySprint UK Ltd, 
and Chair of the Independent Workers of Great Britain. I asked Ms Dewhurst 
about some of the changes she has witnessed over the five years she has done 
this work. Dewhurst replied that there has been a rise in technology such as 
handheld computers (XDA/PDA like Palm Pilots) and apps, both in the courier 
industry and food delivery. These technologies have digitised what used to hap-
pen on paper, and are used primarily for the collection of signatures to author-
ise pick up and collection of parcels. However, the related devices also allow 
companies to GPS track all couriers’ movements in real time, as well as monitor 
the process of collection and delivery at every stage. Dewhurst stated that:
[Y]our every move and action are tracked in a digital audit trail. This is 
quite different from the days when couriers used to work off paper and 
rely solely on the use of the radio (Walkie Talkie) to receive jobs. Now 
everything is digital there is much less freedom and [a] much higher 
amount of control, thus meaning we are much less ‘independent’, even 
though our contracts say we are totally free and independent.
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I asked Dewhurst what, in her view, is the biggest threat to workers’ rights, in 
this context. She noted that bogus Independent Contractor (IC)/Subcontractor 
contracts are prevalent in gig economy work. She told me that the rise of digiti-
sation, automation and algorithmic management have risen, stating that ‘used 
in combination, they’re toxic and are designed to strip millions of folks of basic 
rights’. I asked which rights are being stripped in her context of work. Dewhurst 
replied, ‘All of them. The only bit of legislation that protects me would be the 
equality act, but that would only protect certain characteristics and would be 
hard to win anyway. Holiday pay, NMW [national minimum wage], sick pay, 
pensions, parental leave, redundancy, tax and in [national insurance] contribu-
tions… is removed via IC contracts’.
Mags and her colleagues, in response to the pressure they face in gig work,
Built a branch of the IWGB UNION [Independent Workers Union of 
Great Britain] (IWGB). This is the mechanism we have found most ef-
fective for creating change – as it helps consolidate a fragmented com-
munity and gives people hope and strength in numbers and through 
collective fights. So far we have won three major pay rises of 20-30% at 
London’s big three courier companies; CitySprint, Ecourier and Abso-
lutely Couriers. We also won at Gophr a small app company but they 
recently backed out of the agreement. We are also in the process of chal-
lenging our IC status in the courts at four of the big courier companies. 
We’ve also had limited success with the Deliveroo strike in August. Al-
though we didn’t manage to stop the new pay structure coming in, we 
helped the workers escalate their strike, created loads of positive pub-
licity and helped to shine a big light on the gig economy and exposed 
the contradictions inherent in it – which are all present in the courier 
industry as well, obviously.
I asked what more could be done to organise and reform work, and what is 
stopping people from doing it? Dewhurst indicated that the difficulty with 
unionising gig economy workers is that it is hard to get access to workers who 
are constantly on the move because their work is scattered across large areas. 
Dewhurst noted that ‘if we can’t get legislation to force companies to let unions 
in from the off, which is highly likely, then unions need to try harder’. She noted 
that a problem is that unions often have a very negative attitude that only serves 
to prevent action. Dewhurst related that she often hears big unions complain-
ing about anti-trade union legislation and a lack of participation, and blaming 
the government for why they are not winning. In her mind,
[T]his is the wrong attitude and is a recipe for inaction and is defeatist. 
If this is the attitude, of course nothing will happen and of course you 
won’t convince anyone to take action. What was great about the Deliv-
eroo strike was that it was autonomous: the drivers did it by themselves, 
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we merely assisted once it got going. It exposed the failings of govern-
ment, business, and the unions!! Now slowly, the big guys are waking up 
and gearing up but I doubt much will happen. As ever we will rely on 
workers to have the courage themselves to take action and force change 
and that is where the real power lies.
One warehouse operative, Ingrid (not her real name), who has worked in one 
warehouse in Britain for 11 years, provided information to me about a new 
worn device that was rolled out in her workplace in February 2016. All ware-
house work-floor operatives were unexpectedly required to use the hand-worn 
scanner. The current researchers asked what the workers were told the devices 
would be used for. Ingrid replied that management told workers that the de-
vices would provide management with information about any mistakes made 
and who in the warehouse had made them, so that they can be given help not 
to do it again.
In practice, however, Ingrid indicated that the technology has been used, not 
only to track individual mistakes, but also to track individual productivity and 
time spent working and on breaks. Workers were told that management would 
hold individual consultations on the basis of the data, but this had not hap-
pened. Instead, at a specific interval in the months that followed the devices’ 
implementation, workers were told that people would be fired within days, and 
it transpired that data from devices were part of the decision-making process 
for who to dismiss. Ingrid was not clear how the data were interpreted however, 
as seen in her response here:
Recently they sacked 2 or 3 people, and they decided this based upon 
who did least work. Maybe it was in May, when things get a bit quieter at 
work. They sacked 3 people: one of them was lazy, so I understand why. 
But the other 2 were very good. A week before the sackings, the man-
agement said ‘everyone be careful, because we are going to fire someone 
from the temporary staff ’. So everybody speeded up.
Ingrid indicated concern that the data accumulation was in fact, being rigged. 
In one case she and co-workers suspected that specific people were given easier 
tasks during a period of amplified monitoring. While warehouse operatives are 
permitted to join trade unions, Ingrid indicated that she is not part of a trade 
union and that she is not aware of any membership in her workplace. In any 
case, no consultation was held with relevant trade unions nor with workers 
before the technology was integrated. Ingrid stated:
We’re aware that the tracking might be used to put pressure on us 
to work faster, and it might be used to sack people. But lots of us 
feel that we don’t care anymore. Because physically we just can’t do  
any more.
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5.2. The Quantified Workplace Experiment and A(e)ffective Resistance4
From 2015–16, one group of professional workers in an office in the Nether-
lands carried out an experiment they called the ‘Quantified Workplace’ project 
(hereafter labelled as QWP). Up to 50 employees were given the option to ob-
tain a FitBit Charge HR Activity Tracker, and in the end around 35 took them. 
Some employees ordered different sizes which did not arrive, and this and 
other problems led in the end to about 25 participants being engaged at various 
points throughout the year that the project ran. The company contracted a data 
analyst, Joost Plattel, who set up individualised dashboards and RescueTime 
for participants. Volunteers for the project received workday lifelog emails ask-
ing them to rate their subjective productivity, wellbeing and stress.
Findings from interviews showed variable responses to the research ques-
tions. The highest rates of increase in coded categories were in autonomy, de-
sire for coaching and support, and concern for privacy. People’s perceptions 
of whether the QW project had an impact on behaviour change decreased by 
48% from month 3 to 8 of the project. While at the beginning of the project, 
participants were not sure of the need to set goals for personal involvement in 
the project, by the end of the project, the number of responses indicating that 
it would be good to set goals increased by 27%. Workers’ sense of uncertainty 
about the project decreased by 70% by the eighth month. This result, however, 
is not reflected in the level of engagement with the project (see Table 1).
Importantly, the project ran during a period of change management as one 
multinational company absorbed a smaller company that had been a tight-knit 
group of real estate and work design consultants. The smaller company 
Table 1: Interview findings: ‘Quantified Workplace’ project.
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suggested and led the project. The project was part of a move toward a more 
agile workplace, as I was informed by the manager running the project. The 
project manager indicated that his intentions were to help workers adapt to 
an agile working environment, where change was to be expected and red tape 
reduced, and to see to what extent employees’ self-awareness, stress, wellbe-
ing and ‘wellbilling’ (the amount of revenue an employee generates for the 
company), was impacted during the period of transition (interview October 5, 
2015).
In this context, workers were expected to transform affective and physical 
aspects of themselves, through becoming healthier, happier and more produc-
tive with the use of intensely investigatory devices. The company was interested 
in comparing subjectively and objectively measured productivity, this being 
linked to health and activity tracking and ‘billability’. I was not given access to 
the data gathered by the company on whether improved activity led to higher 
productivity and billability. However, the project did fit with the company’s 
moves toward working anywhere, in a gig-like scenario, which was encouraged 
at the time that the project merger was put in place, and also led to increases in 
teamwork; and efficiency. Furthermore, the merger was a significant change for 
all who had worked in the smaller company since all participants in the QWP 
had been employed in the smaller company. So, their experience of change and 
affective labour were measured by the processes put into place by the QWP. 
Workers were expected to manage any emotional or affective impacts as the 
company went through a merge and acquisition process. My interviews with 
participants demonstrate acts of resistance that involve exit from the project 
because of concerns about privacy, concerns about digital devices’ validity, and 
concerns about the corporate surveillance that a project of this type engenders.
Responses in the first interviews demonstrate scepticism about the validity of 
the FitBIt is readings, and desire for more device intelligence:
A big question for me and for a few others as well, is uh, how reliable 
the FitBit is.
[…] This thing [FitBit] might be more intelligent than just recording 
my data.
One respondent in the second interviews indicated frustration:
I don’t get any answers, I just fill in my things, but I don’t get an answer 
if it is good or not, I just want to know if I [am] good and just start 
working.
One comment in the first interviews indicated that employees originally thought 
there would be more ‘complaints about privacy’. However, in the first inter-
views, only three comments indicate concern about what personal data man-
agement were viewing, though this increased to 21 in the final interviews. Most 
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participants were cautious about corporate privacy practices. In the first survey, 
66% agreed that ‘consumers have lost all control over how personal informa-
tion is collected and used by companies’; 62% disagreed that ‘most businesses 
handle the personal information they collect about consumers in a proper and 
confidential way’; 43% disagreed that ‘existing laws and organizational practices 
provide a reasonable level of protection for consumer privacy today’.
One response to the question ‘How/have your thoughts about the Quantified 
Workplace project changed?’ stated,
I still [have] and even [have] more doubt [about] the project. And I 
don’t wear the Fitbit very often. And when I will wear it, it is for myself 
and to see how active I am.
After monitoring my workplace behaviour over a couple of months I 
found out that it didn’t change a lot. It confirmed my thoughts, which 
I had in the beginning. It is better to change your behaviour based on 
your feelings rather than a device.
I learned not very much from it.
Nine interview responses indicated FitBit abandonment, either for a period or 
altogether in the first two months. Some used the FitBit for almost the  entire 
project, while others engaged with it for less than one month/occasionally. 
FitBit use decreased significantly throughout the project, reflected by the 
monthly total average step count recorded from all employees. There was a 30% 
drop in average steps recorded within the first three months, a 50% drop within 
six months, and a 75% drop by the end. These results demonstrate  explicit 
 resistance to the QWP, calling into question the effectiveness of this kind of 
project where affective and emotional labour are managed in a period of agility.
6. Conclusion
Digitalised work unites the body and mind under the sign of mind, as tech-
niques of managerial (mental) control, what Rose (2001) terms the ‘politics 
of life itself ’. The difficulty, however, is that this politics does not speak to ‘life 
itself ’, any more than Fordism or medievalism. What it speaks to is a particu-
lar quantitative, spatial representation of life. Emphasising empowerment, Hardt 
and Negri (2000) illustrate affect and immaterial labour in the post-Fordist cli-
mate as providing possibilities for resistance and formation of communities. 
The emphasis on affect in management strategies can be seen to be tied up with 
labour control and social reproduction (Hartmann 2002, cited in Carls 2007, 
46). As a tool of resistance, affect functions in this system as a structure which 
enables or disables our power to act (through the body). One can contrast an 
instrumental relationship, where the body is ‘used’ by the mind to pursue ra-
tional goals, with an expressive relationship, in which bodily or affective forces 
express themselves in the world, through the mind.  Work in the digitalised 
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contexts occurs in an intensely instrumentalised relationship between workers, 
clients and often invisible forms of management.
I conclude by assessing the possibilities for affective resistance in digitalised 
work. Affect is the ‘power to act that is singular and at the same time univer-
sal’ (Negri 1999, 85). This prefigures and inspires the Deleuzian distinction 
between active and reactive forms of affect or force. Affective labour is the in-
ternal work that takes place before emotions are expressed, and involves both 
the possibility for subconscious labour power that could lead to resistance, but 
also the potential for subconscious affective self-repression. It is linked to the 
biological aspects of work, whereby:
Labour works directly on the affects; it produces subjectivity, it produces 
society, it produces life. Affective labour, in this sense, is ontological – it 
reveals living labour constituting a form of life… (Hardt 1999, 99)
For Spinoza, affect was an intensely embodied concept which refers to the ac-
tive ways in which bodies affect one another and co-produce social life (not 
always in conscious ways). The full positive realisation of affect means that the 
‘power to act’ is enacted, and solidarity is immaterial, becoming also conscious 
and corporeal. Thus affect transcends what is immediately conscious. For this 
reason, affective resistance is a serious threat to systems of workplace operation 
such as interface management in the gig work context. Simply put, affective 
solidarity would lead to the most difficult form of resistance to stop, since, akin 
to invasive management techniques of technological control that infiltrate all 
aspects of life, affect already infiltrates all-of-life.
Simondon (1958/1980) discusses transindividuality as a link to emancipa-
tion by describing technical objects as having an infinite number of possible 
uses when they are individualised, but he notes that their convergence is the 
point at which they are useful and become a system. He looks at the case of a 
‘made to measure’ car, indicating that only non-essential parts are contingent 
and work ‘against the essence of technical being, like a dead weight imposed 
from without’(18). Simondon defends the human as the organiser of the tech-
nical, stating that automation is never perfect nor complete and always con-
tains a ‘certain margin of indetermination’ (4). He states that ‘far from being 
the supervisor of a squad of slaves, man is the permanent organiser of technical 
objects which need him as much as musicians in an orchestra need a conduc-
tor’ (4). In a similar way, people can recognise their individual existence with-
out becoming atomised or hostile, and realise instead that our interrelations 
are what strengthen us and prevent us from abdicating and delegating our hu-
manity to a robot (2). Marx observed during his lifetime the ways in which 
early industrialisation turned ‘living labour into a mere living accessory of this 
machinery, as the means of its action, also posits the absorption of the labour 
process in its material character as a mere moment of the realisation process 
of capital’ (Marx 1858/1993, 693). He adds: ‘[machinic] knowledge appears as 
alien’ and ‘external’ to the worker where the worker is ‘superfluous’ (brackets 
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added) (1858/1993, 605). In this text, Marx identifies the machine in the labour 
process and describes its capacity for quantifying, abstracting and dividing la-
bour; he comments that ‘the worker’s activity, reduced to a mere abstraction 
of activity, is determined and regulated on all sides by the movements of the 
machinery, and not the opposite’ (1858/1993, 693). In this way, Marx identi-
fies agency, and even authority, with the machinery, where ‘objectified labour 
confronts living labour within the labour process itself as the power which 
rules it; a power which, as the appropriation of living labour, is the form of 
capital’ (1858/1993, 693). The means of labour, Marx wrote, is transformed, 
controlled and absorbed by machinery. It is very likely that workers are begin-
ning to resist both traditional forms of management and machinery itself (see 
Moore 2017).
Digitalised work, in the contemporary context of agility and precarity, ulti-
mately demonstrates that machines are now more than ever before the symbols 
for ‘the ordering of life itself ’ (Merchant 1990, 227), accelerating the labour 
process to the cliff edge of what is possible to endure, and dragging workers 
with them. Workers’ responses to the digitalised aspects of gig work, as well 
as their explicit disengagement with the quantified workplace company-led 
project outlined here, demonstrate awareness of the tensions surrounding new 
control mechanisms, the ongoing struggles in the contemporary labour process 
where agility is a key meme, and the urgent need for a review of all-of-life man-
agement strategies. This chapter explores where and how resistance emerges 
to this brave new world of all-of-life work, where monitoring and tracking of 
unseen labour may become ubiquitous. Future research must look at the risks 
this poses for workers, and at forms of resistance that emerge against modula-
tion and control methods in the quantified workplace.
Notes
 1 A version of this chapter has been published in Adam Fishwick and Heather 
Connolly (2018) Austerity and Working Class Resistance: Survival, Disruption 
and Creation in Hard Times (Rowman and Littlefield 2018).
 2 Comment made while testing first wearable computer invented and de-
signed by Claude Shannon and Edward O. Thorp at MIT, to be used for 
casino roulette (Thorp 1998).
 3 Data source: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/apr/23/number- 
of-zero-hours-contracts-in-uk-rose-by-100000-in-2017-ons
 4 Lukasz Piwek provided data analysis support for this project.
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CHAPTER 11
Beyond Repression : Reflections on 
Phoebe Moore’s Chapter
Elisabetta Brighi
The UK government recently commissioned a report looking into the question 
of wellbeing at work, in particular the impact of mental ill health on the UK 
economy. The ‘Thriving at Work’ report, authored by a former chairman of 
HBOS insurance and by the chief executive of the mental health charity ‘Mind’, 
estimated the annual cost of poor mental health to UK businesses at £99bn, 
and stated that 300,000 people lose their jobs each year due to mental health is-
sues (The Guardian 2017). Although informative and well-received, the report 
sadly stands out for lack of critical engagement with an issue now recognised as 
urgent. To start with, the report relies on a conceptualisation of mental health 
that narrowly focuses on its economic ‘costs’, rather than its human, social and 
political implications. Secondly, the report fails to investigate the relationship 
between mental health issues, working environments and the wider society, 
including its dominant economic system. The report’s recommendations boil 
down to well-known, short-term quick fixes: e-learning modules in resilience 
for employees and increased monitoring of staff ’s mental health and wellbe-
ing for employers. With a discussion of the relationship between affect and 
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neoliberal capitalism beyond the pale, and the effects of alienation duly con-
cealed behind a smokescreen of ‘data’, the solution remains the same – shift 
responsibility squarely to the individual, and pathologise normality.
Phoebe Moore’s chapter is a timely intervention in the increasingly important 
conversation about affect and platform capitalism. Taking as her point of de-
parture Antonio Negri’s assertion that in the global, postmodern modes of pro-
duction affect has acquired ‘fundamental productive qualifications’, and thus 
‘must be controlled’ (Negri 1999, 86, 87), Moore investigates the affective di-
mension of platform capitalism and charts the way in which technologies have 
come to exercise such control. The landscape that opens in front of our eyes 
is one where the injunction of productivity has entirely captured the affective, 
emotive sphere, rendering wellness just another dimension of performance, 
just as life becomes another dimension of work. The digitalised workplace of 
the ‘gig’ platform economy pits the precarity of workers whose lives are disfig-
ured by the imperative of mobility, flexibility and resilience against a techno-
logical management of labour that relentlessly monitors, tracks, measures and 
sanctions it. As Moore rightly puts it, precarity thus emerges as the purest form 
of alienation.
The literature on affect and platform capitalism has looked extensively at the 
ways in which emotions are mobilised and monetised in the modes of produc-
tion of contemporary capitalism (Hardt 1999, Blackman and Venn 2010, Mas-
sumi 2015, Ilouz 2017). Two converging issues are at stake here: the first is that 
affect seems to have become the real currency of neoliberal capitalism; the sec-
ond, is that capital seems to have completely captured the emotional, psycho-
logical and personal sphere, the sphere of affect. Moore draws on an extensive 
literature and contributes to it by focusing on the particular form of ‘all-of-life 
work’, that is gig work in the ‘demand economy’. Here affect emerges as both 
intensely central to work and intensely regulated through work. In gig work the 
most intimate aspects of workers’ lives, including dispositional, emotional and 
psychological traits, are at once interpellated, monetised and regulated. The 
neoliberal imperative of resilience means that workers must constantly draw 
from their reservoir of mental and emotional resources to succeed in a type of 
environment that is not only uncertain and hyper competitive, but that often 
trades in affect (Neocleous 2012, 2013). On the other hand, today’s technology 
offers employers the ability to control and regulate workers’ affective sphere, 
incentivising moods that are functional to the reproduction of capitalist labour 
relations (Atkinson 2015, Ahmed 2010). Moore’s chapter richly illustrates these 
two points theoretically and empirically.
What perhaps remains to be analysed in greater detail are the effects of the 
capitalist capture of affect on the lives of workers, both as individuals and as a 
group or class. In this respect, there is an opportunity for a greater engagement 
with those literatures, from social and clinical psychology to psychoanalysis, 
that look at the intimate correspondence between social structures and ‘struc-
tures of feelings’, between social and economic conditions and the individual 
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psychic and affective plane. Understanding more clearly the affective contours 
of alienation, however, is crucial if any project of emancipation is to succeed.
Amongst psychoanalysts and psychotherapists there is widespread agreement 
regarding the psychologically nefarious nature of neoliberalism as incarnated in 
platform capitalism (Davies 2017, Tweedy 2016, Wilkinson and Pickett 2010). 
As Paul Verhaeghe recently argued, with precarity and uncertainty dominat-
ing the neoliberal workplace, with labour constantly being monitored, tracked 
and evaluated, workers become stripped of any sense of autonomy, control, in-
dependence and ultimately meaning (2014a). This depressive condition of ex-
treme dependency coexists with a manic attitude of extreme objectification to 
create a number of lacerating self-perceptions: on the one hand, the belief that 
one is ultimately and independently responsible for one’s own success or failure; 
on the other, the belief that one is disposable, insignificant and utterly depend-
ent. The former reinforces narcissistic and punitive fantasies about dominance, 
control and production of the self, including its affects; the latter exacerbates 
alienation, abandonment and apathy. The neoliberal workplace creates there-
fore a social environment unable to contain our worst fears and instincts – in 
fact, one that exacerbates these traits and pits them one against the other, while 
it systematically thwarts the reparative, creative and fulfilling potential of social 
interaction (Verhaeghe 2014b). Deleuze and Guattari (1972/2004) believed 
that capitalism produced schizoid personalities, while Žižek (2009) later iden-
tified capitalism with perversion. There is now an argument to be made about 
neoliberalism translating into an epidemic of bipolar disorder – or, indeed, 
 psychosis, with its related tendencies of splitting, projection, and paranoia (Bell 
2006, 2016). Moore makes a passing reference to these psychoanalytic dynamics 
when she writes about the degree to which affect is regulated in the workplace 
of the ‘gig economy’:
Pinning to the corporeal, affective gig labourers do not engage in crea-
tive production using their own affective capacities. They are engaged 
in a type of affective repression by which the required subordinate per-
formances corrode their own psychosomatic and bodily wellbeing. [my 
italics]
Because of their complexity, however, the emotional, psychological and affec-
tive dynamics that whirl around in the neoliberal workplace exceed the rela-
tively simple process of repression and cannot be exhausted in this category. 
If repression was the only psychological mechanism really at play, the current 
condition would not be so self-lacerating – and the possibility to transcend it 
would be less difficult to imagine.
This feeds into a second, important theme explored in Moore’s chapter, one 
which also necessitates further analysis. This is the theme of affective resist-
ance and of the construction of an emancipatory project able to move beyond 
platform capitalism. Here again Moore draws on Michael Hardt (1999) and 
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Antonio Negri, as well as Spinoza, to make the argument that ‘affect and imma-
terial labour’ provide ‘possibilities for resistance, collective subjectivities and 
formations of communities’. In fact, Moore argues, ‘affective solidarity’ leads 
‘to the most difficult form of resistance to stop, since affect already infiltrates 
all-of-life’, and again, ‘affective resistance is a serious threat to systems of work-
place operation’ – which of course explains neoliberalism’s determination to 
control it. The material presented by Moore is certainly significant – in the 
chapter there are a number of examples of workers exercising their power to 
resist the ever more intrusive reach of neoliberal technologies by exiting pro-
jects because of concerns about privacy and/or corporate surveillance, or by 
turning the asymmetry generated by tracking technology on its head, so as 
to have more, rather than less, control. Yet these examples fall somehow short 
of conjuring up a ‘real alternative’. If the aim, as Moore claims, is ‘an alterna-
tive that does not prey on insecurity but builds solidarity, a constituting of the 
political without the requirement for a single leader, a rhizomatic formation 
of activation, without requiring a class identity in the orthodox sense’, the data 
presented only goes so far. This is not so much an issue of quantity, or critical 
mass, but rather a qualitative issue that points back to the question of what 
might be really at stake in affective resistance, beyond the issue of repression.
According to Negri (2017), in the conditions of global post-Fordist capital-
ism, ‘the struggle will always be a combination of exodus and desertion. Deser-
tion from command and exodus beyond command’. But what does that entail 
exactly from an affective perspective? What does it mean to affectively desert 
the neoliberal workplace and to psychologically refuse its command? What 
does it mean to feel and act politically in platform capitalism? I would argue 
that the vocabulary of alienation and repression does not cut deep enough 
into the affective entanglements of neoliberalism to permit the construction 
of emancipatory projects. ‘For solidarity to fully emerge amongst digitalised 
workers, class consciousness in the Marxist sense is necessary’, writes Moore. 
And yet she is aware of the centrifugal forces that today threaten to dismember 
any notions of ‘class’.
The capitalist capture of affect is important precisely because it completes 
the process of the atomisation of society: it brings alienation to perfection. As 
such, it reduces the possibility, not only of class consciousness, but of indi-
vidual consciousness, to its minimum – in fact it actively aims to pervert, ma-
nipulate, control and regulate consciousness. The possibility of deserting and 
refusing the capitalist command today inevitably plays out on this battlefield, 
at the level of this extreme individualisation, and boils down to a discernment 
of sorts. Against the barbaric neoliberal transformation of notions of the ‘care 
of the self ’ into a purely commodified and self-interested version of depres-
sive, hedonistic accumulation, the alternative may well unfold through the ar-
ticulation of a non-servile virtuosity (Virno 1996, 200), a consciousness about 
ourselves that is aware of our entanglement with others; that refuses to project 
unwanted feelings of anxiety onto vulnerable others by preying on insecurity; 
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that demystifies the delusion of autonomy and independence and uncovers its 
sadistic, violent import; that refuses to relate to ourselves and to others as com-
modity; that believes in the human capacity to create, live, care and heal.
In his Political Theory of Exodus, Paolo Virno (1996) praises intemperance, 
as opposed to incontinence, as a cardinal virtue. Incontinence, according to 
Virno, is a vulgar unruliness and disregard for the law that bursts into the pub-
lic sphere with the aim of capturing its institutions and power – the same dis-
ruptive quality with which symptoms violently burst into consciousness after 
years of repression. Virno argues that intemperance, on the other hand, ‘is not 
ignorant of the law’ nor does it merely oppose it – rather, it ‘discredits it’ on eth-
ical and political grounds, and ‘in the name of the systematic interconnection 
between Intellect and political Action’ (Virno 1996, 199). The aim, therefore, is 
not to overthrow the state nor capture its institutions, but rather to safeguard 
positive prerogatives, forms of life and ‘works of ‘friendship’ that have been 
achieved and conquered, not without struggle, en route. Given the atomisa-
tion of contemporary labour relations, I would argue that the development of 
a class consciousness is contingent on the development of an individual con-
sciousness which, in turn, is first and foremost affective in nature. The task may 
still be to educate the masses, but the place to start today may be a ‘sentimen-
tal  education’– i.e., an education about the emancipatory and self-sabotaging 
 affects mobilised in the neoliberal workplace.
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CHAPTER 12
Goodbye iSlave : Making Alternative 
 Subjects Through Digital Objects
Jack Linchuan Qiu
1. Introduction
Since the arrival of the ‘digital revolution’, we have been repetitively reminded 
about the emancipatory power of technological objects. Apple’s iconic ‘1984’ 
commercial was a good example, showcasing that their new Macintosh com-
puter could liberate human subjectivities from the tyranny of Big Brother. 
However, more than 30 years later, when the iPhone turns ten years old in 2017, 
we look back and see a very different, even opposite picture: digital objects 
such as smartphones have not only failed to deliver their emancipatory promise 
(Qiu 2016a), but have created instead new conditions of enslavement, so much 
so that I would contend that the abolition of digital slavery, or iSlavery, is an 
imperative duty we have no choice but to take on.
The keyword ‘iSlave’ was originally a slogan invented during a transnational 
campaign in 2010 by labour activists in Hong Kong and Switzerland (see Fig-
ure 4), which I picked up and fleshed out in the 2016 volume Goodbye iSlave: A 
Manifesto for Digital Abolition. The book title is thus a salute to those working 
on the frontlines of digital labour activism, to their bravery and creativity. The 
subtitle of the book contains the word ‘manifesto’, which was something much 
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bolder than the original idea I had when I started this book. However, I think it 
suits my goal pretty well, because I hope to make two provocations: first, digital 
media has done much more damage to the world and to humanity than most of 
us would like to realise; second, we can and have to use the same technological 
objects to resist and abolish new and old modes of slavery, to regain human 
dignity, and to create new subjectivities of a post-capitalist era.
In this essay, I will first discuss ways to define slavery in the twenty-first 
 century, which I will apply to conditions of digital capitalism from the assembly 
line to the data mine. Then I will briefly introduce two basic modes of iSlavery: 
one is the ‘manufacturing iSlave’ or production-mode iSlavery, such as Chi-
nese migrant workers at Foxconn – the world’s largest electronics producer, 
known for its notorious sweatshop conditions, which are comparable, arguably, 
to the trans-Atlantic triangular trade. The second mode is ‘manufactured’ or 
consumption-mode iSlavery, such as Facebook free labour and people who are 
addicted to digital gadgets. Section 2 will focus on antislavery struggles and 
openings for digital abolition through collective resistance, creative memes, 
and social media on the picket line (Qiu 2016b), which can be observed abun-
dantly in the Chinese factory zones and online. My goal is not only to criticise 
the status quo but also to illuminate hope for our collective digital future.
But let me confess upfront: I have been a user of Apple’s products for more 
than three decades. I am as complacent in what I’m about to critique as every 
i-gadget consumer who happens to read this essay. Frankly speaking, to ar-
rive at the theme of slavery marks a point in a completely unexpected journey 
for myself. Yet I’m now presenting this unlikely idea because I see great utility 
in connecting slavery with things digital. To me, slavery is much more than a 
past condition or a provocative metaphor for contemporary reality. It is, more 
precisely, a comparative method that re-historicises our thinking about digital 
media and labour, China and the world. This is crucial because I happen to 
possess too many scattered empirical observations from my work on Foxconn 
since 2010, for which I need a larger and more coherent analytical framework, 
and because studies of digital media in China have suffered increasingly from 
methodological nationalism or Chinese exceptionalism. But with a compara-
tive slavery framework, we can re-connect China with world history, reconstrue 
trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific struggles as one continuous longue durée pro-
cess. This conceptual enlargement can be a theoretical breakthrough. After all, 
slavery is about the reduction of human subjects into inhuman objects, an ul-
timate form of objectification and alienation, a process always accompanied by 
resistance, recalcitrance, and the re-making of subjectivities.
2. Conceptualising Slavery
Borrowing from the scholarship of history, sociology, anthropology and legal 
studies, I have constructed a conceptual framework, as shown in Figure 1, to 
Goodbye iSlave 153
define slavery in the modern era. The Figure shows that there are two deep 
foundations for enslavement, one being capitalist modernity, the other the ca-
pacity of slave regimes to mutate over time. Slavery is surprisingly resilient. It 
transforms as capitalism takes on new forms (Blackburn 1997). Standing on 
the quicksand of capitalist modernity, the immediate and tangible foundation 
for slavery is geopolitics, by which I mean the politico-economic and military 
complex of empire, expanding over oceans and continents, and now into the 
New World of cyberspace, smart devices and Big Data.
Slavery has two pillars, one of which is alienation or, more precisely, ‘natal 
alienation’ as Orlando Patterson (1982, 7) calls it. The other pillar is resistance 
by the enslaved, whose revolutionary spirits inspire us to re-imagine a better 
digital economy and a more humane world. While conventional wisdom often 
focuses exclusively on suppressive slave regimes and alienating experiences of 
enslavement, it is important to stress that slave resistance has always been part 
and parcel of the social reality in conditions of slavery, past or present (Line-
baugh and Rediker 2013; Rediker 2007).
The ultimate goal of slavery is to exploit the body or body parts of the en-
slaved under conditions of abnormal labour-capital relationship (Fuchs 2014). 
In order to reach this goal, surplus value from alienated labour has to be ex-
tracted from processes of consumption, dominated by hegemonic cultures of 
consumerism – which are now coded in corporate algorithms, the latest instru-
ments of enslavement through the manipulation of social media platforms.
Finally, borrowing from legal scholarship, especially the 2012 Bellagio-Harvard 
Guidelines on the Legal Parameters of Slavery, I define iSlavery as de facto 
Figure 1: A conceptual framework illustrating ways to define slavery.
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conditions instead of de jure status. If any ‘powers attached to ownership’ are 
found to exist – such as possession, transfer, or disposal – then this suffices to 
indicate ‘institutions or practices similar to slavery’ (Allen 2014, 213, 220).
The first global regime of modern slavery, as I shall submit, was the 
seventeenth-century trans-Atlantic system. Although there were Africans be-
ing trafficked to the Caribbean in the 1500s, it was only in the 1600s that the 
racial structure, the mode of production and transcontinental trade centred 
on sugar, became stabilised. This regime expanded tremendously in the 1700s 
until its demise in the 1800s, bookended, for instance, in the British Empire by 
the 1807 Slave Trade Act and in the USA by the conclusion of the American 
Civil War in 1865.
But slavery still exists in the twenty-first century. Since the year 2000, the In-
ternational Criminal Court in The Hague and the High Court of Australia have 
both used slavery charges to successfully indict former militia and gang mem-
bers. In so doing, both courts recognised that the criminal offences constituted 
slavery, despite this term’s usual historical application, because they looked at 
de facto conditions as summarised in Figure 1. The question is: can we further 
extend this framework of understanding about modern slavery into the world 
of digital media and smartphones?
A few conceptual clarifications are in order. For one thing, the type of slavery 
that I’m critiquing here differs from the ‘slave society’ in classic Marxist theory, 
which Marx and Engels understood as an archaic mode of production that took 
place before feudalism. In its present shape, twenty-first-century slavery is a 
techno-social novelty. In another words, iSlavery in its current shape never ex-
isted before.
Furthermore, we know from historical studies that slaves are not just poor 
labourers toiling in plantations or factories, but that there is also a high-class 
category of what Patterson calls the ‘ultimate slave’ (1982, 299), such as familia 
Caesaris – pardon my Latin – the so-called ‘families’ of Caesar, who served 
as surrogates of the emperor. They could be extremely wealthy and powerful. 
But they could be executed without legal procedure when the emperor disliked 
them. These ‘ultimate slaves’ also sometimes rebelled, even turning themselves 
into kings and queens, for instance, when Turkish slaves founded Mamluk 
kingdoms in medieval Egypt. This was able to occur because the surrogate had 
become the sole means of communication for the emperor, and ‘the control of 
communication is power. Sublation of the relationship immediately becomes a 
possibility’ (1982, 333). In other words, in this case the slave-master intersub-
jectivity was subverted, first in thinking and the realm of symbolic interactions, 
then in the real world of society and its institutions.
The third clarification is that the notion of iSlavery is not racially defined: 
over and again, we have learned this lesson from history: interracial resurrec-
tion of the ‘motley crew’ often serves as arguably the most formidable form of 
antislavery struggle (Linebaugh and Rediker 2013, 211). Because of this I would 
submit that an effective movement of digital abolition – an effective global class 
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struggle indeed – can only succeed when it transcends identity politics, when 
the enslaved form solidarity on the basis of their common exploitation, not the 
colour of their skin.
This is my main thesis based on the above conceptualisations: digital capital-
ism revives slavery, but it also spurs new antislavery movements that hold the 
premise of emancipation. Developing this thesis, we possess a conceptual lens 
that opens new vistas and brings in fresh thinking. It enables us to travel back 
and forth between the seventeenth and twenty-first centuries.
More specifically, my comparative analysis follows the three models of tri-
angular exchange that are schematically outlined in Figure 2. On the left is the 
seventeenth-century trans-Atlantic triangular trade between Europe, West Af-
rica, and the New World. This needs no belabouring because it is a classic for-
mation based on the flow of African slaves, sugar and money.
At the bottom is twenty-first-century iSlavery. Here Apple is singled out due 
to its close affinity with Foxconn. However, it applies not only to Apple but other 
major gadgets brands as well, such as Samsung, Huawei, Sony and Amazon 
Kindle. Structurally speaking, the Apple-Foxconn relationship is comparable to 
the Europe-West Africa exchange four centuries ago. Together they expand to 
the New World of digital consumption and social media, where user-generated 
content (UGC) is the new ‘sugar’, so to speak.
On the right is a new model of antislavery exchange, where organised ‘net-
work labour’ functions as a third pillar of network society, forming dialectical 
relationships with network enterprise and network state. The cultural capital 
and social innovations of network labour materialises through working-class 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) (Qiu 2009), which are 
Figure 2: Three circuit models of slavery and antislavery.
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used to create collective and activism-oriented worker-generated content 
(WGC). WGC converges in working-class public spheres, leading to digitally 
networked action (DNA), which produces new meanings and a new praxis for 
network labour, thereby contributing to an alternative circuit of antislavery, re-
gionally and globally.
The rest of this paper compares the two circuits of objectification, commodi-
fication, and capitalist accumulation on the left and the bottom of Figure 2. We 
will then to zoom into the circuit of antislavery and new subject formation on 
the right, which is but one model of re-subjectification and re-humanisation 
toward genuine, sustainable, systemic change.
3. Two Modes of iSlavery: Manufacturing and Manufactured
There are two modes of iSlavery: the manufacturing or production-mode iSlave 
on the one hand, and manufactured iSlave or consumption-mode slavery on 
the other. In the manufacturing domain, the story starts in the bowels of the 
earth, in places like the Democratic Republic of Congo, where ‘blood minerals’ 
such as coltan are extracted by miners including child labour, who are under 
warlords’ control, even under gunpoint (Van Reybrouck 2014). These minerals 
are essential to the electronic components in our smart devices. The compo-
nents are assembled in massive factories such as those operated by Foxconn.
Foxconn is the world’s largest electronics manufacturer. According to Wall 
Street Journal, it employs approximately 1.4 million workers in mainland China 
(Mozur and Luk 2013), an army more numerous in number than all the armed 
forces of the US military combined. What are the labour conditions in Fox-
conn? The company first came under media scrutiny in 2006, when reporters 
sneaked into Foxconn ‘Peace’ dormitory in Shenzhen, South China, and were 
astounded by what they saw: up to 300 workers sleeping on three-level bunk 
beds in one huge room without air conditioning. According to a worker liv-
ing there: ‘The odour of sweat and dirty feet was suffocating’ (Zhang and Li 
2006). This reminds us of the lower deck of the slave ship in the Middle Passage, 
with African bodies being packed together, suffocated in the packed space with 
 extremely poor ventilation.
Another parallel is the transfer of labouring bodies, who are unfree and can-
not escape. The auction of African or African-American slaves is well recorded 
in archives and recent films such as Twelve Years a Slave. In Foxconn, we en-
counter the so-called ‘student interns’ sent by vocational schools in the Chi-
nese hinterlands to the factory. These are usually youngsters in their late teens. 
Without working at Foxconn for three months, they simply could not graduate. 
At school they majored in accounting, English, or pharmaceutics. At Foxconn, 
they are assigned to the most tedious of assembly line work – making iPhone 
back cases, for instance (Chan Pun and Seldon 2015).
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As I learned from my interviews with their production line-leaders in 2012, 
each day these ‘interns’ had to stand for ten hours while making iPhone cases. 
In the first week, all female students would break down in tears; in the second 
week, all males would cry due to excruciating pain in their legs. Yet they could 
not leave, because otherwise they wouldn’t be able to receive their graduation 
diploma. Both the schools and the factory benefit handsomely from this trans-
fer of enslaved bodies.
What happens if a worker gets sick due to vocational diseases, like leukae-
mia? What about cases of work injury, when the employees can no longer 
work? Will the factory take care of them, as required by China’s labour law? 
No. In the 2016 book, I documented several sad cases of workers being dis-
posed of, such as the case of Zhang Tingzhen, who lost half of his brain due to 
a work injury sustained at Foxconn (Qiu 2016a). This is not essentially different 
from the discarding of African bodies when they became liabilities during the 
Atlantic trade.
The most horrifying tragedies took place in 2010, when 15 Foxconn work-
ers jumped to their death from tall buildings within six months (Chan and 
Pun 2010). Never before had such a series of suicides been recorded in the 
history of industrial capitalism. However, if we go back to the trans-Atlantic 
trade, we find a surprisingly similar device of labour discipline and social con-
trol against the attempts of the enslaved population from taking their own lives: 
the anti-jumping nets (see Figure 3, below).
According to Olaudah Equiano, a slave boy who survived the Middle Pas-
sage in the 1700s, he witnessed fellow Africans jumping through that netting 
Figure 3: A typical Foxconn building being sealed off with anti-jumping nets.
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because they wished to die and free themselves from the miseries of enslave-
ment (Equiano 1789/1995). At the time, anti-jumping nets were a standard fea-
ture of slave ships. These nets became obsolete when the trans-Atlantic trade 
was abolished in the nineteenth century. But in 2010, they re-appeared on top 
of Foxconn buildings where i-products are made. There are three levels of net-
ting: the ‘Sky Net’ at the top, the ‘Ground Net’ at the bottom, and the ‘Middle 
Net’ sealing the windows and corridors in between. Foxconn claims to have 
taken down the anti-jumping nets, although I still see them when I visit the 
factory facilities in the Pearl River Delta and the Yangtze River Delta.
Due to China’s media censorship, we do not have a full account of suicides 
in Foxconn since 2010. But they have continued, as indicated by the suicide of 
Xu Lizhi, now a famous worker-poet in China’s literary scene, who leaped to 
his death from Foxconn Shenzhen in 2014 (Tharoor 2014). In August 2016, in 
Foxconn Zhengzhou, where most of the latest iPhones are made, we still had 
reliable information about a worker leaping to their death after assembling iP-
hone 7s.
This is why we call it ‘manufacturing iSlave’: because along the assembly line 
and around it, there are many parallels between the electronics sweatshops of 
the twenty-first century and seventeenth-century slavery of the Atlantic sys-
tem, seen through a global and longue durée perspective. The culprit is not a 
single company or a single country. It is rather a planetary system I term ‘Ap-
pconn’, i.e. a new global regime that not only produces gadgets but also fatal 
alienation, objectification, enslavement, the disposal of ‘useless’ labour, and the 
anti-jumping nets.
We turn next to ‘manufactured’ or consumption-mode iSlavery. It starts with 
the real case of a Chinese teenager, from a working-class family, who in 2011 
sold one of his kidneys to buy an iPhone and an iPad. This was an extreme case 
of voluntary servitude, an extreme tragedy of a human subject being deprived 
of his soul. Why on earth would anyone be so fanatical as to trade his health 
for gizmos? He did it because of peer pressure. Why, then, are so many people 
devoted to their i-devices in such a fanatical way?
The historical comparison is with the addictive substances of the Atlantic sys-
tem centuries ago, such as tobacco and alcohol, although the real driving force 
of the seventeenth-century triangular trade was sugar, including rum that was 
the by-product of sugar production. Today we have the functional equivalents 
in our digital gadgets: Facebook, WeChat, Candy Crush (even the name sounds 
sugary!).
The result of addiction is not just about hardware or software but about a 
fundamental shift in lifestyle toward what Sidney Mintz calls ‘desocialized eat-
ing’, when consumption is regularised and individualised in order to meet the 
rhythm of consumer goods production and marketing rather than the soci-
ocultural needs of communities and families (1985, 121). This is the crucial 
revelation: historically, the increase of slave production in the New World had 
to be matched by the rise of consumption in the Old. A hegemonic culture of 
consumerism is key to the domination of Appconn, when system-generated 
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consumption markets serve as a pillar of the New World System, which is as 
indispensable as its production apparatus. A strong addictive substance comes 
from the games and social media platforms – as much as it was for those who 
are addicted to sugar, alcohol, and tobacco. We lost our freedom when we be-
came addicts (Schull 2012).
Another angle to assess addiction is to look at how much time the Appconn 
regime has been able to extract from us. Time is a key dimension for the Marx-
ist analysis of exploitation. For Marx, capitalist accumulation of surplus value 
is ultimately about the acquisition of socially-necessary labour time – either by 
extending work hours or by the intensification of production processes (Marx 
1867/1992). According to Robin Blackburn (1997, 581), all the slaves under the 
control of the British Empire contributed 2.5 billion hours of labour time in 
1800, mostly by working in sugar fields and associated factories. If we apply the 
same calculation to Foxconn, by my calculation the modern factory of digital 
gadgets extracted 4.8 billion hours of labour time in 2014. That is, about two 
British Empires in 1800. How much time has Facebook extracted from us? My 
conservative estimation for 2014, using only the total number of daily active 
users is 653 billion hours, a truly mind-boggling amount equivalent to approxi-
mately 261 British Empires or 137 Foxconns.
‘The “i” word is practically an intoxicant,’ writes Judy Wajcman (2015, 178) in 
Pressed for Time. One way to recover our humanity, she continues, is to restore 
our ‘temporal sovereignty’ – to use the same digital tools as instruments of 
 antislavery, to recover and re-invent human subjectivities.
4. Antislavery: Resistance Through and Beyond WGC
With the darkening of the sky, we see brighter stars of hope. iSlavery is not the 
end of the world. It is, rather, a fresh start for the constant struggle of the hu-
man species to regain subjectivities and reconstruct intersubjectivities, which 
also constitutes a broad class struggle toward liberty – liberty for all working 
people and their families, who now have their own digital devices.
Among historians, there are two strands of thought about antislavery. One 
emphasises abolition – by the elite, the educated, lawyers, religious groups 
and the middle class, including white saviours – from the top down (Clarkson 
1839; Eltis and Walvin 1981; Drescher 2009). The other strand sees antislavery 
through the eyes of the oppressed – Africans and Afro-Americans, the indig-
enous people, the women, the illiterate, the black Jacobins, who resist the pow-
ers that be at the grassroots level and from the bottom up (James 1938/2001; 
Linebaugh and Rediker 2013; Reynolds 1981). While I am an abolitionist, my 
work leans more towards the second strand that stresses the resistance of the 
enslaved.
Most important are three insights from the historical literature that throw 
light on my analysis. First, antislavery takes many forms: singing & dancing, 
stealing, sabotage, hunger strikes, suicide – the list goes on (Rediker 2007). 
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Second, slavery and antislavery, accommodation and resistance, coexist in 
global and regional contexts. Third, bloody confrontations are exceptional; 
more common forms of resistance took place in culture, in daily work and 
life, and in the constant process of subject making, un-making, and remaking 
(Genovese 1976).
With these historical patterns in mind, one must admit that China today is 
also unique, especially the central part played by the Chinese state in moulding 
Appconn through the provision of cheap labour, land and infrastructure (Pun 
Lu Guo Shen 2011). Another factor, a geopolitical one, is Beijing’s attempt to 
fold in Taiwanese capital in order to achieve its goal of re-unifying the ‘Great 
Chinese Nation’. This makes local state agencies – in the form of city govern-
ments competing with each other in desperate endeavours to win corporate 
favour – stand out above and beyond the conventional power centres of Beijing, 
extending deep inside the country. The Chinese state, be it national or subna-
tional, remains a key arena for social struggle and power contestation (Zhao, 
2008). This means Appconn is not invincible if the authorities such as ACFTU 
(All China Federation of Trade Unions) can be pressurised into carrying out its 
basic duties. ACFTU is a strategic institutional space that is often better under-
stood by Chinese workers than by intellectuals.
Another vital development in China today is the wide diffusion of the Inter-
net and the rise of the information ‘have-less’ (Qiu 2009), a category between 
the so-called haves and have-nots of the digital divide, providing a crucial 
techno-social basis for the making of network labour – a new working class of 
the digital era. These are groups such as migrant workers with less income and 
resources, but they are also less committed to the politico-economic status quo. 
A crude indicator for the have-less is educational attainment. When China’s 
official Internet statistics unit released its first survey results about user de-
mographics in 1998, those without a Bachelor’s degree (roughly, the have-less 
group) accounted for 41.1% of all Internet users in the country, a figure which 
climbed to 78.8% in 2008, and 88.4% in 2016 (CNNIC 1998; 2008; 2016). 
Nearly nine out of ten Chinese Internet users belong to the working class and 
lower classes. What would they communicate, online and off?
Western media and Chinese commercial media alike routinely portray Chi-
nese workers as docile and obedient. When the Foxconn ‘suicide express’ oc-
curred, the tragedy received sensational coverage. But when workers fought 
back in the immediate aftermath of the ‘suicide express’, the media looked the 
other way as if there were nothing newsworthy. The struggle continues on a 
daily basis though, and is often livecast online via Weibo, China’s Twitter-like 
digital platform. Factory workers, including in Foxconn, use online videos to 
document their collective resistance, for instance, against violent guards. The 
most commonly used images, however, are stills, such as those taken at the 
Yuyuan shoe factory strike in 2014 (Qiu 2016b).
In retrospect, we see not only myriad ways of using ‘social media on the 
picket line’ (Qiu 2016b), but also at least three phases of working-class subject 
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formation facilitated by digital media. Before 2004, actions centred on QQ, the 
instant messenger. Between 2004 and 2009, the online forum Weblog, along 
with podcast and video sites, attracted more attention. Since 2009, Weibo and 
WeChat have been the dominant players. The technological platforms accumu-
late on top of existing ones, as do workers’ collective experiences; the most in-
teresting developments are probably Maoist and neo-Maoist online formations, 
and these deserve more study in the future.
Against such a rich backdrop of worker resistance, it makes sense to consider 
WGC (worker-generated content) as an alternative route, apart from UGC, that 
leads to subjectivities other than those constrained by neoliberalism. In many 
ways, WGC circulated via China’s working-class social media can be compared 
with African singing and dancing during the Middle Passage. To unacquainted 
observers, it may appear to be meaningless and chaotic. But to insiders, it can 
be immensely spiritual and poetic, gratifying and powerful, defiant and fun.
I would, however, contend that, although Chinese WGC is indeed impressive, 
today’s acts of social media on the picket line are still less remarkable than that 
of revolutionary Atlantic history. (Linebaugh and Rediker 2013). The famous 
Wedgwood antislavery medallion on the left side of Figure 4 is but one remark-
able symbol from the eighteenth-century abolition movement. Its cameo de-
sign of an African image with the Christian message – ‘Am I Not a Man and a 
Brother?’ – was reproduced in various material forms: fine porcelain, watches, 
gold pins. This ‘meme’ of abolition travelled across the social classes, beyond 
geographical and historical limits. It inspired and joined forces with a pleth-
ora of antislavery endeavours, from literary interventions such as Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin to the ‘free produce store’ taking the blood out of agricultural products, 
Figure 4: Wedgwood abolition medallion (1787) and the iSlave meme (2010).
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especially cotton and sugar (essentially nineteenth-century Fair Trade). Com-
paratively speaking, the digital abolition movement of twenty-first-century 
China, and globally, has not yet developed such impactful memes. Nor has it 
been successful in building coalitions and transforming broader society. Much, 
therefore, remains to be learned across the historical span.
5. Concluding Remarks
The main message from this essay is about historical continuity, despite the 
racial specificity of African or Afro-American versus Chinese or Asian labour. 
Yes, the two enslaved groups are oceans apart and centuries away from each 
other. Yes, there was a gender shift from male to female as the most quintes-
sential form of the enslaved body. But they are both objectified and exploited, 
weighed down by the capitalist world system and the colonial masters, old and 
new. It is this subjugation, alienation, objectification and violent suppression 
that constitute their strongest bond – across racial categories, across national 
boundaries, across history.
At this point it should be clear that digital media remain in the shadow of 
slavery, now cast from China and Congo to the New World of Appconn and Big 
Data algorithms. It is therefore imperative to conceive of an alternative system 
and help it materialise. To achieve this goal we need a more holistic conception 
of digital labour. It is imperative to see through digital capitalism, and to un-
derstand the worsening of contemporary labour conditions along the assembly 
line and inside the data mine, as anything but coincidental.
Chinese workers, intellectuals and activists have much to learn from the At-
lantic theatre of African resistance and the lessons of American abolition. One 
of them is the centrality of cultural resistance, where objectified labour joins 
the antislavery struggle through processes of re-subjectification and where 
consumer advocacy can play a central role in reclaiming our intersubjectivities 
in the production and consumption mode, converging in the creation of new 
revolutionary subjects.
The other lesson is an immensely empowering revelation. That is, histori-
cal slavery, despite its formidable appearance, has been and will be defeated, if 
we know how it works. This paper starts with a note on the resilience of slave 
regimes under conditions of pre-capitalism and capitalism itself. Let us end on 
a different note: the forces of antislavery and efforts to recover our collective 
humanity are even more resilient – if we look back on how abolitionists have 
succeeded in the past against all odds then we can indeed imagine an alterna-
tive, post-capitalist world.
By my understanding, the global slave system of the 1780s, with its harness-
ing of political, cultural and religious forces, was probably the most powerful 
ever known. Today’s Big Data capitalism, or twenty-first-century iSlavery, is not 
nearly as powerful as that world order of the 1780s. Yet it only took a generation 
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after the 1780s for the trans-Atlantic trade to start to crumble; the first modern 
antislavery legislation in human history was passed in 1807, in the Palace of 
Westminster, London. Bearing this historical note in mind, we really have no 
reason to despair and feel hopeless. We indeed shall act together with confi-
dence and our collective optimism of the will.
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CHAPTER 13
Wage-Workers, Not Slaves : Reflections on 
Jack Qiu’s Chapter
Peter Goodwin
Jack Qiu’s chapter, like his book Goodbye iSlave: A Manifesto for Digital Aboli­
tion (Qiu 2016), is a powerful exposé of some of the appalling labour condi-
tions which lie behind the glitz of the ‘digital revolution’, and of the resistance 
to these conditions by those who suffer them. Equally powerful is his compari-
son of the position which Foxconn and Apple occupy in the globalised capital-
ism of the early twenty-first century, with that occupied by the Atlantic slave 
trade in the international capitalism of the seventeenth and eighteenth century. 
Given the huge social, political and, indeed, moral importance of the issues he 
so effectively raises, it seems almost indecent to quibble.
But for all its power – and truth – I think we have to question the notion of 
iSlavery in this context. Is Qiu perhaps sacrificing some important analytical 
rigour for undoubted – and welcome – polemical effect?
As Qiu outlines in this chapter, and at far greater length in Chapter 2 of his 
2016 book, slavery has taken various forms at various times. It has histori-
cally been an important part of the development of capitalism, rather than a 
hangover from pre-modernity. And it has always generated various forms of 
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resistance among the enslaved. But if slavery can be part of capitalism, what 
distinguishes a slave from a wage-worker or proletarian? Surely it is that a slave 
is owned by a capitalist and can be bought and sold (along with the totality of 
her or his labour power), while a wage worker retains possession of her or his 
labour power which s/he sells to one capitalist or another. The distinction is 
an important one, socially, politically, economically and historically. If it were 
not important, then neither would be Lincoln’s 1863 Emancipation Proclama-
tion in the American Civil War, or the 1865 thirteenth Amendment to the US 
Constitution.
Karl Marx, in the manuscript ‘Results of the Immediate Process of Produc-
tion’ (written when the abolition of capitalist slavery in the US was very much 
a current event) was clear on the economic difference:
The slave is the property of a particular master; the worker must indeed 
sell himself to capital, but not to a particular capitalist, and so within  
certain limitations he may choose to sell himself to whomever he wishes; 
and he may also change his master. The effect of all these differences is 
to make the free worker’s work more intensive, more continuous, more 
 flexible and skilled than that of the slave, quite apart from the fact that they 
fit him for a quite different historical role.’ (Marx 1976/1864, 1032-1033).
I doubt whether Qiu would disagree with any of this. But the distinction be-
tween worker and slave has always been unclear, both in reality and in dis-
course. One grey area is that much wage labour has involved extra-market 
elements of coercion, from gang-masters to company police, to tied housing 
or company dormitories, to the truck system, and so on. It is this real – and 
horrible – grey area that Qiu describes. The discursive grey area is that, from 
the very arrival of the modern working class on the scene, labour organisers 
and socialists – including Marx and Engels – have frequently referred, gen-
erally rhetorically, to ‘wage-slavery’ or ‘wage slaves’. And in the period when 
capitalist slavery in its purest form in the United States fed the textile mills of 
Europe, socialists sometimes chided factory-owning abolitionists for ignoring 
‘their own’ wage slaves, while supporters of real slavery sometimes made the 
same accusation of hypocrisy in support of their own reactionary cause. It is 
in exploring both these real and rhetorical grey areas that the strength of Qiu’s 
argument lies. But one cannot avoid the fact that the workers Qiu is talking 
about are wage workers, not slaves in the pure sense, and will remain exploited 
wage workers even when the battles are won to remove the grotesque abuses 
which Qiu documents.
Qiu stresses one side of the history of anti-slavery – the history of slave resist-
ance and slave rebellion – as against the other, and still better known history, 
of morally motivated white abolitionists. So alongside exposing the abuses, he 
focusses on the acts of resistance and rebellion by the Foxconn workers.
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The other side of Qiu’s picture of iSlavery is altogether less plausible, at both 
an analytical and a rhetorical level. Qiu distinguishes between two modes of 
iSlavery: ‘the manufacturing or production-mode iSlave on the one hand, and 
manufactured iSlave or consumption-mode slavery on the other’. What we 
have just been talking about (the workers of the giant Foxconn factories) are 
Qiu’s ‘manufacturing or production mode iSlaves’, and although I have criti-
cised Qiu’s technical conflation of worker and slave, on this ‘production-mode 
iSlavery’, I have absolutely no quarrel with the thrust of his argument. But Qiu’s 
second ‘consumption-mode iSlave’ seems to me to be both analytically thin and 
to have exactly the opposite of rhetorical power.
Qiu gives the example of a ‘Chinese teenager, from a working-class family, 
who sold one of his kidneys to buy an iPhone and an iPad in 2011’. He notes 
that this was an ‘extreme case’ of what he calls ‘voluntary servitude’, by which 
he seems to mean addiction. ‘The historical comparison is with the addictive 
substances of the Atlantic system centuries ago, such as tobacco and alcohol, 
although the real driving force for the seventeenth-century triangular trade was 
sugar, including rum that was the by-product of sugar. Today we have the func-
tional equivalents in our digital gadgets: Facebook, WeChat, Candy Crush’. He 
concludes, ‘we lost our freedom when we become addicts’.
I would question whether the term ‘addiction’ is a helpful characterisation of 
the general use of social media or of digital devices (and Qiu himself, remem-
ber, states that his example of selling a kidney to buy an iPhone is an extreme 
one). But even if one accepts that it is helpful, then that does not make those of 
us who today need our iPhones or Facebook accounts ‘slaves’, any more than 
it made into ‘slaves’ the eighteenth-century white Europeans of all classes who 
needed their regular fix of sugar.
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CHAPTER 14
Critique or Collectivity? Communicative 
Capitalism and the Subject of Politics
Jodi Dean
1. Introduction
The questions posed for the symposium ‘Digital Objects, Digital Subjects: Ac-
tivism, Research & Critique in the Age of Big Data Capitalism’ take up pos-
sibilities of digital activism and of critique in a digital age. What does digital 
mean as a qualifier of activism and condition of critique? On the one hand, this 
is obvious: we are talking about our current conditions of networked media, 
personalised mass communication and the production of the devices that sup-
port it; we are talking about Big Data, about the general setting of communica-
tive capitalism. On the other hand, there is something that is rather less clear 
in qualifying activism and critique with ‘digital’, namely the underlying theory 
of the subject. What notion of the political subject is posited or assumed in 
inquiries into digital activism and critique, and how is this subject impacted 
by a digital age? Is this impact, if there is one, best understood in terms of 
‘digitality’, or might ‘digital’ in fact mark or periodise a certain understanding 
of capitalism and the ways it determines our setting? (I should add here that 
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in critical media studies it is of course Christian Fuchs who has insisted on 
the necessity of analysing digital media in terms of capitalism and its catego-
ries of labour, production, and value rather than, say, bourgeois categories of 
information.) In my view, ‘digital’ directs us to our setting in communicative 
capitalism. It tells us less about the subject of politics than it does about the 
processes aligned to block this subject’s appearance, processes that nevertheless 
contribute to the concentrations and aggregations that are opportunities for the 
subject’s  appearing.
I take it as uncontroversial that a theory of the political subject is impor-
tant for any approach to activism and critique (digital or otherwise). Do we 
think, for example, that the subject of politics is necessarily an activist subject? 
Or do we assume that it is acted upon, subjected, conditioned or determined? 
Likewise, do we imagine the political subject as engaging in or impacted by 
critique? Are online practices of sharing and opining, Twitter storms and Face-
book updates, the practices of a political subject? What about hacking or blog-
ging? Perhaps most important, do we proceed as if this subject were individual, 
or collective; is it present in the actions and events carried out in its name and, 
if so, how?
In this essay, I first briefly sketch a theory of the political subject (anchored in 
Lacan), that brings together the Slovenian view of subject as gap in the struc-
ture (Žižek and Dolar; see my discussion in Dean, 2016) with the early Badiou’s 
(2009) emphasis on subjectivation and the subjective process as responses to 
the intervention of the subject. Second, I illustrate the theory by turning to 
crowds. Crowds are not the political subject, but their ‘egalitarian discharge’ (a 
term I take from Canetti 1984) can exert effects that are retroactively attributed 
to the divided people (people as the rest of us [Dean, 2012], a revolutionary 
alliance of the oppressed) as their subject. The emphasis on crowds enables, 
third, a way to find ‘grave-diggers’ in communicative capitalism’s mobilisa-
tion of and reliance on complex networks and their power law distributions 
of links. The politics of digital networks then takes shape as a dual problem of 
the one versus the many and maintaining the gap of the subject – a politics of 
collectivity rather than critique. Finally, I put my thesis up against Hardt and 
Negri’s approach to networked biopolitics to demonstrate the relevance of the 
party form for us today as that perspective, that instrument and organisational 
means, necessary for revolutionary politics.
Rather than jumping right in to the theoretical discussion, I want to set out 
descriptively the general problem I aim to solve in terms of survivors and sys-
tems. Two dominant themes in contemporary theory and activism constellate 
around either survivors or systems. So some activists and theorists, not to men-
tion many students and others active on social media, are deeply invested in 
identity politics and intersectionality. They take identity to be a crucial site of 
politics, one that must be defended and asserted against multiple violations and 
harms. Lacking either solidary social and political associations or an economi-
cally reliable future, they raise the multiple intersecting challenges obstructing 
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access to success and happiness. They imagine these challenges as, like them, 
specific rather than general. Betrayed by institutions, they have little faith in 
organised collectivity. So they repeat, spontaneously, the dominant injunction 
to rely on themselves and go it alone, despite the fact that they are already out-
raged by the obstructions that block them from being able to ‘go it alone.’ In this 
vein, some advocates hold up livability, survivability, as a crucial achievement. 
‘Survivor’ thus becomes, in this strand of theory and activism, a key figure for 
the contemporary subject of politics.
Yet even as social media and left political culture more broadly valorise survi-
vors, a concurrent strand of contemporary theory distances itself from people, 
from anything like a subject, indeed from the human. For these theorists, un-
derstanding the present requires a posthumanist focus on systems – geologic, 
galactic, algorithmic, chaotic and so forth. We see this general move in empha-
ses on extinction, exhaustion, objects and things.
These two theoretical currents correspond to neoliberalism’s dismantling of 
social institutions and to communicative capitalism’s intensification of capi-
talism via networked media/informatisation. University, schools, family and 
unions are less stable and more in flux. Social welfare protections have been 
dismantled in the name of people taking responsibility for themselves. The 
breakdown of social groups and institutions renders individuals ever more 
vulnerable to exploitation, violence and coercion; they are ever more likely 
to experience others as competitors or threats, and view them with suspicion. 
Taking care of oneself now appears as a politically significant act, rather than 
as a symptom of the dismantled social welfare net and obscenely competitive 
labour market wherein we have no choice but to care for ourselves if we are go-
ing to keep up. The spontaneous response is individual: outrage, a demand that 
something be done, a call for change. Communicative capitalism supplies the 
infrastructure for this spontaneous politics of the individual: mobile phones 
and social media. These media reward immediate reactions such as the tweet, 
the status update, signing of a petition, emailing a representative – individual 
activities all ancillary to the singular act said really to matter: voting. What 
passes for politics enslaves individuals ideologically to bourgeois individualism 
and its individualised political practices. Jobs are less reliable, and people feel 
like everything is more competitive, more precarious. More and more choices 
in a more and more complex and uncertain informational field are downloaded 
onto the individual, even as these individuated choices have little to no impact 
on the real determinations of our lives in a setting where satellites, fibre-optic 
cables, server farms, Big Data, and complex algorithms power high-speed trad-
ing, enable just-in-time production, intensify labour markets and concentrate 
wealth in ever fewer hands.
The Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt characterised liberalism as replacing politics 
with ethics and economics. I would say that when combined with communi-
cative capitalism, neoliberalism is characterised by ideological investment in 
survivors and systems (intensifications, respectively, of ethics and economics). 
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Neoliberalism compels (and social media encourages and encloses) individu-
alised self-cultivation, self-management, self-reliance, and self-absorption, at 
the same time as communicative capitalism installs and accelerates impersonal 
determining processes, circuits and systems. Singularised, rendered-unique, 
hyper-individuated persons find themselves confronting a setting that is utterly 
determining and outside their control. Survivors struggle to persist in condi-
tions of unliveability rather than to seize and transform these conditions. Sys-
tems are presented as the processes and objects determining us, something to 
view and diagram, perhaps even to predict or mourn, but never to affect. And 
for good reason – no individual can make a difference. Individuals can have 
political feelings – and social media encourage the expression and circulation 
of these feelings, the generation of affective intensities via the outrage of the 
day. Individuals can document and report – here’s a photo of this event, here’s 
how I felt about that bit of news. Individuals can even speak – social media 
(like anarchist politics) tells us that no one can speak for us and lets us each 
speak for ourselves, even as the cacophony of voices means that it is ever harder 
to feel heard, and so we are then all enjoined to listen. But how can we listen 
to everyone, even to many, without trying to get each other to be ever briefer, 
and even at 140 characters it is impossible to hear very many at all, and at this 
point haven’t we become an audience again, the cost of being a free provider of 
content that of also becoming a permanent member of an audience for a per-
formance that never ends? An audience not of mass media but of personalised 
media, a media of and by many, that we curate for ourselves?
At any rate, our present ideological configuration of survivors and systems 
makes it hard to see the political subject. We can see fragile individuals and 
powerful algorithms and geologic forces, but we omit entirely the subject ca-
pable of political action – the divided people, historically figured as working 
class, peasantry, reserve army of the unemployed, the colonised, those who 
have fought back against slavery, against patriarchy, against oppression. Com-
municative capitalism operates as a system of desubjectivation – and those who 
place their political focus on algorithms, objects, geology, and extinction pro-
vide ideological expression of this desubjectivation.
But there is another way, a way that begins from the divided people as the 
subject of politics.
2. Subject: The People as Subject
As we learn from Marx, we don’t make our own history. Politics is not a matter 
of our own choosing, something we make as we please under self-selected cir-
cumstances. What these circumstances are and how they are circumscribed is 
neither fixed nor infinitely malleable. History’s repetitions are not repetitions of 
the same; what was once a tragedy is later a farce. Expressed in more Žižekian 
terms, repetition can work as negation, negativity or death drive, producing not 
just impasses but also ruptures.
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For Žižek (along with Mladen Dolar), these ruptures are the subject: the sub-
ject is the gap in the structure. My claim is that the political subject is a gap in 
the social structure because the people are the subject of politics (by people, I 
mean the divided people; the proletarianised and oppressed, not the people as 
populist totality).
In their self-relating, people always come up against themselves. They en-
counter the practical, material limits of their association, the psychic and af-
fective pressures of their commonality. The excess of their reflective relation 
to themselves as ‘the people’ is the torsion of politics. Politics takes place in the 
non-identity, gap, or torsion between people and their self-organisation. Politi-
cal subjectivation forces this non-identity, making it felt as an effect of a subject. 
The ‘subject of politics’ is not just any gap or absence. The political subject ap-
pears through the active occupation of the constitutive lack in the people.
There is politics because the political subject is collective and it is split. This 
split is practical and material, the condition of our physical being. The people 
can never be politically (or, differently put, the ‘people’ is not an ontological 
category). They are only present as parts, as subsets, as claims. This is the case 
with crowds occupying public squares, elected assemblies, armies in battle and 
opinion polls. All are necessarily parts. Their partiality – the gap between parts 
and (imaginary) whole – is the exciting cause of political subjectivation. Even 
as parts, the people are only present temporarily. They may try to inscribe their 
presence, their having been, in documents, practices and organisations which 
will take their place and operate in their stead, a taking and operating which is 
also and unavoidably partial. Some degree of alienation is unavoidable because 
creating new institutions cannot eliminate the minimal difference between the 
collectivity and the people. The condition of politics, then, is simply this prac-
tical material split between the people and the collective that actually comes 
together.
The split in the people goes all the way down. It can’t be limited to the idea 
that some are excluded from the people (and hence that including them would 
solve the problem of the gap). Nor can it be rendered as the problem of rep-
resentation (and hence addressed via ontology, as if our alienated condition 
would be remedied through a rebirth into ontological fullness if only we could 
do away with representation). And it is surely not resolved via platforms that 
seek to replace political forms like unions and parties with forms of preference 
aggregation. Such technological fixes reproduce communicative capitalism’s 
ideology of survivors versus systems, that is, individuals with their individual 
needs confronting a large infrastructure outside their control. I am thinking 
here of Alex Williams’s positioning of ‘parties and unions structured around 
outdated principles of structural unity’ as something to be overcome in favour 
of platforms ‘capable of hosting an unknowable range of contingent political 
actions’ (Williams 2015, 227). Not only does the expression ‘structural unity’ 
misrepresent the political need for unity of action in the face of an enemy, but 
the party (especially in Lenin’s version) names ‘the flexible organization of a 
fidelity to events in the midst of unforeseeable circumstances’ (Bosteels 2011, 
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243). Williams omits the element of fidelity, of consistency, indeed, the political 
dimension of ‘platform’ where a party’s platform announces its commitments, 
values, plans, and intentions. ‘Array of contingent political actions’ doesn’t 
name a politics at all; really, it is no more than an embrace of Facebook and 
Twitter.
The people do not know what they want. They are not fully present to them-
selves. Conflicting and contradictory desires and drives render the people a 
split subject perpetually pushing to express, encounter and address its own 
non-knowledge. As the collective subject of politics the people is nothing but 
this gap, the force or push of many through and against claims, representations 
and institutions offered in their name.
The economy (over-)determines the setting of subjectivation. It configures 
the terrain on which we organise the consequences of a subjectivation. To come 
back to my argument, politics cannot have just any point of departure because 
it does not take place in an open, unconditioned manifold. Rather, it pushes 
forth in a setting ruptured and structured by a fundamental antagonism. So the 
economy, the mode of production that characterises a society – digital or oth-
erwise – doesn’t determine the political subject. It is the setting for the subjecti-
vation of the rupture or gap that attests to the force of the subject. Further, the 
economy is the setting of the struggle over this attestation – what, if anything, a 
rupture means, the terms and images available for this meaning, and the con-
stellation of forces lined up for or against a given attestation that an event was 
an effect of the subject of politics.
Crowds – collectivities, provisional heterogeneous unities – help illustrate 
how the people as the political subject appear in and as a gap.
3. Crowds – Force of Collectivity
Over the last decade, crowds and protests have shown us the people sensing 
their collective power, the capacity of many to inscribe a gap in the expected. 
This ‘inscription of a gap in the expected’ was manifest during the Occupy 
movement – finally people were protesting, rising up. We’ve seen crowds push-
ing against the separations of democracy in Tunisia, Egypt, Spain and Greece; 
in a wide array of anti-austerity protests; in protests for reproductive freedom 
in Poland and Ireland; in the massive outpouring of women in the US on 21 
January 2017, and so on.
The very powers that let crowds force a gap in the expected, however, also 
introduce a set of political challenges. Crowds are destructive, creative, un-
predictable, contagious and temporary. They don’t endure. People go home. 
Crowds are politically indeterminate – people amass for all sorts of conflicting 
reasons, feelings and compulsions (which is why interviewing single partici-
pants misses the point; you can’t interview a crowd – and here I have in mind 
Paolo Gerbardo’s [2017] in many ways very interesting and essential book, The 
Mask and the Flag. Gerbardo breaks up the crowd into individual recollections. 
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By doing so he is able to reduce an international chain of disruptive crowd 
events into citizen participation, ‘citizenism,’ thereby effacing the challenge of 
the various occupations and demonstrations of 2010-2011 to the status quo. 
The strength that comes with the indeterminacy of the crowd’s message is a 
weakness when the crowd disperses. The crowd doesn’t have a politics; it is the 
opportunity for a politics – which is another way of saying that the crowd in-
scribes a gap; it breaks up the expected, the everyday, but it doesn’t tell us how 
or in what direction.
How the crowd gets a politics depends on the response to the crowd event 
and whether this response is faithful to the egalitarian substance of the crowd. 
In Crowds and Power, Elias Canetti (1984) describes the moment of the crowd’s 
emergence as the ‘discharge.’ This is the point when ‘all who belong to the crowd 
get rid of their differences and feel equal’. Up until that point, there may be a lot 
of people, but they are not yet that concentration of bodies and affects that is a 
crowd. As the crowd’s density increases, libidinal effects are unleashed: ‘In that 
density, where there is scarcely any space between, and body presses against 
body, each man is as near the other as he is to himself, and an immense feel-
ing of relief ensues. It is for the sake of this blessed moment, when no-one is 
greater or better than another, that people become a crowd.’ Canetti gives us the 
crowd as a strange attractor of jouissance, a figure of collective enjoyment. The 
libidinal energy of the crowd binds it together for a joyous moment, a moment 
Canetti renders as a ‘feeling of equality’ and that we might also figure as the 
shared intensity of belonging. The feeling won’t last; inequality will return with 
the dissipation of the crowd. But in the orgasmic discharge, ‘a state of absolute 
equality’ supplants individuating distinctions.
What we get from Canetti, then, is the substance or essence of the crowd 
form as an absolute equality. This equality is only temporary, but it is essential 
to the crowd discharge, the feeling for which the crowd amasses. Canetti argues 
that the crowd’s equality infuses all demands for justice. Equality as belonging – 
not separation, weighing and measure – is what gives ‘energy’ (Canetti’s term) 
to the longing for justice. The crowd concentrates equality and a longing for 
justice (and so carries out a function Marx associates with the factory).
The crowd event may register as the movement of the people. Some other 
will view the crowd as having been the people because she apprehends the 
jouissance of the egalitarian discharge. She responds to the courage and jus-
tice intertwined in the crowd, perhaps with some anxiety in the wake of its 
jouissance. Her response indicates that the rupture of the crowd event was 
a subjectivation (my analysis here is guided by Badiou [2009] in Theory of 
the Subject). The other sees the people in the crowd, their collective force, 
as the universal struggle of the oppressed. She responds to the rupture as a 
moment in the subjective process of the emancipatory egalitarian movement 
of the people. The crowd was not just these particular people here right now. 
They were the people fighting for justice. Fidelity to the egalitarian discharge 
is an effect of the crowd event; the people as subject is thus understood as 
its cause.
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Neither capital nor its state want the people to appear. So they try to mend the 
rupture, close the gap as quickly as possible. They deny something happened, 
relying on the repetitive novelty of relentless media to deflect and disperse at-
tention. They claim it wasn’t the people; it was thugs, a mob, outsiders. They 
make it business as usual, the citizens participating like citizens are supposed to 
do. Spontaneous responses on the Left challenge claims for the divided people 
as the collective subject of the crowd event by emphasising specific groups, is-
sues, and identities, by highlighting who wasn’t there, by prioritising their own 
unique spin on the event just for the sake of being different. Social media en-
courages such responses, the more and more varied the better. Communicative 
capitalism feeds on multiplicity, confusion, indeterminacy, anything that can 
disperse the force of the crowd.
4. Central Feature of Digital Networks – Power Law  
Distributions
And yet, communicative capitalism nevertheless produces crowds. We can 
quickly point to several different kinds: crowds of ‘friends’, followers, and users 
in social media; crowds of workers in factories (see Jack Qui’s book, Goodbye 
iSlave [2017]), as well as Christian Fuchs’s detailed case studies of digital la-
bour); crowds of commodities and disposable things; crowds of Big Data (in 
fact Big Data might be one of the most powerful crowd symbols in our cur-
rent digital era); and crowds of those dispossessed from their work, homes, 
lives, and futures by the intensified inequality of the networked economy. 
These crowds need to be understood in terms of the ‘long tail’ of a power law 
distribution – the many to the one.
Communicative capitalism stimulates the production of networks that gen-
erate power law distributions. It relies on the creation and enclosure of general 
fields or commons characterised by free choice, growth and preferential attach-
ment. Out of the common a ‘one’ emerges, the one at the top, the one with the 
most hits or links, the blockbuster or superstar. Here exploitation consists in 
stimulating the production of a field in the interest of finding, and then mon-
etising, the one. Many contribute, many work. One is rewarded. The bigger the 
field, the more powerful, valuable, or elite the one.
Inequality is a necessary and unavoidable feature of complex networks, that 
is, networks characterised by free choice, growth, and preferential attachment. 
As Albert-Laszlo Barabasi demonstrates, complex networks follow a power law 
distribution of links. The item in first place or at the top of a given network has 
twice as many links as the item in second place, which has more than the one 
in third and so on, such that there is very little difference among those at the 
bottom but massive differences between top and bottom. Many novels are writ-
ten. Few are published. Fewer are sold. A very few become best sellers. Twitter 
is another example: it has over a billion registered users; one pop singer, Katy 
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Perry, has over 94 million followers. Most people have 200. Popular media ex-
presses the power law structure of complex networks with terms like the ‘80/20 
rule,’ the winner-takes-all or winner-takes-most character of the new economy, 
and the ‘long tail.’
Notice that it doesn’t matter what kind of network or field we are talking 
about – novels, Twitter, Amazon, Google, movies – the content is unimpor-
tant. Capitalist productivity depends on the expropriation and exploitation of 
communication. Any communicative action is equivalent to any other; their 
meaning or use value matters less than their exchange value, the fact that they 
can be shared. A repercussion is that capitalism has subsumed communication 
such that communication does not provide a critical outside. Volume, number 
and the crowd overpower critique. And in complex networks this volume, this 
number, is organised hierarchically in power law distributions: the one versus 
the many.
The challenge of politics in communicative capitalism is to make effective the 
power of the many – how the crowd can be in and for itself, that is, how crowds 
can produce effects that can be attributed to the divided people as their subject. 
Social media functions to dissipate efforts to hold open the gap produced by 
the crowd rupture, so that what for a moment was the people is later forgot-
ten, diminished, reinterpreted. Yet its very processes produce new crowd forms 
through which collectivity tries to exert its force – hashtags, memes, selfies and 
other common images. My point is not that hashtags are revolutionary. Rather 
they point to political openings that arise as critique loses efficacy.
5. Hardt and Negri
I’ve emphasised the fact that complex networks produce hierarchy. In con-
trast, Hardt and Negri highlight the democratic dimension of biopolitical la-
bour. They claim that the same networked, cooperative structures that produce 
the common generate new democratic capacities, and even ‘make possible in 
the political sphere the development of democratic organizations’ (Hardt and 
Negri 2009, 354). Given the ways that the exchange value of communicative 
contributions displaces their meaning or use value, and given the ways that 
communicative capitalism drives processes that individuate and singularise, on 
the one hand, and concentrate resources and power in the one, on the other, it 
is hard to see how their claim for new democratic capacities is anything differ-
ent from the techno-utopianism of the nineties. The same holds for newly pos-
sible democratic organisations, especially in light of Hardt and Negri’s rejection 
of ‘vanguard organizations.’ They tell us that the vanguard party corresponds to 
a different, earlier, structure of labour (a different technical composition of the 
proletariat). According to their periodisation, the vanguard party corresponds 
to the early twentieth century’s professional factory workers. The deskilled 
workers of the mid-twentieth century fit with that period’s mass party. But 
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today, they argue, the political form appropriate to biopolitical labour must be 
democratic, cooperative, autonomous, and horizontally networked. The van-
guard party is inadequate, ‘anachronistic,’ because it doesn’t look like the net-
works of contemporary biopolitical production.
This argument is not convincing. Complex networks are not the horizontal, 
cooperative and autonomous forms that Hardt and Negri imagine. As Albert-
Laszlo Barabasi’s work (2003) on complex networks demonstrates, free choice, 
growth and preferential attachment produce hierarchies and inevitable dramatic 
differences between the one that is most chosen and preferred and the many that 
are not (see my discussion in Dean 2016, 12–13). The ostensibly creative, co- 
operative and democratic character of networked communication doesn’t 
eliminate hierarchy. It entrenches hierarchy by using our own choices against 
us. And, as Barabasi’s work on complex networks makes clear, this hierarchy 
isn’t imposed from above. It is an immanent effect of free choice, growth, and 
preferential attachment.
A political form mirroring biopolitical production would not be horizon-
tal and democratic. Its democracy would produce power law distributions, 
unequal nodes or outcomes, winners and losers, few and many. We see this 
phenomenon on Twitter as people fight through trending hashtags. Hashtags 
provide common names that serve as loci of struggle; when they trend, they rise 
above the long tail of the millions of unread, unloved Tweets coursing through 
the nets. The democratic element – people’s choice to use and  forward  – 
produces the inequality that lets some hashtags appear as and even be, for a 
moment, significant. The fact of emergent hierarchies suggests that an emer-
gent vanguard may well be the political form necessary for struggles under bio-
political conditions, that is to say, communicative capitalism.
The structure of the complex networks of biopolitical production indicates 
that, contra Hardt and Negri, a vanguard party is not anachronistic at all. It 
is instead a form that corresponds to the dynamics of networked communi-
cation. This structure indicates an additional problem with Hardt and Negri’s 
rejection of the vanguard party. They characterise Lenin’s party as involving an 
organisational process that comes from ‘above’ the movements of the multi-
tude. Historically, this insinuation is clearly false. The Bolsheviks were but one 
group among multiple parties, tendencies and factions acting in the tumultu-
ous context of the Russian Revolution. They were active within the movements 
of the oppressed workers and peasants. The movements themselves, through 
victories and defeats, short and long-term alliances, new forms of cooperation, 
and advances in political organisation gave rise to the party, even as the party 
furthered the movements.
For Hardt and Negri, the goal of revolution is ‘the generation of new 
forms of social life’ (Hardt and Negri 2009, 354). They describe revolution-
ary struggle as a process of liberation that establishes a common. Such a 
process, they argue, consolidates insurrection as it institutionalises new 
 collective habits and practices. Institutions are then sites for the management 
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of encounters, extension of social rupture, and transformation of those who 
compose them.
The resemblance between these institutions and the vanguard party is strik-
ing. The party involves a common name, language, and set of tactics. It has 
practices that establish ways of being together. Its purpose is to occupy and ex-
tend the gap within society that class struggle denotes. As Georg Lukács insists, 
Lenin’s concept of party organisation prioritises flexibility and consistency: the 
party has and must have a capacity for self-transformation. What Hardt and 
Negri describe as the extension of insurrection in an institutional process is 
another way of theorising the party.
Hardt and Negri outline instead a platform of demands without a carrier, 
without a body to fight for them. Their model of institutions suggests that 
a party or parties could be such a carrier, but rather than present their plat-
form as a party platform, Hardt and Negri present it as a series of demands to 
be made to existing governments and institutions of global governance (but 
who makes these demands?). The demands are for the provision of the basic 
means of life, global citizenship, and access to the commons. Hardt and  Negri 
acknowledge that ‘today’s ruling powers unfortunately have no intention of 
granting even these basic demands’ (Hardt and Negri 2009, 382). And Hardt 
and Negri’s response is laughter, ‘a laugh of creation and joy, anchored solidly 
in the present’ (Hardt and Negri 2009, 383). No wonder they don’t present their 
demands as the platform of a party. The demands are not to be fought for. They 
mark potentials already present in the biopolitical production of the common, 
limits to capitalist control.
Hardt and Negri imply that the party form is outmoded. I’ve argued that not 
only do contemporary networks produce power law distributions of few and 
many, but that emergent hierarchies – particularly when understood in terms 
of the vanguards and practices that already emerge out of political movement – 
point to the ways that party organisations emerge. Current examples of this 
tendency include the adoption of common tactics, names and symbols that 
bring together previously separate, disparate, and even competing struggles. 
When local and issue politics are connected via a common name, successes in 
one area advance the struggle as a whole. Separate actions become themselves 
plus all the others. They instil enthusiasm and inspire imitation.
Many of us are convinced that capitalist crises have reached a decisive point. 
We know that the system is fragile, that it produces its own grave-diggers, and 
that it is held in place by a repressive international state structure. Yet we act as 
if we did not know this. The party provides a form that can let us believe what 
we know. As we learn from Lenin, revolutionary political consciousness is the 
collective perspective organised in the party, oriented by its theory and far-
reaching historical tasks. Without the party the people can be hard to see. Their 
acts become co-opted and displaced, channelled and packaged so as to buttress 
the system they oppose. In communicative capitalism, multiple resistances blur 
into a menu of opinions and choices, options disjoined from truth. The legacy 
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of peoples’ struggle and their crowd event are conveyed by university, culture, 
and momentary organisations, subjected to the demands of capitalism and de-
activated as living resource. The power of systems re-emerges as the locus of the 
power that matters – communication, circulation, accumulation. If we want to 
defeat these systems, we can’t repeat or reinforce them. We have to seize them. 
And that requires political organisation.
To return, then, to the thematics of survivor and system: these tendencies 
in contemporary theory occlude the space of the subject, preventing us from 
acknowledging contradictions in communicative capitalism – but the long tail 
is a crowd, and the crowd can be organised, concentrated, politicised. Further, 
some emergent hierarchies – hashtags, common images, common political 
forms like occupations and even parties – become important means of contes-
tation, of political struggle. Beyond critique is collectivity.
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CHAPTER 15
Subjects, Contexts and Modes of Critique : 
Reflections on Jodi Dean’s Chapter
Paulina Tambakaki
In Philosophy and Real Politics Raymond Geuss takes issue with ideal theo-
ries of politics. Ideal theories, he argues, start from a ‘few general principles’ 
that they posit as historically invariant (2008, 7). They explain and justify these 
principles and they then draw conclusions about how people ought to live 
and act. Missing from these theories is a reflection on what Geuss refers to as 
‘contexts of action’, that is, historically situated conjunctures that affect human 
motivations and shape political actions (Geuss 2008, 9–11). Any responsible 
(and realist) theory, insists Geuss, must take these contexts of action into ac-
count. For they frame and augment our grasp of politics and the ways it might 
be refigured. Jodi Dean’s study of the conditions of communicative capitalism 
exemplifies this framing.
Communicative capitalism, explains Dean, desubjectifies. It makes it hard 
to see the political subject that is capable of political action because the col-
lectivity that carries out this action is, in this context, blocked. Dissolved into 
the individual who registers her outrage on social media, collectivity is treated 
with suspicion and rendered obsolete. At the same time, according to Dean, 
neo-liberal mantras of self-management, self-reliance and self-care further 
184 Digital Objects, Digital Subjects
singularise. They reinforce themes of individual survival and, in so doing, they 
erode the prospects for a collectivisation that aims to transform – and not sim-
ply critique – individuating trends.
For Dean, collective subjects have the capacity to transform politics, and 
these subjects find proto-expression in the egalitarian discharges of the crowd. 
While these discharges are temporary, they show that it is possible to transgress 
the individuating and, ultimately, depoliticising conditions of communicative 
capitalism. More to the point, the crowds (of users, followers, hashtags and so 
on), with their power law distributions that communicative capitalism para-
doxically produces, serve, according to Dean, as openings for the emergence 
of a politicised subject that is more forceful (because it is divided and collec-
tive); more permanent (because it persists after the event); and more radical 
(because it aims to displace and seize the system). This subject demands work, 
argues Dean. Political organisation, in the form of a vanguard, carries this work 
forward, undoing the normalisations of communicative capitalism. Or to put it 
in Dean’s words: ‘beyond critique is collectivity’. This argument without doubt 
provokes refreshing questions about the limits of critique.
Political theories have long been obsessed with the central role that critique 
plays in a transformative politics. From Boltanski and Chiapello’s call to revive 
the social and artistic critiques of capitalism in order to resist it (2007), to ago-
nistic theories that stress the excesses that arise to contest and disrupt politics, 
it is difficult to overlook the intimate connection established between change 
and critique. On the back of the assumption that dispute, resistance and dissent 
expose exclusions, a consensus has formed about the benefits of critique, in 
terms of the openings it makes possible for alternative politics. Dean unset-
tles this consensus when she tells us that it is collectivity, rather than critique, 
that is needed in order to transform socio-political configurations. Critique 
is not enough in the context of communicative capitalism, argues Dean, and 
she is right. While there are manifold disputes over the meanings and prac-
tices of contemporary politics, such disputes leave few traces; the crowd events 
of, say, the Aganaktismenoi or the Occupy movements tend to dissolve once 
the events have ended. There is also more opportunity for individuation and 
little opportunity for collectivisation understood as processes. And there are 
vulnerabilities, exploitations, outrage and conformity – in other words, de- 
subjectification, much like Dean explains. But is collectivisation the answer to 
these developments? Or to put the same question in somewhat more exagger-
ated terms, is more politics the answer to the lack of transformative politics?
No doubt, the response one gives to this question largely depends on the 
diagnosis of the problem that collectivity claims to solve – in this case, the indi-
viduating and singularising trends that animate much of contemporary activ-
ism and certain strands of digital critique. But what if there is no disagreement 
in diagnosis? As I have already noted, I find Dean’s account of the political 
challenges that arise in the wake of a communicative capitalism convincing. 
This agreement is exactly what, however, leads me, in a second step, to ponder 
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whether Dean’s diagnosis ends up undermining the argument that a collectivity 
can arise in and out of power law distributional openings. The emphasis on the 
verb ‘can’ draws in many ways on a familiar if not commonplace argument in 
the literature. When it comes to envisioning the rise of the exploited or even of 
the conformists, questions hover about their ability to rise, given that they are 
significantly incapacitated by the systems and discourses that have dominated 
them. If this is the case, then it becomes difficult to see how the desubjectiva-
tions of communicative capitalism can be overcome, individuating tendencies 
transgressed, and collectivities formed.
Of course, it is noteworthy that communicative capitalism does produce 
crowds and that such crowds gesture toward collectivity – especially as they 
can offer glimmers of division, subjectivation and egalitarian demands. But 
what if these crowds do not deliver any politics, because they do not manage 
to elicit a response to the crowd event? The issue here is not so much that col-
lectivities are unable to form because they have become incapacitated, but that 
vanguards have failed to make the appearance of the crowd persist. When we 
think of the divisions that inhere in discussions about political organisation, 
then it is not unreasonable to consider the possibility that vanguards might not 
be immediately available to counter the hierarchies that complex networks of 
communication establish. And if vanguards are not available, then the crowd 
might be all we have left to do politics and critique. For example, when I think 
of the Occupy movements I cannot deny the effectiveness of their critique of 
the institutional establishment grounded on the slogan ‘we are the 99%’. What 
I want to contest, however, is whether this critique brought any rupture to the 
political establishment – and if it did what kind of rupture this was. In other 
words, the claim I want to advance with this example is that the critiques that 
crowds develop might be durable after the event without immediately leading 
to any transformative politics. This widening split between transformation and 
critique calls forth a serious rethinking not just of the aims (and perhaps even 
limits) of critique, but also of the relation between democracy and critique, for 
we are accustomed to think that democracies are sites of openness and, inevita-
bly, of transformation and critique.
Dean takes issue with democracy, and particularly with Hardt and Negri’s 
faith in democratic practices as vehicles for change. Democratic practices, she 
argues, harness unequal outcomes and one-versus-many distributions. Un-
derstood as the ‘people’s’ choice to use and forward’, democracy produces ‘sig-
nificant’ hashtags that nurture inequalities and entrench hierarchies. For these 
reasons, democracy, and Hardt and Negri’s preferred modes of horizontal and 
autonomous organisation, are too limited as platforms for change, not because 
change is difficult to achieve, but because such institutions are easily displaced 
as vehicles that support the exploitative system they seek to resist. This thought-
provoking argument presses us to consider anew how change occurs within and 
through democratic institutions (if at all). Indeed, if the democratic lexicon is, 
as Dean intimates, supportive of communicative capitalism, then perhaps there 
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is little value in expecting that change might come through democratic institu-
tions. There would also be little value in investing in democratic institutions.
Dean thus suggests that the time has come to disinvest from democratic in-
stitutions and to anticipate the emergence of another, more political and more 
equal, world around the common of communism. The common she tells us, 
pace Hardt and Negri, is hierarchical. Its hierarchies call for an oppositional 
politics that inspires fidelity and change. But what if this common (digitalised 
or not) is analogous to what Jacques Rancière (1999) understands by the or-
der of the police, and therefore as something immune to anything other than 
collective, if momentary, subjectivations? This grim possibility that confronts 
most attempts to envision another politics taps into existing anxieties generated 
by communicative capitalism. From my perspective, it serves as an opportunity 
to bolster our energies to rework politics, democracy and the limits of critiques. 
It is in this direction that Dean’s ‘Collectivity or Critique’ takes an inspiring and 
thought-provoking lead.
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CHAPTER 16
The Platform Party : The Transformation 




To each generation its constitution, famously proposed Condorcet, arguing 
that the institutional system necessarily had to adapt to historical changes. To 
each generation its form of organisation, one could quip in response, witness-
ing the constant historical change that has invested the political party in the 
course of history. When one utters the word ‘party’, i.e. political party, the mind 
flies, at least for most people on the Left, to a very specific form of party, to 
what the French political sociologist Maurice Duverger (1959) called the ‘mass 
party’, the type of party that emerged at the height of the industrial era. But 
many other forms of party have existed in history such as the party of notables 
that was prevalent in the 19th century. And after the decline of the mass party 
new types of parties have emerged such as the so-called catch-all party and the 
cartel party described respectively by Otto Kircheimer (1966) and by Richard 
Katz and Peter Mair (1994). We are now at a time when a new party type is 
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emerging, its birth-pangs being visible in a number of new political formations 
that have arisen in different political countries around the time of the financial 
crisis of 2008. This is what in this chapter I discuss as the ‘platform party’ or 
‘digital party’ namely the ‘party type’ that corresponds to the digital society, 
in the same way in which the mass party reflected the nature of the industrial 
society.
The platform party may also be described as ‘digital’ because of its adoption 
of digital technology as a key means of communication and organisation. This 
emerging template incarnates the new forms of organisation, the new values 
and social relationship that are dominant in a digital society. Examples of plat-
form parties are manifold, and available in very different national contexts. 
Among the most representative are Podemos in Spain, the Five Star Movement 
in Italy, the Pirate Party in Northern European countries, La France Insoumise 
in France or organisations such as Momentum in the UK. These formations 
have been described, as ‘digital parties’, ‘Internet parties’ or ‘network parties’ 
because of the the way they have presented themselves as the champions of the 
new forms of organisation and of new values of the digital society.
Such digital character is visible at different levels of depth in both their exter-
nal communication and in their internal organisation. Externally, these forma-
tions have harnessed the power of social networks such as Facebook and Twitter 
or dedicated YouTube channels to build a vast base of supporters and sympa-
thisers. Internally, they have developed a number of online decision-making 
platforms to invite all registered members to discuss and vote on policies, can-
didates and leadership. Yet these features do not seem sufficient to classify these 
parties as belonging to the same set. There is more to their commonality than 
meets the eye, something that makes it justifiable to associate them with one 
another, even while other parties that also make use of digital technology are 
excluded from this association. Why can we claim, for example, that Momen-
tum is a digital organisation while the (British) Conservative party is not? Or 
on what grounds can we argue that the 5 Star Movement better corresponds 
to the ideal type of the platform party than does its adversary, the centre-left 
Partito Democratico? What do the formations cited above, that straddle the 
Left/Right divide, often claiming to transcend it altogether, have in common? 
What form of organisation is typical to the digital party? And how do platform 
parties reflect the nature of digital culture, and of the new forms of subjectivity 
and power that emerge in the era of social media and Big Data?
Platform parties are not simply parties which use digital technology in a 
purely instrumental sense, as a way to achieve specific ends, while otherwise 
maintaining the organisational forms and dynamics of the past; instead the 
change is far more profound and systemic. These parties pursue a far-reaching 
restructuring of their organisational forms and their philosophy in ways that 
are coherent with the nature of a digital society and its drive towards directness, 
disintermediation, interactivity, adaptability and instantaneous responsiveness 
(Van Dijck 2013). These formations betoken an attempt to mend and simplify 
The Platform Party 189
politics, thus responding to the perception of a yawning gap between the citi-
zenry and the political process. They strive for customisation, adaptability and 
interactivity, in a way that makes them resemble social media and app plat-
forms such as  Facebook, Airbnb or Uber.
This organisational restructuring is informed by a strong ‘participationism’, 
i.e. by the belief that the unrestrained participation of ordinary people in dis-
cussions, decisions, and actions is a force for good. Yet this attempt does not 
lead to a condition of pure horizontality, and to a wholesale end of representa-
tion and hierarchy, as some of the most fervent evangelists of digital disinter-
mediation would lead us to believe. In fact, while eliminating some of the forms 
of intermediation existing in bureaucratic mass parties, and in particular the 
so-called intermediary levels, of the apparatchiks, the bureaucrats, and the lo-
cal cadres, platform parties do not go as far as eliminating leadership at the top. 
On the contrary, many of these parties are characterised by strong leadership. 
They are as much ‘participationist’ as they are ‘presidentialist’. Within them the 
drive towards disintermediation takes the form of an organisational polarisa-
tion, in which the hyperleader – a charismatic, mediatised and celebrity-culture 
informed leader – mirrors himself in and allies himself with the superbase – a 
highly activated and responsive digital assembly of all party members or ‘users’, 
that finds new opportunities of day-to-day participation in social media con-
versations and in discussions and decision-making conducted on the online 
‘participatory platforms’ set up by all these formations.
2. From the Industrial Party to the Platform Party
In each historical era there tends to be an analogy between the mode of pro-
duction, and what we could call the ‘mode of organisation’, namely the set of 
organisational mechanisms, practices and structures that are prevalent at the 
time. In other words, political parties are historically specific: they are not or-
ganisational structures imposed on society from above, but phenomena that in 
order to be effective necessarily contain and reflect the social tendencies which 
are specific to any given society in different historical periods.
As argued by Italian political scientist Marco Revelli the mass party 
 incarnated the logic of production of the industrial society, the organisational 
structures and forms of social experience proper to that period. The party came 
to resemble the Fordist factory, by establishing a solid and heavy organisational 
structure marked by a strong closure towards the outside, and hierarchy and 
vertical integration on the inside. The mass party was thus a perfect mirror of 
industrial society, with its tendency to ‘gigantism to incorporate large masses 
of men in a stable way, by arranging them in solid and permanent structures’. 
(Ravelli 2013). ‘The party was conceived as a factory where politics had to be 
produced through collective “political work”, as if it were a sort of manufacture, 
inspired by the Taylorist criteria of efficiency and rationalisation. In this structure 
190 Digital Objects, Digital Subjects
the militants were the equivalent of workers on the assembly line, the local 
cadres the production technicians, and the central committee the corporate 
management body’ (ibid). Here we encounter the party as a ‘Modern Prince’, 
to use the expression of Antonio Gramsci in The Prison Notebooks: a neuralgic 
centre through which to coordinate political action, to conquer the state and at 
the same time to control society, following the logic of the vertical integration 
of the great Fordist factory (1971).
This organisational model came into crisis due to a series of profound eco-
nomic and cultural transformations that began to develop from the sixties, 
largely due to the crisis accumulation model of Fordist capitalism that weak-
ened the working class and the old bourgeoisie. The rise of new protest move-
ments, the student protests of 1968, ecological movements, feminism and urban 
protests were the sign of the growing complexity of a society that was becoming 
more and more difficult to integrate vertically. The rampant individualism and 
consumerism of the neoliberal era superseded the political militancy of the 
 industrial era.
The mass party crisis opened the way for a new party form that was dis-
cussed in political science through a series of concepts: ‘professional-electoral 
party’ (Panebianco, 1988) ‘catch-all party’ (Kirchheimer, 1990) and the ‘cartel 
party’ (Katz and Mair, 1995). It seems fit for the purpose of our analysis to 
note that these terms ultimately point to the same trend: the emergence of a 
new ‘light’ post-Fordist party as an alternative to the mass party. The ‘televi-
sion party’ is the term I prefer to adopt in this analysis because this is a party 
for which television, rather than the press or the party newspaper, becomes 
the main channel of communication with the electorate, and a substitute for 
a committed militancy. This turn involves a profound transformation in the 
organising structure of political parties. First, the platform party is a party that 
loses the support of an active base of militants and experiences a severe decline 
in the number of registered members. Secondly, it is a party that no longer has 
the heavy bureaucratic structure of the mass party, but adopts a light structure 
that looks more like an electoral committee, as expressed by the concept of 
‘professional-electoral’ party. Thirdly, it is a party that, unlike the mass party, 
no longer has clearly defined social bases, and seeks opportunistically to draw 
its support from different socio-demographics according to circumstances, so 
it is also described as a ‘catch-all party’, or even as an ‘opinion party’, a party no 
longer based on predefined economic interests but chasing fleeting wishes and 
opinions.
The television party is a type of political party that Italians know well be-
cause it is the one that has been manifested in the political venture of Silvio 
Berlusconi and his ‘party-company’ Forza Italia. For this party a central role is 
played by the media process on account of its access to television and its power 
of influence on the population, which, in Berlusconi’s case, was guaranteed by 
his ownership of half of the national television frequencies. It is also a party 
that introduces a strong personalisation of politics, in which the face of the 
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leader, adopting the role of an actor giving a political performance, becomes 
the central source of recognisability, and the means of building a sentimental 
connection – to use the term of Antonio Gramsci – between the citizens and 
the party (1971). It is also precisely because of its almost complete reliance on 
television appearances as a means of connection between the leader and the 
people, that the television party thus loses the support of an active militancy.
Following the analysis of Revelli, the television party manifests the transfor-
mation of the production mode into a post-Fordist society. This party no longer 
resembles the Fordist factory, but rather service companies, particularly those 
in the field of communication and advertising, which are the vanguard of the 
post-industrial service economy. It is significant that Silvio Berlusconi founded 
Forza Italia on the territorial network of his Publitalia advertising company and 
on the media firepower of his television channels. The television party internal-
ises marketing and advertising techniques used to understand and manipulate 
the people’s desires. It is a party populated by a small army of communications 
consultants, pollsters and spin doctors. It sees politics as an extension of the 
sphere of consumption, and looks at the citizenry as an ‘electoral market’, which 
can be treated just like any other market of goods and services, and where the 
strategic area is represented by centrist voters, more likely to swing between 
parties. It is also a party that generates a passive attitude in the electorate, which 
recalls the ‘couch-potato’ habit of TV viewers. A party that, transforming poli-
tics into a variety show, forces citizens into apathy and disillusionment.
Building on this model, we can argue that we now stand at a new stage in the 
evolution of the party-form. The profound shifts in the mode of production 
signalled by the diffusion of social media and of apps, and by the rise of Web 
2.0 companies such as Facebook, Twitter, Uber, Airbnb and many others, 
is  engendering the rise of a new party type. The digital party, reflects in its 
eidos the new tendencies that are emerging in a ‘network society’ (Castells 
2011), much in the same way in which the mass party reflected the nature 
and  tendencies of the industrial society and the television party the emerg-
ing trends of the post-industrial era. Thirdly, the platform party is not a class 
party. Rather it is a party marked by strong inclusivity and an interclassist 
 tendency. While relying for electoral support on the lower and younger sector 
of an impoverished middle class, these parties for the most part do not appeal 
to classes, but to individuals as part of those classes. Fourthly, it is not an ideo-
logical party, or at least it is not ideological in the narrow, twentieth-century 
sense of the term. The platform party does not have a long-term messianic 
 vision to change society, but rather has a preference for issues that are felt to be 
concrete and immediate.
To summarise, using an expression of startup and  software jargon, the plat-
form party is a ‘light’ and ‘agile’ yet powerful party structure. It is light in its 
organisational skeleton, but powerful in the depth and intensity of the partici-
pation of its members; it is agile at the top and highly reactive at the base. It thus 
conjoins two features that seemed irreconcilable in past parties: a lean directive 
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structure and an active, though mostly in the limited sense of ‘reactive’, militant 
support base.
3. The Party as a Platform
The platform party is the form the political party adopts in the era of social 
media and apps, at a time when new forms of communicating, working, and 
purchasing online are revolutionising all sorts of social patterns. How does this 
change in technology lead to a modification in the nature of the party? What 
difference do social media and online platforms, heavily used by formations 
such as Podemos, the Five Star Movement and Pirate Parties, make for the digi-
tal party? Following our foregoing discussion on the analogy between the mode 
of production and the mode of organisation, it can be said that the platform 
party internalises the new forms of social experience of the digital age, and 
the forms of production, consumption and interpersonal relationships that are 
prevalent in it. Central to these trends, is the role played by digital platforms, 
which is at the origin of the platform party alternate name: ‘digital party’.
In political science, the term ‘platform’ is normally used to refer to political 
parties’ political platforms, namely the set of policies they pursue and propose 
to the electorate. Yet in the context of the digital party we have a rather differ-
ent kind of platform in mind. The platform hinted at here is the digital ‘plat-
form’, a term used to describe the logic inherent in a set of online services, from 
Facebook and Twitter to consumer apps such as Uber and Airbnb, that have 
come to define the era of social media and Big Data. Digital platforms, such as 
those used by these and other companies, are mini operating systems, execu-
tion environments of various programmes and applications, enabling users to 
accomplish a diverse set of activities: socialising with friends and acquaintances 
(Facebook); publishing personal thoughts or news (Twitter); finding sentimen-
tal and sexual partners (Match.com, Tinder); ordering a taxi (Uber, Grab etc.); 
or reserving accommodation (Airbnb, Booking.com etc.).
Over the last few years a lot has been said about the nature of such platforms 
and their social, political and economic consequences. Media theorist Joss 
Hands (2013, 1) has defined platforms as ‘“Cloud”-based software modules that 
act as a portal to different types of information, with nested applications that 
aggregate content, often generated by the “users” themselves’. In his recent book 
Platform Capitalism, Nick Srnicek (2016, 43) has approached them as ‘digital 
infrastructures that allow two or more groups to interact’. They are therefore 
positioned as ‘intermediaries that connect multiple users: customers, advertis-
ers, service providers, manufacturers […] and even physical objects.’ The key 
aspect of online platforms is the way in which they disintermediate social and 
economic relationships. However, this process of disintermediation carries a 
more complex reality. By disintermediating, in fact, platforms create new digi-
tal intermediaries which go hand in hand with new power relationships.
The Platform Party 193
The disintermediation/re-intermediation introduced by digital platforms 
revolves around a series of key elements: their dependence on data and infor-
mation generated by users as expressed in the term ‘user-generated content’; 
their high degree of personalisation; their aggregative logic which allows, for 
example, people with similar interests to know each other, or producers and 
consumers in a certain location to connect, or advertisers to target a niche mar-
ket; the partially closed or ‘enclosed’ character of such systems, as a means of 
harnessing ‘network effects’. Online platforms seek to respond to the extreme 
mutability of contemporary society and economy by building systems able to 
intercept consumer demand instantaneously; by developing complex forms of 
intelligence on the behaviour and consumer choices of individuals; by creating 
new services to quickly respond to new needs (or creating new needs); and by 
‘perturbing’ pre-existing markets through new forms of brokering, as expressed 
in the discourse of ‘digital disruption’ used to describe companies such as Uber 
and Airbnb.
Platform parties reflect different elements of this new platform logic that un-
derpins the world of social media and apps. First the platform party integrates 
in its operations a series of online platforms, ranging from social media such 
as Facebook and Twitter for external communication, to various instant mes-
saging services such as WhatsApp and Telegram for internal communication. 
Secondly, platform parties have developed their own dedicated discussion and 
voting platforms: the so-called ‘participatory platforms’ that have become a 
symbol of their attempt to build forms of direct and participatory democracy. 
These formations adopt digital companies’ logic of data mining, aggregation 
and analysis adapting it for the purpose of creating consensus and political mo-
bilisation. Similarly to what happens with companies such as Facebook, Twitter 
and Airbnb, platform parties unite in the same ‘database’ citizens who, despite 
their individual idiosyncrasies, are united by common interests, demands 
and wishes. See for example, the way in which France Insoumise has used the 
NationBuilder software to enlist half a million supporters to the campaign of 
Jean-Luc Melenchon, by simply having them hit the button ‘je soutien’ (I sup-
port). Or witness how other parties have used participatory platforms and so-
cial media accounts to gather thousands of supporters, often in a very short 
time-span. Online platforms thus become not just a participatory architecture 
for these parties, but effectively also an organisational ‘scaffolding’ that serves 
to compensate for their lack of a dependable bureaucratic structure, found in 
twentieth-century parties and trade unions.
4. Cloud/Start-up/Forum
Adopting the platform logic of digital companies, the platform party comes 
to reflect some of the typical functions and characteristics associated with digi-
tal culture. This tendency of of the platform party is visible in various ‘faces’ 
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of the platform party that correspond to different aspects of its operation: the 
cloud party, the start-up party and the forum party. 
First, the platform party is a a cloud party, an agile party which alike online 
software platforms is accessible by every device and every place. In this context, 
digital communication becomes a substitute for physical infrastructure such as 
the offices, circles and sections that constituted the organisational structure 
of traditional parties. The platform party is also a start­up party. It shares the 
rapid growth rate of start-ups, their ability to quickly scale up to respond to 
growing consumer demand for their products and services. This dynamic is 
paralleled by the similarity of these parties to social movements – which is 
why they are often described as ‘movement-parties’ – but also in the ‘gaseous’ 
and extremely flexible nature of such formations that results from their lack of 
of a dependable and stable organisational infrastructure. However, start-ups 
are also characterised by a high degree of ‘child mortality’. And indeed while 
many platform parties are formed few mature from a start-up to an established 
company.
Decisive for the success of these formations is the launch phase and the crea-
tion of an enthusiastic supportive atmosphere. Platform parties try to excite the 
enthusiasm of the base, using highly emotional communication on their social 
media channels, and staging symbolic events demonstrating the support they 
enjoy, occasions in which their phantom online crowd of supporters is tempo-
rarily manifested as a physical crowd. 
The platform party is ultimately a party whose success depends heavily on 
the degree of participation of its supporters, and on the discussions they de-
velop on its organisational and communicative platforms. Therefore it can be 
described as a forum party, to refer to the online discussion forums that sustain 
its everyday existence and which constitute the site of a permanent digital as-
sembly of all members where the most diverse topics are debated from current 
news, to policies, even to candidates and leadership. This participatory feature 
of the platform party is inscribed precisely in its platform nature, which makes 
the party akin to a sort of ‘container’, whose content is process-oriented and 
largely dependent on the ongoing interactions of members.
Participation in the life of platform parties can take different forms, with a 
higher or lower degree of formalisation. On the one hand, participation takes 
place on social media and with ongoing discussions on such channels as Face-
book and Twitter that end informing the positioning of these formations. On 
the other hand, it is pursued in a more formalised way on the decision-making 
platforms that constitute the true heart of digital parties, and where dilemma 
decisions with important consequences for the life of these political organisa-
tions are taken.
Podemos, Five Star and Pirate Parties have established their own participa-
tory platforms, which constitute the most important organisational innova-
tion such platform parties bring to the fore. These platforms have gained great 
importance in marking the difference between these parties and traditional 
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parties accused of being deaf to the will of the base. These participatory plat-
forms appear to cater not merely for the desire to participate but also for the 
extreme fragmentation and dispersion of post-industrial society.
The digital forum, like the forum of antiquity, is a gathering space, a 
meeting place where individuals otherwise prey to atomisation can partic-
ipate in collective discussions and adopt common identities. This aggrega-
tive operation has similarities to the logic of applications such as Uber and 
Airbnb and the way they profile users and gather them in micro-niches. If 
in the case of commercial platforms the purpose is to connect consumers 
with producers of a given service, in the case of platform parties it is to ag-
gregate all those who are interested in a certain policy and in a related pub-
lic good (such as clean air or public education). The platform party is an 
aggregation system that responds to a social condition in which the mass – 
the key metaphor which informed the mass party of the industrial era – is not 
a starting point, but rather the result of a lengthy political process sustained 
in discussions and deliberations conducted on the Internet, and achieved by 
means of identification with a charismatic the leader, who acts as a spokesman 
for the ‘general will’ emerging from such interactions.
5. Superbase and Hyperleader
The promise that is at the heart of all the platform parties is a new democracy 
beyond the deep crisis of existing democracy. These parties are animated by 
the diagnosis that the growing inequality, insecurity and injustice of contem-
porary society is the result of the disconnect between voters and those they 
elect, and the betrayal of a political class increasingly detached from the needs 
of ordinary people. In response to this condition, platform parties have used 
digital technologies as a means of building new forms of democratic partici-
pation appropriate to the social experience in the digital age. The promise of 
radical democracy made by platform parties  revolves around the lofty project 
of direct and participatory democracy, in which citizens entirely bypass their 
representatives. However, this techno-utopian narrative does not coincide with 
reality. The adoption of more or less radical forms of digital democracy does 
not lead to the total elimination of organisational hierarchies and of the asym-
metry between the base and the vertex which is is inherent in the party form, 
but to a radical redefinition of such relationships.
To understand this restructuring we have to return to one of the classic de-
bates on the nature of the party-form and on the problematic relationship that 
exists between democracy, organisation and representation, raised in the early 
twentieth century by Robert Michels (1915). Michels argued that parties were 
characterised by an iron law of the oligarchy that could be summed up as fol-
lows: democracy requires organisations; organisations are characterised by 
an oligarchic tendency, and are inevitably dominated by a small ruling class; 
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therefore democracy is impossible. These contradictions between democracy 
and organisation resurface in the context of the digital party.
Platform parties are presented as radically democratic parties that want to 
give citizens a direct say on collective decisions, thus eliminating forms of me-
diation suspected of distorting the democratic process. However, and here is 
the paradox, they are often characterised by the presence of highly centralised 
and unifying charismatic leadership. How can these two trends coexist?
To solve this puzzle, we need to understand precisely what kind of disin-
termediation is offered by these parties. Hereby, disintermediation involves a 
strengthening of organisational extremes – the base and the vertex – at the 
expense of the intermediate structures, the party bureaucracy and the party 
cadres. The platform party refer to the base as a synonym of the membership, 
but also to the emergence of a ‘superbase’ – to use a term used in chemistry 
to describe an extremely basic and reactive compound – that is, a situation in 
which the members acquire strong negotiating power thanks to their ongoing 
participation in online discussions and voting. This is however accompanied at 
the other extreme by the emergence of a ‘hyperleader’ who enjoys great power 
and freedom of action. The superbase derives its power from its participation in 
decision-making platforms which, as previously discussed, host consultations 
on various proposals and political issues. 
These democratic processes offer new possibilities for the involvement of or-
dinary members in decisions that were previously controlled by delegates. Fur-
thermore, they have facilitated interesting experimentations with new forms 
of participatory policy development. However, a number of issues point to the 
limited democratic quality of these forms of online participation. First, doubts 
have been raised over the level of influence possessed by the staff of these plat-
forms in the timing of consultations and in the formulation of questions. Sec-
ond, the low frequency with which such consultations are convened has been 
criticised. Third, in some cases, there have been allegations of manipulation of 
such consultation, which may well be the case when voting is conducted on 
proprietary systems with no external validation, as has often happened in the 
case of the Five Star Movement. Finally, most of the times these consultations 
have returned highly expected results, with super-majorities supporting the 
options favoured by the party leadership. Rank-and-file rebellions have been 
very rare. One of the most notable ones happened in January 2014 in the Five 
Star Movement, when the base voted for the repeal of the illegal immigration 
offense in spite of contrary recommendations made by Grillo and Casaleggio.
Strengthening the power of the base does not mean, however, that these par-
ties create a horizontal decision-making space, as libertarians advocating direct 
democracy would want. The superbase mirrors itself in a hyperleader, a highly 
centralised and personalised leadership that materialises itself in the body of 
the charismatic leader. This is a phenomenon that does not only affect platform 
parties. In the era of Trump, Sanders, Mélenchon, Salvini and Marine le Pen, 
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this tendency is manifested in the most diverse contexts, and in particular in 
anti-establishment and populist formations, whether of the right or of the left.
The term ‘hyperleader’ was used in Podemos’s internal debate to describe 
Pablo Iglesias’ role. The hyperleader was understood in this context as a charis-
matic leader who has the task of representing the party and its members in the 
media sphere. Similar, has been the role of Beppe Grillo, in the early phase of 
the Five Star Movement, when he lent his symbolic capital, accrued through a 
long career as comedian, to the movement.
The hyperleader is often also the founder, the one individual without whom 
the party would not exist, much in the same way as it happens with founders of 
digital companies such as Jack Dorsey for Twitter or Mark Zuckerberg in the 
case of Facebook. It is indicative that in the European elections of May 2014, 
the symbol that the voters found on the ballot next to the word ‘Podemos’, was 
not the circle logo of the party, but the photo of Pablo Iglesias with his deter-
mined and angry face. There are obvious similarities between the hyperleader 
and the figure of the ‘benevolent dictator’ seen in a number of digital culture 
phenomena from Jimmy Wales, the founder of Wikipedia, to Linus Torvalds, 
the founder of Linux. As is the case with these figures, the hyperleader presents 
himself as the ultimate guarantor of the party and its founding principles.
The superbase intervention is mostly reactive rather than active, requiring 
constant retroalimentation from the hyperleader, and the conflicting alliance 
between the two serves to crush intermediate levels – the official, heavy bureau-
cratic structures of traditional parties – which many suspect to be distorting 
popular will. However, this does not mean that platform parties do without 
such intermediate structures altogether. They rely on the presence of a tiny but 
strategically important ‘political’ staff responsible for managing their resources, 
communication channels and platforms. In some cases, this structure recalls 
social movements, heavily depending on the free labour made available by vol-
unteers. In other cases, however, it may come to assume the features of a ‘po-
litical enterprise’, a party-company, to revive a concept used to describe Forza 
Italia from the 1990s.
This type of distortion – and it could not be called otherwise – is clearly vis-
ible in the case of the Five Star Movement, whose logo is registered as a trade-
mark and in which management of the decision-making platform is assigned 
to a private company, Casaleggio Associati, whose role goes far beyond mere 
communication consultancy but is closer to an outsourced political manage-
ment firm. Undoubtedly, this is an organisational model that ensures a high 
level of efficiency compared to most traditional political parties, but it is ef-
ficiency gained at the price of democracy and transparency.
The new forms of authority and organisation that are emerging within plat-
form parties will be a matter of debate for many years. What can however al-
ready be said at this stage is that emerging formations as the Pirate Parties, the 
Five Star Movement and Podemos have managed to subvert a tired political 
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system, and have demonstrated a remarkable ability to experiment with new 
forms of organisation which display great potential and have facilitated the 
mobilisation of hundreds of thousands of people who were previously distant 
from the political process. Yet, digital parties also display major contradictions 
between the claims of direct participation and disintermediation they put for-
ward, and their reliance on a charismatic and highly and centralised leader-
ship. It remains to be seen whether these contradictions may be successfully 
resolved, or whether the platform party may end up substituting the iron law 
of oligarchy, with another iron law centering on the benevolent, and sometimes 
not too-benevolent, dictatorship of the hyperleader.
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CHAPTER 17
The Movement Party – Winning Elections 
and Transforming Democracy in a 
 Digital Era : Reflections on  
Paolo Gerbaudo’s Chapter
Anastasia Kavada
Are political parties changing fundamentally in the digital age? In his contribu-
tion to this edited volume, Paolo Gerbaudo advances a compelling case that 
they are, focusing on parties across the Left-Right spectrum, like the Five Star 
Movement in Italy or Podemos in Spain. As a response to Gerbaudo’s argu-
ment, I would like to focus on two interrelated points: first, that the evolution of 
the political party form may be better explained by changes in communication 
technologies rather than by the influence of models of economic organisation; 
second, that the platform (or ‘digital’) parties described by Gerbaudo are also 
movement parties that are constituted around contradictory objectives – to win 
the electoral game and to transform the system of representative democracy – 
a contradiction which may explain their organisational structure.
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Gerbaudo convincingly suggests that what he terms the ‘digital party’ has 
three key characteristics: it is based on an infrastructure of digital assets located 
on the Cloud, it serves as a forum of interaction for the grassroots, and it re-
sembles a start-up company in its agility and ‘high mortality rate’. However, the 
strengthening of the party grassroots does not lead to a less hierarchical party 
structure, according to Gerbaudo. It simply thins the middle layer of party cad-
res and creates a ‘hyperleader’ who acts as the embodiment of the party.
In tracing these changes, Gerbaudo argues that ‘In each historical era there 
tends to be an analogy between the mode of production and what we could 
call the “mode of organisation”, namely the set of organisational mechanisms, 
practices and structures that are prevalent at the time.’ 
Following Revelli, Gerbaudo argues that in the industrial era the party was 
conceived as a Fordist factory, adopting a hierarchical and bureaucratic struc-
ture to coordinate a mass of participants. After the end of the 1960s, party 
organisation developed along a post-Fordist model with an emphasis on nim-
bleness, while power was concentrated in the hands of a few technocrats. Often 
dubbed ‘the television party’, this new formation aimed to appeal to a broader 
electorate, rather than simply represent the interests of a specific political class. 
In this historical trajectory, the platform/digital party constitutes the latest 
form that corresponds to new types of economic organisation as represented 
by start-up and digital companies like Facebook and Google.
While Gerbaudo’s analogy between economic and political organisation is 
evocative, his essay does not provide a detailed explanation as to why these 
forms are related. Gerbaudo also implies that the prevalent organisational 
models in a given era emerge from the economic rather than the political 
sphere. Thus, the political parties of the industrial age followed the organisa-
tional model of the factory and not vice-versa. But why would this be the case? 
The reasons are not immediately apparent, particularly when we consider that 
the organisation of companies and political parties is constituted around dif-
ferent objectives. The former aim at the production and selling of goods and 
services at a profit, while the latter are oriented towards winning elections and 
seizing control of the state.
An alternative and perhaps more fitting explanation could be that the paral-
lels between models of economic and political organisation partly stem from 
developments in communication technologies, rather than from the direct 
influence of economic forms on political ones. Thus, economic organisation 
was transformed by new technologies of production and distribution that af-
fected the coordination of the factory in line with capitalist demands around 
flexibility and cost reduction. At the same time, the evolution of the political 
party form resulted from concerted efforts to appeal to the electorate within an 
increasingly ‘mediatized’ political system (Blumler and Kavanagh 1999) and in 
a changing media environment.
The organisation of the party up until the Second World War centred on 
the coordination of local volunteers who would disseminate leaflets, knock 
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on doors, recruit new party members and mobilise potential voters to attend 
political rallies. In this pre-modern age of electoral campaigning, as Norris 
(2000) calls it, the party machinery was based on the partisan press and on 
direct interactions between party volunteers and the electorate. The rise of the 
mass media, with the emergence of radio in the 1930s and particularly with the 
advent of television, ushered electoral campaigning into a ‘modern’ phase. As 
Gerbaudo also alludes in his analysis of the ‘television party’, the political party 
form during the modern period centred on the use of television for electioneer-
ing. The strategic appearance of the party in broadcast media was controlled 
from behind the scenes by a small group of party technocrats and ‘spin doctors’ 
in a ‘war room’ model of campaigning. The party thus became increasingly cen-
tralised, while the influence of the grassroots was weakened. The organisation 
of political parties was infused with the news values of television with regards 
to ‘the scheduling of political events ([…], the language of politics […], and 
the personalisation of its presentation (with a sharper focus on top leaders)’ 
(Blumler and Kavanagh 1999, 212). From the 1980s onwards, electioneering 
entered a ‘third age’ (ibid) of postmodern campaigning in response to the rise 
of 24-hour rolling news, the proliferation of television channels and the frag-
mentation of media audiences. Political marketing and the micro-targeting of 
voters, together with sophisticated polling techniques, became crucial aspects 
of electoral campaigning (Norris 2000).
Within this context, the advent of the Internet and social media is associated 
with two countervailing dynamics. On the one hand, it has heightened individ-
ual micro-targeting through the collection and analysis of personal data and the 
growth of political advertising on digital media platforms. On the other hand, 
the Internet has facilitated the coordination of grassroots volunteers which has 
brought door-to-door campaigning back to the fore. This became evident in 
the first presidential campaign of Barack Obama in 2008, which used digital 
media to mobilise party volunteers on the ground, and also launched MyBa-
rackObama.com, a campaign-owned social network site (Chadwick 2013). The 
explosion of discussion forums and email lists, as well as the ease of online ref-
erenda and consultations, have allowed the political party base to have greater 
input into the formulation of party policy.
What this brief historical sketch demonstrates is that the evolution of the 
political party form is better explained by the parties’ response to a changing 
media and political environment than by the influence of dominant forms 
of economic organisation. Where economics seems to play a greater role is 
in shaping the political conditions that underlie this drive for organisational 
change – namely, the interrelated crises of capitalism and representative de-
mocracy. As Gerbaudo suggests, platform parties have emerged at a time when 
trust in political institutions is low, while citizens feel alienated and disempow-
ered from politics. This is accentuated by the economic crisis of the last decade, 
which has resulted in cuts to the welfare state and a slew of austerity meas-
ures. Governments seem both unable and unwilling to address the growing gap 
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between rich and poor, and to ensure that economic activity benefits the many 
rather than the few. The rise of anti-establishment feeling has fuelled a wave 
of protest against political corruption and the undue influence of economic 
interests on the political system. It has also led to demands for more direct 
control of and participation in politics, a demand that has manifested in differ-
ent ways, from the assertion of national sovereignty, to fears over the control of 
borders and unchecked immigration, to calls for more direct and participatory 
democracy, for a more decentralised system that challenges the concentration 
of power in the hands of the few.
The organisational form of platform parties has emerged in response to these 
political conditions and in some cases as a direct result of protest movements. 
The Five Star Movement arose out of protest against political corruption, while 
Podemos is linked to the Indignados movement of 2011, which attempted to 
prefigure a different kind of democracy based on direct participation, transpar-
ency and the rejection of central leadership.
The platform parties analysed by Gerbaudo are thus movement parties, 
which points to a fundamental change to the objectives that these parties form 
around. Social movements revolve around a conflict that challenges the lim-
its of the political system in which they arise (Melucci 1996). Therefore, the 
movement component of contemporary platform parties means that they aim 
not only at getting elected but also at radically changing the system of repre-
sentative democracy of which they are part. The latter objective means that 
the political party is not simply a machine of electoral campaigning, but also 
a space for experimenting with new forms of party (and national) governance. 
These experiments allow the party to channel more authentically the demands 
of ordinary citizens, and provide it with ideas about innovating governance if it 
ever finds itself in power.
Yet, as experiments in governance, digital parties do have differences among 
themselves in the ways they design grassroots participation, which may reflect 
their different positions across the political spectrum. If these parties are plat-
forms, as Gerbaudo suggests, then their platform design can be revealing of 
their broader desires around democracy, political participation and the power 
of the party base. A focus on this architecture of participation can also help us 
to distinguish parties that are truly committed to a vision of radical democracy 
from those that simply adopt the discourse – but not the actual practice – of 
grassroots participation as a cynical ploy to win more votes. For example, on-
line referenda can be more authoritarian than democratic when the party base 
does not have input in the formulation of questions. The political economy of 
the party’s digital platforms can also provide clues as to its experimentation 
with new forms of governance. For instance, Rousseau, the digital platform of 
the Five Star Movement, belongs to the private company of one of its founders, 
Gianroberto Casaleggio, a company now run by his son Davide after Gianrob-
erto’s death. This allows the owner of the company to profit from the party plat-
form and to become a gatekeeper without holding an official position within 
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the party (Politi and Roberts 2017). By contrast, Podemos believes in making 
the software code of its platform freely available, arguing on its website that 
open source equals open democracy (Podemos n.d.).
However, the two objectives around which movement parties are organised 
are not always commensurable. Movement parties aim at both winning the 
electoral game by following the rules of the existing system and at moulding 
their organisation around a model of democracy that does not yet exist. This 
may explain the contradictory presence of the hyperleader and the superbase 
in current platform parties. Hyperleaders help the party to win elections in a 
communication environment that is still characterised by the personalisation 
of politics. At the same time, and as Gerbaudo suggests, the rise of the super-
base constitutes a key aspect of these parties’ radical democratic politics.
But is it perhaps too early to identify with certainty the new type of party that 
is emerging? Are we still in a phase of transition? If this is the case, then the 
movement party may still shed some of its characteristics, particularly those 
that are carry-overs from a previous era, as it completes its tranformation. In 
this scenario, the figure of the hyperleader can be considered a remnant of the 
past or of a dated and no longer desirable present: of a system of representative 
democracy based on media spectacle, personalisation and empty rhetoric. The 
fact that many of these leaders are white, male, middle or upper class adds to 
this sense of déjà vu. One hopes that the hyperleadership will be cast aside once 
the superbase finds better ways to win elections and govern itself.
I am not suggesting this as a possible development but as one that we may 
wish and strive for. In an age of interregnum, when ‘the old is dying and the new 
cannot be born’ (Gramsci 1971, 276), Michels’ iron laws are thrown in disar-
ray and the hegemony is challenged. In such times, identifying the new system 
that may emerge from the turmoil is not only a matter of political analysis. It is 
also a matter of envisioning and experimentation, of prefigurative practices and 
self-fulfilling prophecies that require political will, courage and imagination.
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CHAPTER 18
The Appropriation of Fixed Capital : 
A Metaphor?
Antonio Negri
Translated from Italian by Michele Ledda with editorial support by 
David Chandler, Christian Fuchs and Sara Raimondi.
1. Labour in the Age of the Digital Machine
In the debate over the impact of the digital on society, we are presented with 
the serious hypothesis that the worker, the producer, is transformed by the use 
of the digital machine, since we have recognised that digital technologies have 
profoundly modified the mode of production, as well as ways of knowing and 
communicating. The discussion of the psycho-political consequences of digital 
machines is so broad that it is just worth remembering it even though the re-
sults obtained by this research are highly problematic.
They normally propose the passive subjection of the worker to the ma-
chine, a generalised alienation, the epidemic character of depressive illnesses, 
the definition of algorithmic Taylorism and so on and so forth. Among these 
catastrophic novelties rings the old Nazi adage: ‘The earth on which we live is 
revealed to us as a dead mining district which slices the very essence of man’. 
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It seems more sophisticated to think about the impact of the digital by asking 
if, and perhaps how, the minds and bodies of workers appropriate the digital 
machine.
Let us quietly remember that if the new impact of the digital machine on the 
producer happens under the command of capital, not only does the producer 
yield value to constant capital during the production process, but also, insofar 
as he is a cognitive work force both in his individual contribution to the produc-
tive effort and in his cooperative use of the digital machine, he connects to the 
machine and can be merged with it, when the connection is effected through 
the immaterial flow of cognitive labour. In cognitive labour, living labour can 
invest fixed capital, being both its substance and its active engine at the same 
time, even though it is subjected to it when it develops its productive capacity.
Therefore, in Marxist circles people have started to talk about ‘appropriation 
of fixed capital’ on the part of the digital worker (or the cognitive producer). 
When the increase in productivity of the digital workers or even the productive 
capacities of ‘digital natives’ are analysed, these themes and problems spontane-
ously present themselves. Are they simply metaphors?
2. The Appropriation of Fixed Capital
And in particular, are they simply political metaphors? By saying ‘the appropria-
tion of fixed capital’ on the part of the producers (by contrast with the enterprise, 
which acts for profit) one conjures up themes that have had great resonance in 
the political and philosophical domains in the past 50 years. The theme of the 
hybrid human/machine has been developed widely in German anthropology 
(of Helmuth Plessner, Arnold Gehlen, Heinrich Popitz) as well as in French ma-
terialism (Simondon), and in materialist feminism (Donna Haraway and Rosi 
Braidotti) (cf. Braidotti 2013, Gehlen 1980, Haraway 1991, Plessner 1924, Popitz 
1995, Simondon 2017). Suffice to recall here Guattari’s theory of the machinic as-
semblages that runs throughout his work and greatly influences the philosophi-
cal design of A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). Probably the 
most important thing that has happened within these philosophical theories is 
that their structure – which is homogeneously materialist, despite the many dif-
ferences between them – has shown new characteristics which are not reducible 
to any variant of the past. Of course, materialism has long abandoned the epic 
form elaborated by Enlightenment authors from d’Holbach to Helvétius, and 
has acquired from twentieth-century physics clearly dynamic features. However, 
in the theories mentioned above, it now shows a ‘humanistic’ imprint which, far 
from renewing idealistic apologies of ‘man’, is characterised by an interest in the 
body, in its singularity and density both in thought and in action.
Materialism presents itself today as a theory of production that is widely 
unbalanced towards the cognitive aspects and the effects of the cooperative 
hybridisation of production itself. Is it the change in the mode of production, 
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from the predominance of the physical to the hegemony of the non-physical, 
which has produced these effects on philosophical thought? Since I am not a 
follower of reflection theories, I do not believe so. However, I am convinced 
that this marked change in the materialist tradition has been simultaneous with 
the growth of the digital mode of production. We can now attempt to answer 
the question of whether ‘appropriation of fixed capital’ is a political metaphor? 
It certainly is, if from this assumption we draw a definition of power (constitu-
ent power, if need be) in political terms, and the appropriation of fixed capital 
becomes the analogical basis for the construction of an ethical and/or political 
subject that is appropriate to a materialist ontology of the present and a com-
munist teleology of the yet-to-come.
3. Karl Marx on Fixed Capital
However, the development of the theme ‘appropriation of fixed capital’ is not 
always metaphoric. It was Marx who, in Capital (Marx 1867/1976; 1885/1978; 
1894/1981), showed how the very placing of the worker before (the  command 
of) the means of production modified, besides his productive capacity, his 
 persona, his nature, his ontology. In this respect, the Marxian narrative of 
the shift from manufacture to modern industry is a classic. In manufacture, 
there is still a subjective principle in the division of labour – and this means 
the worker appropriated the production process after the production process 
had been adapted to the worker. This is in contrast to modern industry, where 
the division of labour is only ‘objective’, as the subjective, artisanal use of the 
machine is eliminated and machinery is constituted against the human being. 
Here the machine becomes a competitor, an antagonist of the worker, or even 
reduces the worker to a working animal. And yet there is in Marx also another 
aspect: he recognises that the worker and the working tool also acquire a hybrid 
configuration, and that the conditions of the production process constitute in 
great part the conditions of the life of the worker, his ‘conditions of his active life 
process itself, his conditions of life’ (Marx 1894/1981, 180). The concept of labour 
productivity itself implies a tight dynamic connection between variable and fixed 
capital, and theoretical discoveries – Marx adds – are relayed in the production 
process through the experience of the worker. We will see later how Marx himself 
foresees, in Capital, the appropriation of fixed capital on the part of the producer.
Now, let us keep in mind that in Capital, Marx’s analysis is in any case informed 
by the arguments of Grundrisse, that is, by the theorisation of ‘general intellect’ 
as substance and subject of the production process (Marx 1857/1858/1973, 
706; 831): This discovery showed how central cognitive matter was to produc-
tion, and how the concept of fixed capital itself was transformed by it. When 
Marx asserts that fixed capital – which in Capital is normally understood as 
the network of machines – has become ‘man himself ’ (Marx 1857/1858/1973, 
712), he anticipates the development of capital in our own time. Although fixed 
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capital is the product of labour and nothing else than labour appropriated by 
capital; although the accumulation of scientific activity and the productivity 
of what Marx calls ‘general intellect’ are incorporated in the machines under 
the control of capital; finally, although capital appropriates all this for free – at 
some point of capitalist development living labour begins to exert the power to 
reverse this relationship. Living labour starts to show its priority with respect 
to capital and to the capitalist management of social production, even though 
this cannot necessarily be taken out of the process. In other words, as living 
labour becomes a larger and larger societal power, it operates as an increas-
ingly independent activity, outside the disciplinary structures commanded by 
capital – not only as labour force but also, more generally, as vital activity. On 
the one hand, past human activity and its intelligence are accumulated, crystal-
lised as fixed capital; on the other, reversing the tide, living humans are capable 
of reabsorbing capital in themselves and their own social life.
Fixed capital is ‘man himself ’ (Marx 1857/1858/1973, 712), in both senses. 
Here the appropriation of fixed capital is not a metaphor any more but becomes 
an apparatus that the class struggle can take on, and that imposes itself as politi-
cal programme. In this case, capital is no longer a relationship that objectively 
includes the producer, imposing its dominion by force. On the contrary, the 
capitalist relationship now includes an ultimate contradiction: that of a pro-
ducer, of a class of producers, that has dispossessed capital, either in part or in 
whole, but in any case effectively, of the means of production, thereby imposing 
itself as hegemonic subject. The analogy with the emergence of the Third Estate 
within the structures of the Ancien Régime is conducted by Marx in the histori-
cisation of the relationship of capital, and clearly presents itself in an explosive, 
revolutionary way.
4. Labour’s Social Networks and Autonomy
At this point, we must bring into focus the new figures of labour, especially 
those that have been created by workers themselves in social networks. These 
are the workers whose productive capacities have been dramatically enlarged 
by their ever more intense cooperation. Now, let’s examine what happens here. 
With cooperation, work becomes more and more abstracted from capital, 
meaning that it has a greater capacity to organise production itself, autono-
mously, and particularly in relation to the machines, even though it remains 
subordinate to the mechanisms of extraction of labour on the part of capital. 
Is this the same autonomy as the one we have recognised in the forms of au-
tonomous work at the beginnings of capitalist production? Certainly not, it 
seems to us. Our hypothesis is that there is now a degree of autonomy that does 
not concern the production process only, but also imposes itself at an onto-
logical level – that in these circumstances work acquires an ontological texture 
even when it is completely subjected to capitalist control. How can we under-
stand a situation in which both productive enterprises, extended in space and 
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continuous in time, and collective, cooperative inventions on the part of the 
workers are in the end fixed as extracted value by capital? This is difficult unless 
we shake off linear and deterministic methodologies and adopt a method that 
is articulated through apparatuses. By doing this we can recognise that, in the 
current situation, the production processes in the hands of the workers and the 
capitalist means of valorisation and control are increasingly pulled apart. Work 
has reached such a high level of dignity and power that it can potentially refuse 
the form of valorisation that is imposed on it and therefore, even under com-
mand, it can develop its own autonomy.
The growing powers of labour can be recognised not only in the expansion 
and increasing autonomy of cooperation, but also in the greater importance 
that is given to the social and cognitive powers of labour within the struc-
tures of production. The first feature, an expanded cooperation, is certainly 
due to the increased physical contact between digital workers in the informa-
tion society, but even more so to the formation of ‘mass intellectuality’ that 
is animated by linguistic and cultural skills, by affective capacities and digital 
powers, as Paolo Virno has always suggested. There is also a second feature: it 
is not a coincidence that these abilities and creativity increase the productiv-
ity of work. Let us therefore reflect on how much the role of knowledge has 
changed in the history of the relationship between capital and labour. As we 
have already seen, during the phase of manufacture, the craftsman’s knowledge 
was employed and absorbed in production as a separate, isolated force that 
was subordinated to a hierarchical organisational structure. In the phase of 
modern industry, by contrast, workers were considered to be incapable of the 
knowledge that was necessary for production, which was therefore centralised 
by management. In the contemporary phase of ‘general intellect’, knowledge 
has a multitudinous form in the production process, even though, from the 
owner’s point of view, it can be isolated just as the craftsman’s knowledge was 
in manufacture. In fact, from the point of view of capital, the way in which 
work self-organises remains a mystery, even when this becomes the basis of 
production.
In order to move forward, let us take an example: a powerful figure of as-
sociative labour is today made invisible in the functioning of algorithms. To-
gether with the ceaseless propaganda about the necessity of capitalist control 
and the sermons on the impossibility of an alternative to this system of power, 
we often hear praise of the role played by the algorithm. But what is an algo-
rithm? Firstly, it is fixed capital, being a machine born of cooperative social in-
telligence, a product of the ‘general intellect’. Although the value of productive 
activity is fixed in the social process of extraction of surplus labour by capital, 
we should not forget that the force of living labour is at the root of this process. 
Without living labour, there is no algorithm.
Secondly, however, algorithms also present many new features. Let us con-
sider Google’s Page Rank, perhaps the best-known algorithm as well as the 
largest generator of profit. Now, the rank of a web page is determined by the 
number and quality of its links, and high quality means a link to a page that 
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itself has a high rank. Page Rank is therefore a mechanism to incorporate the 
judgment and the value given by users to Internet objects. Matteo Pasquinelli 
(2009, 152) writes that ‘while every link on the Web contains a little bit of hu-
man intelligence, all the links combined contain a great deal of intelligence’. 
However, a marked difference of algorithms such as Google’s Page Rank is that, 
whereas industrial machines crystallise past intelligence in a relatively fixed 
and static form, these algorithms continually add social intelligence to past re-
sults in such a way as to create an open and expansive process. It seems that 
the algorithmic machine is itself intelligent – but this is not true. It is instead 
open to continuous modifications by human intelligence. When we say ‘intel-
ligent machines’, we must understand that machines are capable of continually 
absorbing human intelligence. Another distinctive feature is that the process of 
extracting value established by these algorithms is itself open in an incremental 
way, and socialised in such a way as to eliminate the border between work and 
life. Google users know this very well. Finally, another difference between the 
production processes studied by Marx and this kind of value formation con-
sists in the fact that today’s cooperation is no longer imposed by the owner of 
the means of production but is generated by the relationship between produc-
ers. Today we can really speak of the re-appropriation of fixed capital by the 
workers, and the integration of intelligent machines under autonomous social 
control, which, for instance, takes place in the process of construction of algo-
rithms that are connected to the self-valorisation of both social cooperation 
and the reproduction of life.
We can add that even when cybernetic and digital instruments are put into 
the service of capitalist valorisation, even when social intelligence is put to 
work in order to produce obedient subjectivities, fixed capital is integrated into 
the bodies and brains of workers and becomes their second nature. Ever since 
industrial civilisation was born, workers have always had a more intimate, in-
sider knowledge of the machines and their systems than have capitalists and 
their managers. Today, these processes of workers’ appropriation of knowledge 
can become decisive. They are not actualised in the production processes only, 
but they are also intensified and put into effect through productive cooperation 
in the vital processes of circulation and socialisation. Workers can appropriate 
fixed capital while they work, and they can develop this appropriation in their 
social, cooperative and biopolitical relations with other workers. All this deter-
mines a new productive nature, that is, a new life form that is the basis of the 
new ‘mode of production’.
5. The Changing Relationship of Fixed and Variable Capital
In order to go even deeper into this subject, and to eliminate that semblance of 
utopianism which, if it doesn’t damage our argument, might sometimes seem 
to add confusion, let us consider how some of those who have studied cognitive 
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capitalism structure the hypothesis of the appropriation of fixed capital. David 
Harvey (2012) studies this appropriation through the analysis of the spaces of 
settlement and crossing of the metropolis by the bodies that are put to work – 
movements of variable capital that produce radical effects on the conditions 
and practices of the subjected bodies, which are nevertheless capable of auton-
omous movements and of autonomy in the organisation of labour. This analysis 
remains, however, superficial. Much more incisive is the one proposed some 
time ago by André Gorz (2010), who overturned the complex web of exploita-
tion and alienation by emphasising that the intellectual powers of production 
are formed in the social body. Liberation from social alienation restores the 
capacity to act subjectively/intellectually in production. Proceeding step by 
step in this vein, one is not surprised to discover that today ‘intangible capital’ 
(R&D, software but above all education, training and health) has exceeded the 
portion of physical capital in the global capital stock’ (Lucarelli and Vercellone 
2011, 87). Fixed capital appears now within bodies, imprinted into them and at 
the same time subordinated to them – this is even more the case when we con-
sider activities such as research and software development, where work is not 
crystallised in a physical product that is separate from the worker, but remains 
incorporated in the brain and inseparable from the person. Laurent Baronian 
(2013), finally, stresses, by returning to Capital and its analysis of the relations 
of production, that the power of bodies and minds is generalised in the figure 
associated with the qualifying element of fixed capital. Fixed capital is here so-
cial cooperation. Here the line between dead and living labour (that is, between 
fixed and variable capital) is blurred once and for all.
Indeed, as Marx (1894) concludes in Capital on this matter, if from the stand-
point of the capitalist, constant and variable capital become identical under the 
heading of circulating capital, and if for the capitalist the only essential differ-
ence is the one between fixed and circulating capital, it follows that, from the 
point of view of the producer, constant and circulating capital become identi-
cal under the heading of fixed capital, and the only essential difference is the 
one between variable and fixed capital. Therefore, variable capital’s interest in 
re-appropriation needs to focus on fixed capital.
The emancipatory conditions of living labour’s cooperation therefore invest 
and occupy more and more the spaces and the functions of fixed capital.
Still on this point, let us proceed with Carlo Vercellone and Christian Marazzi. 
What is called immaterial or intellectual capital is in fact essentially embodied 
in humans, and it therefore corresponds in a fundamental way to the intel-
lectual and creative faculties of the labour force. We find ourselves before the 
overturning of the concepts of constant capital and the organic composition of 
capital that we inherited from industrial capitalism. In the relationship of con-
stant and variable capital c/v, which indicates mathematically the organic social 
composition of capital, it is precisely v, the labour force, that appears as main, 
fixed capital and, to repeat an expression by Christian Marazzi (2006), presents 
itself as ‘body-machine’. Marazzi (2006) clarifies that this is because, besides 
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containing the labour force, the labour force also plays the role of the container 
of the typical functions of fixed capital, of the means of production insofar as 
they are sediments of codified knowledge, historically acquired knowledge, 
productive grammars and experiences – in short, past labour.
6. Machinic Subjectivities
One can, for instance, characterise the youth who spontaneously enters the dig-
ital world as having a machinic subjectivity. We conceive the machinic, not only 
in contrast to the mechanical, but also as a technological reality that is separate 
from and even opposed to human society. Félix Guattari explains that whereas 
traditionally the problem of machines has been seen as secondary, compared to 
the question of techne and technology, we must recognise that the problem of 
machines is primary and the problem of technology comes later. We can see, he 
maintains, the social nature of the machine: ‘Since the “machine” is opened out 
towards its machinic environment and maintains all sorts of relationships with 
social constituents and individual subjectivities, the concept of technological 
machine should therefore be broadened to that of machinic agencements [ma-
chinic assemblages]’ (Guattari 1995, 9).
The machinic, then, never refers to an individual, isolated machine, but al-
ways to an assemblage. To understand this, we can start by thinking of me-
chanical systems, that is, machines that are connected to and integrated with 
other machines. Let us then add human subjectivities and imagine humans as 
integrated into machinic relationships, and machines as integrated within hu-
man bodies and human society. Finally, Guattari, together with Deleuze, con-
ceives machinic assemblages as progressive, incorporating all sorts of human 
elements and both human and non-human singularities. The concept of the 
machinic in Deleuze and Guattari (1987), and in a different form the concept 
of production in Foucault, highlights the need to develop, outside spiritual-
ist identities, subjectivities of knowledge and action, and to show how these 
emerge from productions that are materially connected.
In economic terms, the machinic clearly appears in the subjectivities that 
emerge when fixed capital is re-appropriated by the labour force, that is, when 
material and immaterial machines and the various kinds of knowledge that 
crystallise past social production are re-integrated into the social subjectivi-
ties that cooperate and produce in the present. Machinic assemblages are thus 
partly grafted onto the notion of anthropogenic production. Some of the more 
intelligent Marxist economists, from Robert Boyer (2002) to Christian Marazzi 
(2005), characterise the novelty of contemporary economic production – as 
well as the shift from Fordism to post-Fordism – by focusing on ‘la production 
de l’homme par l’homme’ (the production of man by man, Boyer 2002, 192), in 
contradistinction to the traditional notion of ‘production of commodities by 
means of commodities’ (Sraffa 1960). The production of subjectivities and life 
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forms becomes more and more central in capitalist valorisation. And this logic 
leads directly to the notions of cognitive and biopolitical production. The ma-
chinic extends further this anthropogenic model in order to incorporate vari-
ous non-human singularities in the assemblages that it produces. To be more 
precise, when we say that fixed capital is re-appropriated by the working sub-
jects, we do not mean that it simply becomes their possession, but rather that it 
is integrated into machinic  assemblages that constitute subjectivities.
The machinic is always an assemblage, a dynamic composition of the human 
and other beings, but the potency of these new subjectivities is only a virtual 
one until they are actualised and articulated within the commons and in social 
cooperation. Indeed, if the re-appropriation of fixed capital took place on an 
individual basis, by transferring private property from an individual to another, 
it would only be robbing Peter to pay Paul and would have no real meaning. 
When, on the other hand, the wealth and productive power of fixed capital is 
socially appropriated and therefore transferred from private property to the 
commons, then the power of machinic subjectivities and their cooperative net-
works can be fully actualised. The machinic dynamic of the assemblage, the 
productive forms of cooperation and the ontological basis of the commons are 
intertwined in the closest way.
When we see today’s young people absorbed in the commons, determined 
by their machinic engagements in cooperation, we must recognise that their 
very existence is resistance. Whether we are aware of it or not, they produce 
resistance. Capital is forced to recognise this hard truth. Capital can economi-
cally consolidate the development of those commons that are produced by the 
subjectivities from which capital extracts value, but the commons is only con-
structed through the forms of resistance and the processes that re-appropriate 
fixed capital. The contradiction becomes increasingly clear. ‘Exploit your self,’ 
says capital to productive subjectivities. And they reply: ‘We wish to valorise 
ourselves, to govern the commons that we produce’. No obstacle in this process, 
not even virtual obstacles, can prevent the arrival of conflict. If capital can only 
expropriate value from the cooperation of subjectivities and these resist exploi-
tation, capital is then forced to increase the level of command and put in place 
ever more arbitrary and violent operations for the extraction of value from the 
commons. And the theme of the re-appropriation of fixed capital will lead us 
to this passage.
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CHAPTER 19
Appropriation of Digital Machines and 
Appropriation of Fixed Capital as the 
Real Appropriation of Social Being: 
Reflections on Toni Negri’s Chapter
Christian Fuchs
1. Marx
In his essay ‘The Appropriation of Fixed Capital’, Toni Negri makes an argu-
ment for thinking about the role of technology in social struggles and in re-
lation to alternatives to capitalism. He rejects technological determinism and 
technological pessimism. He engages with Marx’s concept of technology in the 
Grundrisse and Capital and applies a similar view to digital technologies.
Autonomism has traditionally preferred readings of the Grundrisse over 
Capital because of the heavy focus on the latter in Stalinist readings of Marx. 
In this context, Negri stresses that the ‘objectification of categories in Capital 
blocks action by revolutionary subjectivity’ (Negri 1991, 8). ‘I am not launch-
ing an abstract polemic against Capital – in fact all of us have been formed 
How to cite this book chapter:
Fuchs, C. 2018. Appropriation of Digital Machines and Appropriation of Fixed Capital 
as the Real Appropriation of Social Being: Reflections on Toni Negri’s Chapter. In: 
Chandler, D. and Fuchs, C. (eds.) Digital Objects, Digital Subjects: Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives on Capitalism, Labour and Politics in the Age of Big Data. Pp. 215–221. 
London: University of Westminster Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.16997/book29.s. 
License: CC‐BY‐NC‐ND 4.0
216 Digital Objects, Digital Subjects
intellectually and brought to theoretical understanding by the class hatred that 
reading Capital nourished within us. But Capital is also the text which has been 
used in order to reduce criticism to economic theory, to the elimination of 
subjectivity into objectivity, and to the subjugation of the subversive proletariat 
by the repressive recomposing of knowledge in the form of a science of domi-
nation’ (Negri 1988, 175). Negri argues that the Grundrisse is ‘a political text 
that conjugates an appreciation of the revolutionary possibilities created by 
the “imminent crisis”’ (Negri 1991, 8). Negri has pointed out the importance of 
technology in capitalism and beyond capitalism. He has in this context stressed 
the role of the Grundrisse’s Fragment on Machines (Marx 1857/1858/1973, 
690–714; see Fuchs 2016, 360–375).
In Fragment, Marx anticipates the emergence of an information economy 
due to the development of capitalism’s productive forces. He foresees a stage 
where ‘general social knowledge’, or what he terms the ‘general intellect’, has 
become ‘a direct force of production’ (Marx 1857/1858/1973, 706). Marx stresses 
the importance of knowledge in the development of fixed capital. His notion 
of the general intellect has a huge influence on Negri’s work and is at the heart of 
the latter’s concepts of the social worker, the multitude, immaterial labour, and 
the commons (see Hardt and Negri 1994, 10, 21; Hardt and Negri 2000, 29–30, 
364–369; Negri 1991, 139–150).
The notion of the general intellect can also be found in Capital as the concept 
of general work (Marx 1867/1976, 667; Marx 1894/1981, 199). It is therefore 
certainly feasible to extend the analysis of knowledge in and beyond capitalism 
to a broad range of Marx’s works, including Capital. In more recent works, Toni 
Negri has increasingly embraced Capital. In his latest book Marx and Foucault, 
Negri (2017) stresses for example that the analysis of relative surplus value and 
large-scale industry in Capital Volume I constitutes a ‘political point of view 
in Marx’. Negri (2017, 55) writes that in the Grundrisse, ‘Marx had advanced 
theses that would only achieve their full and material consistency in Book I of 
Capital’. Machines are fixed capital that labour uses as a means for creating sur-
plus value. They are also a means of relative surplus-value production. When 
Negri says that large-scale industry and relative surplus value are political, he 
means that class struggle in capitalism is a struggle over the control of human 
activity and time. Given that technology is a means for organising labour and 
labour-time, it is embedded in social struggles.
With around 150 pages, Chapter 15 (Machinery and Large­Scale Industry) 
of Capital Volume I is the book’s longest chapter. It is also Capital’s  technology 
chapter (see Fuchs 2016, Chapter 15, for a detailed discussion of this  chapter). 
Technology in capitalism is ‘converting the worker into a living appendage of 
the machine’ (Marx 1867/1976, 614), but at the same time it develops  potentials 
for the ‘totally developed individual’ (ibid, 618) and fosters the ‘struggle 
between the capitalist and the wage-labourer’ (ibid, 553) that extends to ‘the 
 instrument of labour itself, capital’s material mode of existence’ (ibid, 554). 
Modern  technology is at the heart of the capitalist contradiction between 
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productive forces and relations of production. This antagonism does not result 
in an automatic collapse of capitalism, as is incorrectly assumed by breakdown 
theories, but simultaneously fosters repeated crises and the emergence of com-
munist potentials. The dialectical transcendence and Aufhebung of capitalism 
is not caused by technology, but is a potential that can only be realised in and 
through social struggle. We can learn from Marx’s Chapter 15 that technology 
in capitalism always has an antagonistic character; it is a means of domination 
just as it is a potential means of liberation, and, in a post-capitalist world, a 
means of commoning and communism.
Also in the essay printed in this book, Negri stresses the continuity of Marx’s 
analysis of technology in the Grundrisse and Capital. Machinery is a tool both 
of domination and potential liberation. It opens up spaces of exploitation and 
potential spaces of autonomy and self-valorisation. Negri says in his chapter 
in this context: ‘On the one hand, past human activity and its intelligence are 
 accumulated, crystallised as fixed capital; on the other, reversing the tide, living 
humans are capable of reabsorbing capital in themselves and their own social 
life’.
2. The Appropriation of Technology
By speaking of the need for the political appropriation of technology, Toni 
Negri rejects both the optimistic and the pessimistic versions of technologi-
cal determinism. Techno-optimism assumes that technology is itself a form 
of human appropriation and automatically has positive effects on society. In 
the realm of the study of communication technologies, we can look to Mar-
shall McLuhan’s example that electronic media create a global village: ‘The new 
electronic interdependence recreates the world in the image of a global village’ 
(McLuhan 1995, 121). ‘The overhauling of our traditional political system is 
only one manifestation of the retribalizing process wrought by the electric me-
dia, which is turning the planet into a global village’ (ibid, 238).
Techno-pessimism assumes that technology as such is an autonomous realm 
that inherently has negative effects on society. An example is Martin Hei-
degger’s analysis of modern technology. In Being and Time, Heidegger (1996, 
119) characterises the newspaper and means of public transport as inauthentic 
and ‘true dictatorship’. For Heidegger, the left-wing blog and the socialist news-
paper are, just like the right-wing extremist tabloid, a form of inauthenticity. 
In The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger (1977) introduces the no-
tion of the Gestell for modern technology that he sees as inherently alienating. 
Heidegger detaches the analysis of technology from the analysis of capitalism 
and therefore leaves a dangerous void in his theory (Fuchs 2015c, 2015d). Negri 
(2017, 7) speaks in this context of ‘Heideggerian fascism’.
In contrast to techno-optimism and techno-pessimism, Negri stresses that 
the appropriation of technology is a political struggle. Technology does not 
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automatically have a liberating or dominative character, but its character is 
shaped by the process and outcomes of social struggles. To appropriate tech-
nology means attempting to turn it from a means of domination and exploita-
tion into a means of struggle and commoning. The appropriation of technology 
is the Aufhebung of technology, that is, neither its elimination nor its new crea-
tion, but a dialectical transformation that preserves the best qualities of ex-
isting technologies, eliminates their destructive, dominative and exploitative 
character, and creates new qualities that support the common development 
of humans, society and nature. Appropriation as political struggle means the 
transformation of society from a class society into a commonist society. The 
transformation of technologies from technologies of capital into technologies 
of commoning is part of this appropriation process.
The commonist expropriation of the expropriators entails the transformation 
of capitalist technologies into common technologies of commoning, commonly 
owned and controlled technologies that foster the common good. Whereas 
 exploitation is the ‘capitalist mode of appropriation’ (Marx 1867/1978, 929), 
commoning is the commonist mode of appropriation. In capitalism, ‘[a]ppro­
priation appears as estrangement, as alienation’ (Marx 1844/2010, 83), whereas 
commonism is the ‘real appropriation’ of the ‘social (i.e., human) being’ (ibid, 
102), and the ‘appropriation of human life’ (ibid, 103). Real  appropriation re-
quires socially developed productive forces as one of its preconditions in order 
to transform surplus labour-time into the realm of freedom. In the age of the 
social worker and the digital machine, the preconditions and germs of real ap-
propriation exist and develop, but are simultaneously constrained by capitalism.
3. The Appropriation of Digital Machines
In the age of algorithms, social media, Big Data and digital machines, the rela-
tionship between fixed constant capital and variable capital has become more 
dynamic. Traditionally, engineers created machines that were used in the pro-
duction process over a longer time period until they became physically or mor-
ally depreciated and had to be replaced. Digital machines operate on binary 
data. Digital capitalism has datafied our lives. Our online activities are to a 
significant degree digital labour that creates data that is both a commodity and 
part of fixed capital (Fuchs 2014; 2015a, Chapter 5). Data storage is an inher-
ent element of the digital machine. Once created, data in digital capitalism be-
comes fixed constant capital (Fuchs 2015a, 183–185). It is stored on servers as 
part of the digital machine that enables digital capital accumulation. But data 
is also the building block, the circulating constant capital, on which basis digi-
tal labour creates new content and data. In the realm of Big Data, ‘circulating 
constant capital and fixed constant capital tend to converge’ (Fuchs 2015a, 184). 
Data is the objectification of digital labour, of human subjectivity that goes 
online. Data as constant capital is therefore an objectification of the general 
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intellect. Datafication generalises human knowledge and fixes it in databases 
stored on servers.
Toni Negri in his chapter says that young people in particular have the po-
tential to answer to digital exploitation and digital capital: ‘We wish to valor-
ise ourselves, to govern the commons that we produce’. When human subjects 
become political subjects, then commonist digital appropriation can become 
a form of resistance to digital capitalism. Negri reminds us in his chapter that 
algorithms and digital machines are not intelligent. Only humans possess in-
telligence. And it is the political intelligence of humans that gives them the 
capacity to turn digital capital into digital commons, and the capitalist digital 
machine into one of commoning and social cooperation.
Is Big Data commonism the alternative to Big Data capitalism? On the one 
hand, amassing, leaking and publishing Big Data about capitalist power and 
state power has become a strategy of resistance. On the other hand, one must 
see that Big Data generation and Big Data storage serves the interests of capital-
ism and the state. Big Data has emerged from capitalist control (Big Data-based 
capital accumulation) and state control (state surveillance of citizens because of 
the false surveillance ideology that not socialism, but surveillance and a police 
state, are the best means against political and social problems). In addition, Big 
Data capitalism requires massive amounts of energy that are predominantly 
based on non-renewable sources, advancing climate change. Big Data com-
monism therefore aims to limit the amount of data stored to the minimum 
necessary, and to get rid of surplus data that today becomes surplus value and 
surplus power. We need small data instead of Big Data.
But how do we appropriate an algorithm? There are two main strategies, the 
first of which is capital taxation. Global Internet giants constantly avoid pay-
ing taxes, an evasion that is enabled by the contradiction between the global 
Internet and regulation at the level of the nation state. Taxing global corpora-
tions and online advertising can create state income that can be distributed 
to citizens via participatory budgeting. The participatory media fee would tax 
global corporations and give everyone a citizens’ communication income that 
could then be donated to non-profit media projects (Fuchs 2015b). Alternative 
media often lack resources. Via participatory budgeting and capital taxation, 
the alternative media sector could be strengthened in order to weaken the cor-
porate character of the Internet and the media in general. Paying a salary for 
using Facebook is in general not a feasible strategy because it does not question 
the dominant character of digital monopoly capital. A universal basic income 
for universal labour, which includes unpaid digital labour and other unpaid 
reproductive labour, would be a better political strategy.
Platform co-ops and peer-to-peer production are a second strategy. These 
are civil society projects that organise online platforms and digital machines as 
user-controlled and digital worker-controlled organisations that do not operate 
for profit and for the interests of the few, but for the benefit of all and the com-
mon good. Resource precarity is one of the main problems alternative economy 
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projects tend to face. Combining both strategies would generate a resource base 
for platform co-ops and peer-to-peer projects. If they can expand, then they 
can create an economic realm that poses an alternative to digital capital and is 
in itself a form of digital class struggle against digital capitalism.
The Left has traditionally been afraid of conquering state power. To a certain 
degree, the Stalinist experience justifies such scepticism. But the anarchist re-
jection of appropriating the state in order to transform and transcend it often 
leaves alternative projects powerless, marginalised and confronted with a po-
litical economy of precarity (of voluntary labour and resources) that fosters 
sectarianism and anarchist versions of Stalinist orthodoxy and hierarchy. In 
the realm of communications, we should not forget that besides citizens’ me-
dia, there is the realm of public service media (PSM). Especially in Europe, 
there is a strong PSM tradition that, to a significant degree, operates outside 
the logic of capital. The problem it often faces is political clientelism. But just 
like there can be struggles for more autonomous realms from capital in the 
economy, so there can be struggles for more autonomous realms from the state 
in the public sphere. Today, legal frameworks keep PSM from becoming pub-
lic digital services and public service Internet platform providers. Monopoly 
media capital sees PSM as competitors and has influenced legislation that 
in the end helps the economic interests of digital monopoly capital (Google, 
Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft, Apple, etc.). I am not arguing in favour of a 
state-controlled Internet, as we already can find it where secret services im-
plement a surveillance-industrial Internet complex (as revealed by Edward 
Snowden), but for independent, critical public service media that offer specific 
online services, such as Club 2.0 (see Fuchs 2017, Section 3.3) or a public ser-
vice YouTube that offers all archived public service television and radio content 
to the public as a common good that can be appropriated and remixed (using 
certain Creative Commons licences).
What does the appropriation of the capitalist digital machine mean? It means 
the struggle for alternatives to digital capitalism, the de-commodification, 
de-capitalisation and de-commercialisation of the digital and the Internet. 
Today, we often find private-public partnerships that foster commodification. 
Digital appropriation promises to be an effective form of digital struggle when 
organised as commons–public partnerships that negate the logic of digital capi-
tal and help the digital commons to transcend and abolish digital capitalism. 
The broader context of such digital struggles is the renewal of the Left as a 
dialectic of movement and party (Dean 2016).
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